



National
Defence

Défense
nationale

UNCLASSIFIED

Government
Publications

CAI
ND 51
-1990
P54



Canada and Latin America: Strategic Issues for the 1990s

by H. P. Klepak



Extra-Mural Paper No. 54

ORAE

OPERATIONAL RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS ESTABLISHMENT

OTTAWA

Canada

UNCLASSIFIED

December 1990



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2023 with funding from
University of Toronto

<https://archive.org/details/31761116370792>

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

CANADA

OPERATIONAL RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS ESTABLISHMENT

ORAE EXTRA-MURAL PAPER NO. 54

CANADA AND LATIN AMERICA: STRATEGIC ISSUES FOR THE 1990s

By

H.P. KLEPAK

An Extra-Mural Paper presents the view of its author on a topic of potential interest to DND. Publication by ORAE confirms the interest but does not necessarily imply endorsement of the paper's content or agreement with its publications. It is issued for information purposes and to stimulate discussion.

OTTAWA, CANADA

DECEMBER 1990

Table of Contents

	<u>page</u>
Abstract	i
Résumé	i
Acknowledgments	ii
Executive Summary	iii
Introduction	1
Chapter I: A Brief Historical Overview	4
Chapter II: Human Rights and Democracy	39
Chapter III: Immigration	52
Chapter IV: The Economy	58
Chapter V: Instability	71
Chapter VI: The International Relations Context	76
Chapter VII: The Military Context - Domestic	99
Chapter VIII: The Military Context - International	114
Chapter IX: The Brazilian-Argentine rapprochement	138
Chapter X: Nuclear Proliferation	149
Chapter XI: The Canal	156
Chapter XII: Arms Industries	163
Chapter XIII: New Regional Security Arrangements	167
Chapter XIV: Trade and Investment	174
Chapter XV: Aid	177
Chapter XVI: Peacekeeping	181
Chapter XVII: Access to Strategic Minerals	189
Chapter XVIII: The Commonwealth and Francophone Connections	194
Chapter XIX: Drugs	203
Conclusion	222
Annex A: Key Defence Expenditure Data	227
Annex B: Major Exports to Latin America	228
Bibliography	231

List of Tables

Table I: Dates of Latest Formal Democratic Regimes	45
Table II: Immigration from the Americas in Recent Years	53
Table III: Immigration - Selected Latin American Countries	57
Table IV: Comparative Armed Forces Strengths (1955-90)	107
Table V: Relative Military Power Figures (1975)	142
Table VI: Relative Military Power Figures (1990)	143
Table VII: Canadian Imports from Latin America	175
Table VIII: Canadian Development Assistance Programmes	179

ABSTRACT

This study aims to give an introduction to the subject of Canadian strategic interests in Latin America in the light of the major events in recent months which have increased this country's connections with Latin America. While the emphasis in the paper is on strategic issues, the nature of Canada's interests in the region make the definition of the term "strategic" a wide one involving stability in the region and other strictly political issues, trade and investment, and immigration as well as the more traditional security concerns such as nuclear proliferation, the Panama Canal, regional security arrangements, peacekeeping, arms industries and resources. Given its increasing importance in security discussions in the recent past, a chapter will also discuss trends related to the drug trade and national security.

RÉSUMÉ

Cette étude a pour objectif l'analyse des intérêts stratégiques canadiens en Amérique latine dans le contexte récent de l'augmentation des liens entre le Canada et cette région. L'emphase étant sur des intérêts stratégiques, cette étude portera également sur les considérations suivantes: la stabilité dans la région ainsi que d'autres éléments politiques, les échanges commerciaux, les investissements, l'immigration, et des sujets plus conventionnels de la sécurité nationale comme la prolifération nucléaire, le canal de Panama, les accords de sécurité régionaux, le maintien de la paix et enfin, les industries d'armements et les ressources stratégiques. Un chapitre abordera également les tendances reliées aux problèmes du trafic de la drogue et l'influence que ce marché peut avoir sur la sécurité nationale.

Acknowledgments

This paper benefitted from the assistance of the staff of a number of Canadian embassies in Latin America and of External Affairs and of Department of National Defence personnel at home. In particular, the author would like to acknowledge the help of madame Chantal Winter de Varennes, of the Canadian embassy in Lima.

Support for the project also came from the Dean of Research of Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean, Dr. André Filion and the Dean of Arts and Humanities, Dr. Marian Olynyk. The assistance of 2/Lt Stéphane Labelle on both the research and writing phases of this report is particularly appreciated. Finally, the author thanks O&dt Stephen Hanson of CMR's Department of Strategic Studies for his help at the final stage of production.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The entry of Canada as a full member of the Organization of American States, its deployment of troops to Central America as a major contributor to the United Nations observer force in that region, our increasingly close ties with the United States through a free trade arrangement, and public statements on many Latin American issues by the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and other key political figures in the country; all signal a level of Canadian interest in Western hemisphere affairs never before known.

With the seeming end of the cold war, German unity, true national independence for Eastern Europe, and other positive trends; attention focuses naturally on other, often newer problems some of which may be seen as threats and others as opportunities, some even as both. Several of these major concerns bring Canada and Latin America closer together than ever before. The main ones revolve around the international debt, immigration, drugs, trading partnership opportunities, and peacekeeping. Related ones involve concerns over issues as diverse as human rights and nuclear proliferation. Finally, instability in general remains a concern for us.

As Canada moves seemingly inexorably to become a more 'American' nation, the Latin American dimension of such a status looms larger than in the past. Nowhere is this clearer than in the abandonment of many decades of distancing oneself from the Pan-American system, and our full integration into that system with the exception of specific security guarantees written into the Charter of the OAS and which have tended not to be applied in recent years in any case.

Where Canadian interests are concerned in this area of the world this study suggests the following:

- a) Latin America is generally speaking a long-suffering part of the world which looks desperately for assistance in many areas. Canada must be careful not to raise hopes as to what this country can do to help in a time of restraint and relatively little public interest in Latin America. While no doubt one should do as much as possible; with aid, defence and External Affairs budgets all severely feeling the pinch, one must be leary of raising unfulfillable expectations on the part of those Latin American states which feel this country can make a real difference in terms of assistance to them now that we are seen as full 'partners'.
- b) That rhetoric aside, there are quite limited links to date between this country and the Latin American region, that our historical experiences are very different, that our view of the world varies widely, and that our connections have not been helped by common language or a perception of sharing much in the way of cultural affinity, despite the Latin links between French and Spanish. Nor do Canadians feel that common geographical connections in the sense of all of us sharing the Americas have been, or are, very significant. This is not to say this situation could not change, just that these changes are not very visible yet.
- c) Human rights have attracted increasing interest on the part of Canadian NGOs and, to some extent, the public. There is a rôle for Canada in OAS and other agencies where human rights are concerned but one should be sanguine about the limitations under which we are placed as a small and relatively unknown country where Latin Americans are concerned. On the other hand, without democratization and human rights performance

improvements, the prospects for peace in the region are highly limited and this factor must continue to influence Canadian choices. Latin American reformists must be able to feel that there is some hope for reform brought about by peaceful, democratic means. Continued frustration of these hopes can only bring about yet another spiral of protest, repression, terrorism, greater repression, and finally insurrection or civil war. While the trend towards the return to democracy is to be applauded, these new regimes must be supported and forces seeking reform in a peaceful fashion backed.

- d) Immigration has brought thousands of Latin Americans to Canada in recent years truly expanding massively our contacts with those countries. Latin Americans watch carefully trends in receiving countries and a realistic policy is needed which, while showing Canadian generosity, ensures that popular backing for relatively open policies continues.
- e) The Latin American economies are, as a rule, in desperate shape. The terms of trade are, with few exceptions, increasingly unfavourable and the region is living a sustained crisis of immense proportions and consequences. Investment is falling from the major countries of the developed North and access to northern markets is more and more difficult. International debt figures are sprinkled through the press of all the developed countries but the figures, astounding as they are, convey little of the misery they represent for the peoples of countries trying to bring this situation under at least some control. Latin Americans look to Ottawa to show traditional comprehension of these problems and to develop its own policies in consequence as well as to use its considerable influence in international lending agencies in order to have them adopt more flexible guidelines as well.
- f) Related to 'd' above, instability will hurt Canadian interests in trade, investment and security terms. Many countries of the region are living close to the edge with still active insurgencies in El Salvador and Guatemala, a major conflict in Peru, Haiti and Nicaragua far from settled, and political developments of great moment in almost all countries. No economic upswing, combined with harsh economic pills related to debt control, may well produce an unmanageable political scene where fragile democracies which have not had the time to effectively establish themselves face impossible challenges from right and left.
- g) Much of the general pattern of Latin American international relations has changed in recent years. While there are still many causes of dispute of the traditional kind, the countries of the region (and their armed forces) are currently reacting favourably to moves toward co-operation rather than confrontation as a rule of behaviour. The key element of this has of course been the truly extraordinary rapprochement between the Argentine and Brazilian states, this after over a century and a half of outward rivalry. The Central American situation, with the disappearance of the Sandinistas as the governing party in Nicaragua, has become less fraught with possibilities for international conflict even though many obstacles remain before one will have the right to be really optimistic about that sub-region's future. Latin American governments have discovered that they have many problems in common and that they must co-operate if they are to have any

chance of overcoming them. A desire to help with the peaceful settlement of disputes, given Canada's reputation and experience, could be well received.

- h) The role of the military in Latin American societies is of course a major one. Democracies come and go but the military's omnipresent status never seems to be changed in its essentials. It remains the arbiter of much of the politics of the region even when it is out of government and the 1990s are unlikely to change that altogether although it is true that some favourable signs in this regard can be seen. Democratic governments will be seeking an international order in which the environment is propitious for economic progress and peace. Only this could, over the long run, reduce effectively the influence of the armed forces in many of the countries of the region. Here again the links between economic objectives requiring assistance from abroad and political progress at home are great. Canada will be expected to understand these linkages and support the process of democratization with concrete help.
- i) The Brazilian-Argentine rapprochement, already mentioned, will allow for a cooling down of the potential drive for nuclear weapons on the part of both those countries. While it is too early to exclude the possibility that other factors may still produce some potential for proliferation it is nonetheless very clear that threat perceptions on the part of the two rivals are infinitely changed and that guarded optimism is not out of place in this regard. The new-found friendship also offers some real potential for economic advance for Argentina and a continuation of some of the more positive sides of the Brazilian success story. This new pole also provides a framework for wider cooperation in South America as a whole.
- j) The Panama Canal is of importance to Canada as well as to the rest of the trading community. However, Canadians do not tend to see it in the same light as Americans, that is as something essential for national security. The Panamanian government installed after the United States intervention of December 1989 is currently still quite popular. However, it is too soon to speculate on long-term stability in that country. The weakening of the Panamanian armed forces may threaten the eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces from the country at the end of the century. This could have severe effects on U.S.-Latin American relations and Canada may be ill-placed to avoid embarrassment on this issue.
- k) New regional security arrangements are increasingly discussed in Latin America as a result of what is seen as the dismal failure of the Organisation of American States to settle disputes, or even function as an alliance, in the difficult years of the 1980s. The place of the United States, if any, in such an arrangement is the subject of hot debate. Canada has so far shown no interest in the security aspects of the OAS but has been forward in suggesting reforms of the mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes. In addition, we have let it be known that our peacekeeping advice and assistance is available if it can be helpful. In general, direct security cooperation between Latin America and Canada still faces the difficulties of distrust and lack of knowledge from which it has always suffered. This may change over time

and certainly the Canadian Forces will want to know their Latin American counterparts better.

- l) While the figures show some importance in relative terms, the fact is that Canadian trade with Latin America is neither particularly great nor expanding at a satisfactory rate. Nor is investment steady or very positive although the whole portfolio situation is quite impressive. Nonetheless, Canadian trading arrangements with the United States involve this country in a direct way in United States attempts to re-arrange trading relations with the Caribbean, Mexico, Central America and even South America. U.S. economic relations with Latin America will in the future have much more impact on Canada than in the past if the current negotiations between Washington and Mexico City are anything to go by. It will be important to be abreast of these events and to work out appropriate national strategies to enable us to profit from changing relationships in this extremely fast-moving environment.
- m) Aid remains a thorny issue. As increases in the amounts of money available became less certain Canada's chances of reaching historically set figures have all but disappeared. The increases in aid to Latin America, and perhaps especially to Central America and Peru, have raised those countries' profiles in our aid context but have lowered others. The problem is a stark one and is important for many areas of interest for Canada in Latin America. Does the increase in Canadian assistance in Latin America have to come at the expense of that for other areas of the world. In an era of diminishing or slowly growing budgets, it is difficult to reach any other conclusion than yes, such increases have to come from somewhere. The question is then, will the costs be borne by the Commonwealth, Francophonie, or whom? And are our relations with Latin America really more important than these others?
- n) Drugs are increasingly on the agenda of the international system and nowhere is this more obvious than in Latin America. Our giant neighbour considers this problem its most important security issue and this alone makes it of significance for us. While our profile on these matters has been a low one, both in Latin America and elsewhere, this may not always be possible to maintain in the future. The militarization of the 'drug war' is not the answer to this highly difficult problem which is a growing one. Joint strategies may do something to slow or even counter some difficulties but the reality is that the demand-push for these products is such that there is enormous interest, particularly in impoverished countries such as the Andean states, in providing them. There is already a military dimension to the Canadian effort against drugs but this may increase. It is essential that this problem be thought out so that Canada can avoid difficulties if cool heads do not prevail on issues such as military interventions, massive military aid, border controls, stationing of troops, aircraft and ships, and the like.

More generally then, Canada is now infinitely more involved in Latin America than ever before. With our tradition of multilateralism, our interest in stability but not at any price, our keenness on democracy and human rights, and our wish that United States-Canadian relations remain on an even keel; it is not surprising that many questions are raised as to how

we can best achieve all these objectives where Latin America is concerned. It is the view of this author that we can no longer afford to wait and see or even muddle through, fundamental as that tradition is to our foreign and defence policy. The questions that arise in Latin America are pressing and may often pit us against the United States, a traditional and powerful partner, on issues which that country considers vital and we consider somewhat peripheral. These issues must be thought out if Panama-style situations are to be avoided in the future without either a loss in our favoured position with Washington or a constant disappointing of our new Latin American collaborators.

Lastly, major realignments are occurring in Latin America beyond those which may happen as a result of economic changes and the Brazilian-Argentine rapprochement. The Group of Eight, which surfaced as a result of the Contadora initiatives of the early and mid-1980s, has become increasingly institutionalised and shows signs of becoming a real hub around which concrete Latin American joint initiatives are taken on many issues- debt, trade, defence and security, specific North-South issues between Latin America and the United States, democratization, and many others. Canada should not ignore these changes in the general structure of Latin America's intra-regional relations nor their impact on the area's international affairs. If Canada is to play a significant role in the Americas, and if it is to protect its interests more widely, this period of great change and challenge must be seized upon with imagination but with our eyes wide open to our limitations.

INTRODUCTION

The problems of Latin America can seem to the observer to defy description. All the difficulties of the modern Third World seem to be there in stark terms with the added depressant that after almost two centuries of independent political existence many of these problems are actually worse than they were under Spanish colonial rule. Political instability, at the national, regime, leadership, and other levels, is endemic to the area. Democracy, despite impressive recent gains, is far from secure in most countries. The huge international debt threatens economic, social and even political progress. War at national and international levels has left huge scars and hundreds of thousands of dead in the last decade, and still continues in several parts of the region. Human rights are frequently abused or simply unknown. The military's role in much of the area is excessive. Bilateral relations are frequently fraught with mistrust and expenditures on armaments have grown considerably over the last two decades. Emigration increases at an alarming rate for receiving countries and as a reaction to instability, war, repression and poverty. Territorial boundaries between states often remain as prospective causes of conflict and current reasons for discord. The threat of popular revolution keeps the right off-balance while the unwillingness of the well-off to compromise with the poor keeps the latter in poverty and dissatisfied. The United States plays a great role in the area and, despite recent trends in some countries, is still far from losing its hegemonic position.

Thus Latin America offers a picture of less than promising attraction even though it must be said that there are favourable signs as well, particularly in the democratic

experiments recently abroad in the continent. Enter Canada. What is the impact of this situation on Canada? Does it really matter to this country if Latin America continues to live with these problems or even if they are exacerbated? To what extent are we more tied into the region's problems now that we are members of the Organization of American States?

The purpose of this paper will be to address these problems within the context of specific Canadian concerns, and particularly from the standpoint of Canadian security interests and the implications for them of recent tendencies in the Latin American region. The world is changing at bewildering speed and Latin America is not escaping this trend. What are the Latin American aspects of this revolution in international affairs and what is the impact of them on Canada and Canadian security? It is to this question that this paper will address itself while recognising that the issues discussed are in rapid evolution and are frequently complicated and difficult to grasp.

The approach used will be to first give a historical background of the most cursory type for the region as a whole, following this with a recapitulation of the major trends historically in Canada's links with Latin America. The emphasis in both these sections will be on security and international relations aspects of the area's past. Subsequent chapters will discuss the general context of Latin America in the early 1990s under the headings of Democracy and Human Rights, Immigration, the Economy, and General Instability. With these over-all discussions completed, one will be able to move on to those issues most directly of interest to Canada and to this country's security concerns. Here the analysis will be divided into chapters dealing with the international context, the military

situation, nuclear proliferation and the arms industries, drugs, the Panama Canal, Brazilian-Argentine relations, Central America and the Organization of American States. A final chapter will attempt to conclude on these very varied situations and their current and potential impact on Canada.

CHAPTER I: A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Latin America is a term used to describe a region of great size and enormous diversity and like most such expressions suffers from inexactness. It is normally taken to include all those countries of the Americas which speak a Latin language although French Canada is excluded on the basis of its distance from the rest and the inapplicability of most Latin American issues to that part of North America which is French speaking. Thus Latin America includes Mexico, Central America except Belize, South America except the Guianas, and the island states of Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic.

Geographically and even linguistically, this makes little sense. Puerto Rico's dependent relationship with the United States excludes it for some but not for all from being a Latin American country. Others suggest that the French West Indies should be included but they rarely are. For the purposes of this paper then, the traditional use of the term as the independent states of Latin speech south of the United States in the Americas will be that employed here. Thus one is discussing the French-speaking republic of Haiti, the Portuguese-speaking regional giant Brazil, and the 18 Spanish-speaking republics stretching from Cuba and Mexico in the north to Chile and Argentina in the south.

The size and diversity of the region was evident to Spanish and Portuguese explorers early in the 16th century even though its identity was unclear until somewhat later. Terrain features ranged from grasslands to dense jungles and from low swamps to massive mountain ranges. Indigenous populations

encountered varied from primitive Amazon tribes living in Stone Age conditions to the great and sophisticated empires of the Aztecs in Mexico, the Mayas in Central America and the Incas in the Central Andes. Some regions were over-populated while others were nearly deserted.

The conquest of the major empires was astonishingly rapid despite the tiny size of the Spanish forces deployed. The subject peoples were ill-disposed to fight for their overlords and confusion, discord, local ambitions and rivalries made for ease of victory for a Spanish army better equipped and armed than its local enemies.¹ Despite these promising events, the colonial powers still had to effectively pacify the hinterland and this took many campaigns and decades, even centuries, in places. Indeed, it is not too much to say that in some parts of the Spanish and Portuguese empires in the Americas, such pacification had not really been completed when the wars for independence broke out three centuries after the initial conquests.

The region, and indeed the non-European world as a whole, was nonetheless officially divided up in 1495 between Portugal and Spain through the Papal intervention ending with the Treaty of Tordesillas. Disregarding English, French and later Dutch protests the two Iberian powers concentrated on the south of the Americas where mineral wealth was rumoured to be greatest. The northern powers were later to capitalize on this concentration

1. Ross Hassig, in his Aztec Warfare, discusses the Mexican context of this process, especially pp. 236-250, while Edmundo Guillen Guillen does the same for Peru, if not in such a scholarly fashion, in his visión peruana de la conquista, p. 56 and pp. 89-91.

and move into the northern parts of the Western Hemisphere from whence the Spanish were eventually to be pushed and where the Portuguese were never to find a place. Roughly speaking, and in theory, Tordesillas gave Lisbon eastern Brazil while the Spanish got the rest of the Americas. In fact, Portuguese and later Brazilian initiatives led to a state of affairs where nearly half of the South American continent became part of the Brazilian colony and then state.

Iberian settlement and the organization of the colonial possessions reflected the great distances, harsh terrain conditions and varied conditions of this vast region. Emphasis was at first placed on the search for gold and silver but as time went on the land-grab, or rather 'riches grab', became a more organized establishment of imperial authority and a setting up of a social, economic and political structure meeting the demands of the metropolitan powers.

Vast tracts of land were given to the first generations of conquerors and a system of peonage was instituted in one form or another in most of the continent. Native populations were in general badly treated, their treatment ranging from extermination in Cuba to marginalization and exploitation in much of the Andes.² Vast latifundio holdings of land were given out by the Crown in inhospitable regions where there was little population. Black slaves were imported into many areas, especially in support of the sugar industry. Spanish and Portuguese settlement was inconsistent and often reflected the

2. See Jacques Chonchol, "Land Tenure and Development in Latin America," in Claudio Veliz, Obstacles to Change in Latin America, pp. 75-90.

desire for a get rich quick lifestyle. Inter-marriage among the white settlers, Indian populations, and black slaves was common producing the extraordinary variety of racial types seen today in so much of Latin America.

These early stages of the conquest were to mark the region to this day. Elites of extraordinary power, landholdings and wealth were spawned in most of the colonies set up, and they became the oligarchies so influential in Latin American history right into the late 20th century. The vast bulk of the population almost everywhere lived in poverty and through subsistence farming, usually without their own land and often, where such land was held in common by the community, in situations where its defence against the greedy and powerful was a constant problem.³ The distance from Madrid and Lisbon made local elites remarkably independent of outside control and attempts from the metropolis to improve the lot of the masses were more often than not watered down or stopped altogether by on-the-spot obstructionism, dalliance or both.

The imperial possessions of the Iberian powers in the Americas were not for long dynamic. Despite attempts at reform, the area stagnated in comparison to the progress made in the northern colonies of Great Britain and France. Metropolitan dominance of the empire and mercantilist ideas of imperial trading arrangements made for highly restrictive exchange regulations with the result that trade languished but contraband

3. Ibid, pp. 81-83.

flourished.⁴ Spanish and Portuguese relative decline at home furthered the process of degeneration of the region.

Things came to a head with the French Revolution and the rise of Napoleon. Portuguese assistance to the British, and the Spanish refusal to allow French troops to cross the country on their way to chastise Lisbon, led to the abduction of Spain's king Ferdinand VII in 1808 and his enforced captivity. Eventually he was deposed by Napoleon who set his own brother Joseph on the throne, as one of the many members of the extended Bonaparte family ruling as satraps in so much of Europe.

The repercussions of these extraordinary events on the Spanish and Portuguese empires were not long in coming. In the wake of the French invasion the Portuguese royal family fled Lisbon and actually travelled to Brazil to set up the court there thus effectively transferring the metropolis of the empire to the New World. In the Spanish colonies, risings initially in support of Spain and protesting against the French usurpation, spread from Buenos Aires to most of the other capitals. Local elites seized power in the name of King Ferdinand and prepared to resist any attempt to transfer effective French power to the Spanish possessions of Latin America. In the chaos of the next dozen years, with Spain occupied by the French, then liberated by the British (with Portuguese and Spanish assistance), then falling into the throes of a complicated series of civil wars and political manoeuvrings, Spanish America's elites were given a golden opportunity to become the undisputed power in their

4. R.A Humphreys and John Lynch, The Origins of the Latin American Revolutions 1808-1826, pp. 15-21.

nascent countries.⁵ The succession of reactionary and liberal governments in and out of power in Madrid, especially the arrival of the much-feared liberal constitution which threatened the colonial elite with real reform, made for strong pressures to declare independence. One by one the colonies opted for this course although many did so with extreme reluctance and the loyalist cause remained very strong throughout the struggles to come.

The wars for independence were long, bloody, brutal, chaotic, and divisive in the extreme. Simón Bolívar in northern South America and José de San Martín in the southern cone fought long campaigns against armies sent from Spain and their loyalist counterparts. Mexico moved hesitatingly towards independence and Central America did the same. Only in Cuba and Puerto Rico did revolution not catch hold, a result no doubt of the availability of Spanish naval power and the fear on the part of the local elites of slave risings.⁶

Before the revolutions the colonial system had sat upon the pillars of crown, church and army. The legitimacy of the new states emerging from the wars was to say the least questioned by many. The disappearance of the crown and the diminution in many places of the role of the church made for a heightened position for the victorious leaders of the revolutionary armies who became the real arbiters of affairs in the former Spanish dominions. Dreams of a powerful, united

5. See, for example, Jorge Alvarez, Las Guerras civiles argentinas, or Walter Lafeber, Inevitable Revolutions.

6. Hugh Thomas, Cuba, or the Pursuit of Freedom, pp. 93-105.

Spanish America, able to stand on its own and capable of resisting the European powers as well as the United States, a wish generally associated with the name of Bolivar; collapsed in the face of secessionist and independence movements reflecting power groups unwilling to yield to new central governments.⁷ One by one unions and confederations fell victim to these forces: in Central America, in the Andes, in the northern tier of the South American continent. Instead of a great union, the Spanish continental possessions ended up as a patchwork of some 17 states born with territorial divisions and a wide range of serious differences.

In many ways, the social consequences were even worse. Despite rhetoric to the contrary the old colonial elites under the somewhat watchful eye of Madrid, were now become the new independent elites literally running the emergent states of Spanish America. They had little interest in real reform of the colonial social system from which they benefitted enormously. Hence systems of land tenure and labour use changed little or not at all. Indeed at times the elites, now liberated from Spain's meddling, were able more than ever to regulate economy and society to their own liking and with little regard for the interests of the majority.

The removal of the Portuguese court to Brazil changed radically the situation in that colony. The Emperor got to know much better the local situation and the exposure of the local population to a more sophisticated political and social

7. Pierre Queuille, L'Amérique latine, la Doctrine Monroe et le panaméricanisme, pp. 101-103.

structure made for a more mature political elite.⁸ When the monarch returned to Lisbon his son was left in the colony and this move led to eventual independence for a new Empire of Brazil linked to Portugal merely by the dynastic connections of the Braganza family. Separation, although not without fighting and casualties, was much less violent than was the case in most of the Spanish colonies. Nonetheless, the role of the local elite in the process of independence meant that there was relatively little improvement here also in the lot of the majority.

In the years of the post-Independence period, the politics of most of the region was dominated by the supposedly ideological struggles between Liberal and Conservative parties and by the international wars between neighbours attempting to settle discord over the national boundaries and jurisdictions to apply with the end of the colonial regimes. In fact, almost all countries of Latin America suffered from these internal and external wars. Brazil fought Argentina; and Chile, Peru and Bolivia waged war on the Pacific coast. Central American confederation attempts failed in a series of wars among the members. Mexico fought both its northern and southern neighbours with disastrous results in both. The attempt to maintain a Gran Colombia failed in the face of Venezuelan and Ecuadorean separatism.

Within these new countries, the Liberal-Conservative split, while far less ideological than it was declared, caused frequent wars. In general, Liberal parties were in favour of

8. Maria Candida Proenca, A Independência do Brasil, pp. 19-22 and 35-41.

federal states, wished for an opening to European trade, investment and immigration, and were anti-clerical. On the other hand, and again speaking generally, Conservatives were for stronger central government, restricted European connections, and a major role for the Church in society. In reality these wars were largely intra-elite struggles reflecting "caudillo" style competition among local strongmen who mobilized their own peons and client groups in support of armed candidacies for control of their countries.⁹ In so doing they were anxious to get command of the greater resources of the central government where they could then dispense patronage to those in a client-patron relationship with them. This scourge of Latin American political life disappeared slowly and in many areas only well into the twentieth century.

The main force in bringing it to an end and in bringing the modern era to Latin America was to begin to make itself felt in the last three decades of the 19th century. This was the incorporation of Latin America into the international division of labour. Europe, and later the United States, were anxious to have access to Latin American (and other world) primary resources in order to have the raw materials for the production of their increasingly industrialized economies. In addition, they were anxious to have access to markets for that very production of finished products. Latin America was increasingly anxious for foreign technical assistance, investment, immigration and trade. It could provide many minerals for Europe and agricultural opportunities abounded particularly as

9. n J. Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America, pp. 38-48.

modern transport and refrigeration methods made the provision of Europe possible and interesting commercially.

In the decades preceding the First World War there was an explosion in European trade with emigration to, investment in, and concern around, Latin America.¹⁰ As the largest group of independent states outside Europe, Latin America offered not just economic but political interest and a real competition for influence began despite the dominant position of the United Kingdom in the region well before 1870. The general Franco-German antagonism saw itself reflected in investment and arms sales policies, not to mention trade and technical assistance efforts, in the area.¹¹ Germany made what was often a concerted attempt to displace the United Kingdom in parts of Latin America where this difficult task offered some possibility of achievement. Indeed, by 1914 Berlin could boast truly exceptional penetration of this British "colonia sin bandera". United States progress at largely British expense had also occurred by this date especially in the West Indies, Mexico and Central America.

This incorporation of Latin America into the international division of labour had of course many aspects, some negative and some positive. The Latin American societies became more dynamic, or most of them did, and immigration and economic prosperity in many places did filter down.

10. Victor-L. Tapié, Histoire de l'Amérique latine au XIXe siècle, pp. 137-139.

11. Jurgen Schaefer, Deutsche Militärhilfe an Südamerika: Militär- und Rüstungsinteressen in Argentinien, Bolivien, Chile vor 1914, p. 15.

Particularly in the southern cone a large middle class developed, but even elsewhere there was at least some improvement for part of the community. Government coffers were everywhere fuller, and major infrastructural works were undertaken, however unevenly, throughout the region. Nonetheless, the increasing dependence on an export economy frequently based on one or only few crops, minerals or other products could lead to damage done to the ability of countries to provide for their own needs in terms of food and made them highly vulnerable to price fluctuations in their one or few major sources of income.

Whatever its advantages and disadvantages, the international division of labour was not to last very long in its traditional form. The triple shocks of the First World War, the Great Depression and the Second World War, were to transform the system completely and not necessarily to the benefit of the Latin Americans. In the first of the century's great wars Latin America saw the European economies gear up for war to the virtual exclusion of normal civilian trade considerations. The U-boat campaign struck hard at allied shipping and the Royal Navy's blockade effectively cut off the Central powers from Latin America and indeed the rest of the outside world. Latin America, faced with this situation, had little option but to turn to its own resources or to the United States in order to replace the greatly reduced European economic connection. Import substitution began during the four years of the war reinforcing the size and importance of local bourgeoisies and creating new interest groups. The United States, particularly during the first three years of the conflict in which it was neutral, happily stepped into the gap left by the Europeans.

The difficulty with this latter relationship was that while the United States was anxious to sell finished products to Latin American markets, its economy in no way required the same, or the same quantity, of goods produced by the Latin Americans. While this was to some extent hidden during the boom years of the war, it became increasingly evident as a key element in the trading position of Latin America in the immediate post-war period.

After 1918, the European powers did their best to reassert and reconquer their position in the trade and investment posture of the region. The disruptions of the war, and the disastrous weakening of European financial power, made for great difficulties in re-establishing what had been a pre-eminent place. As if this were not enough, the Great Depression occurred only a decade later bringing with it high tariffs, trade wars, and generalized further dislocation of the already enfeebled international division of labour. The rising middle classes, linked increasingly to inefficient national industries, cried out for protection against more efficient European producers. The latter continent's economic misery, however, led to a dramatic fall in trade and to a virtual end to investment from the European bond markets and investors.

In the late 1930s, this situation began to improve but the Second World War arrived to endanger and weaken the international division of labour even further. This time, Nazi conquest involved virtually the whole of Europe, leading to a naval blockade which cut off trade not merely to some continental countries but to nearly all of them. The reply of the Germans, in the form of a spectacular U-boat campaign, was

such that British merchant marine losses were very great indeed and at more than one stage came close to threatening the United Kingdom's survival and continued participation in the war. In addition, as the only major trading country in Europe not conquered by the Nazis, Great Britain was forced to gear its industry to the war effort in a way far surpassing the already extraordinary experience of the First World War.

The result of all of this was, needless to say, that Latin Americans were forced into infinitely greater import substitution arrangements and also were obliged to look to Washington more and more as a source for trade and investment. The shattered European powers which came out of the Second World War, even the victorious ones, were in no position after 1945 to stake a claim in any meaningful way to their role in the Latin American region as it had existed in the pre-war period. Even the United Kingdom was virtually bankrupt after its enormous exertions during the war, Germany was of course flattened as an economic power as was Italy, and France was to take decades to recover a significant export and investment capability. Now major interest groups in many countries throughout the region were tied to protected domestic industries. And with the United States the unquestioned greatest economic, and indeed military and political power in the world, Latin America not surprisingly drifted into a relationship of dependence vis-a-vis its great northern neighbour and into economic relationships far from those felt ideal for an effectively running international division of labour.

While the war spawned, through its propaganda and economic transformations, political movements clamouring for greater democracy and social welfare, it is surprising to what

extent traditional elites were still able to preserve power either directly, or in cooperation with the armed forces, in many countries of the region. Neither the bourgeoisie nor the trade union movement was able in a general way to supplant traditional power structures although successes were registered in some of the more developed parts of the area. The United States' economic role was followed rapidly by a vastly increased political and military one in the region, a trend which had already begun in the late 1930s, but which was to come fully into fruition with the beginning of the cold war, the establishment of the Organisation of American States and the signing of the Rio Pact.¹² Anxious about assumed "Communist" subversion or other illicit activities in the hemisphere, and keen as well to make more concrete its dominant position in the Americas, United States initiatives in the late 1940s called for a defence organisation which could coordinate the security effort of all the republics in the Americas and which could provide a structure for American leadership. This was to be found in the Rio Pact of 1947. Following close on its heels came the foundation of the Organisation of American States, which while having major political, economic and social elements, also declared in its Chapter V that an attack on one American State would be considered by the others as an attack on all.

Flesh was added to the bones of this arrangement when in 1950 the Korean War broke out and the United States moved to sign a series of bilateral mutual assistance pacts with a number of Latin American countries. These accords typically included provision for guaranteed United States access to key minerals

12. Jan Knippers Black, Sentinels of Empire, pp. 27-37.

and agricultural products coming from the region and for certain cooperation and basing rights for American armed forces in some of the countries involved. In return the United States increased, in some cases dramatically, its military, technical, and economic assistance to the republics in question and undertook to train local officers and in some cases senior NCOs in United States military, air force and naval training establishments. In this way most Latin American armed forces were much more greatly brought under the influence of the United States military and in a number of cases, this went for their governments as well.¹³

Latin America had hoped that these accords and this more systematic arrangement of the Inter-American system would be underscored by large-scale American economic assistance. These hopes, however, were to be dashed, as both the post-war situation in Europe, and the United States' obsession with the Communist threat, made Washington give overwhelming priority to Western Europe, secondary importance to East Asia and only at best a third, poorer place to its southern neighbours.

Latin America remained relatively calm and, from the United States' point of view a backwater of interest until 1959. Occasional "scares" had occurred, such as the Guatemalan leftist regime of Jacobo Arbenz, which the United States viewed with ill-disguised hostility, but these were all easily arranged to Washington's benefit, in the case of Guatemala by an engineered coup d'état against the offending president.¹⁴ The year 1959,

13. For a full discussion of this long process see Jan Knippers Black, Sentinels of Empire or Horacio Veneroni, Estados Unidos y las fuerzas armadas de América latina.

14. Lafeber, op. cit., pp. 117-124.

however, was a clear watershed in Latin American development. The arrival in power in Havana on New Year's Day of that year of Dr. Fidel Castro Ruiz was soon to change the whole nature of inter-American relations and indeed much more. Castro moved quickly to establish a revolutionary regime which, whether as a result of internal considerations, heavy-handed United States intervention, or more likely a combination of both; opened itself up increasingly to Soviet and other Communist influences, nationalised large land holdings, expropriated United States and other Western private enterprises and called for the establishment of similar regimes throughout Latin America. Washington's reaction to these trends was at first disbelief, then hard opposition and finally attempts to overthrow the regime and re-establish a rightist government.

Giving proof of the remarkable resilience of his regime, Castro survived nonetheless but became over the years (1961-1967) almost totally isolated in the Americas. Only Mexico in the OAS, and only it and Canada in the Americas as a whole, were able to resist the United States' pressure to break relations with Havana and to join in the restrictive policies aimed at bringing Castro down. In the face of such isolation, and in moods reminiscent of the first years of the French and Russian revolutionary regimes, Castro attempted to foment rebellion throughout Latin America but particularly among the Caribbean Spanish-speaking countries, with a view to replacing inveterately hostile regimes with ones more likely to favour, or at least not oppose, Cuba.¹⁵

15. Wayne S. Smith, The Closest of Enemies, pp. 90-92.

In the famed Guevara phase of the revolution's history, rebellions were inspired, insurgencies planned, combatants trained, propaganda provided, and a safe haven created for revolutionary movements of a similar colour in much of Latin America. Nonetheless, the results were meagre to say the least. The United States, overwhelmingly influential and powerful, had now decided to take Cuba, and indeed Latin America, seriously. The Kennedy administration pushed forward programmes of increased military assistance for threatened Latin American regimes and, in the context of the "hearts and minds" thinking behind counter-insurgency warfare in vogue after the British Malayan experience, instituted the dramatic Alliance for Progress aid programme. This involved the despatch of thousands of young Americans to Latin America in the Peace Corps and the provision of greatly increased economic assistance, all with the aim of cutting off the guerrillas from their hoped-for popular base. Whatever the success of the civilian elements of these initiatives, the military by 1968 had eradicated all major insurgencies in the Americas, had killed Guevara in Bolivia, and had insured thereby the continued isolation of the Castro regime. This in its turn reinforced the tendency for Cuba to become ever more dependent on the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact States, a situation only changing as this is written.

The 1970s, however, were to bring increasingly bad times to Latin America and to threaten domestic peace even further in many countries of the region. Military regimes had been set up in a number of countries in the 1960s and early 1970s and they tended to retain power until the very end of the latter decade or even well into the next. Economic shocks of a variety of types dislocated the Latin American economies which had not been particularly strong earlier in the 1970s. The prices of key

commodities fell in many cases and this left a number of countries, particularly those with a one crop or one mineral economy, in a very grave situation indeed. The oil crisis of 1973 dealt a shattering blow to all the non-petroleum-producing countries, that is to the whole of Latin America save Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador and Mexico. Rampant inflation, rapid urbanization, disjointed development and militarization were all woes afflicting the majority of the region. In trying to deal with them, and in the presence of easily accessible petrodollars, most countries were tempted into high levels of debt to banks and governments in the developed world, a situation which would prove dangerous indeed a decade later. Not surprisingly social disorder grew from this painful list of problems.¹⁶

In answer to these disorders, military governments tightened the reins or took over in countries which had retained civilian power structures, and tensions were bottled up insofar as this was possible. Nonetheless, the simmering Guatemalan insurgency began to be serious again, terrorism passed to the stage of civil war in Nicaragua and El Salvador, a budding insurgency began in Peru and while crushed, urban guerilla movements were for years active in Argentina and Uruguay.

The 1980s were thus dominated by the problems of civil war, ending military regimes, controlling inflation, reducing the worst aspects of overcrowding in the cities, human rights, and debt. Despite great international declaratory posturing, the reality has been that the developed world has not shown a great interest in helping to root out the bases for these

16. Edgar J. Dosman, Latin America and the Caribbean: The Strategic Framework - A Canadian Perspective, Ottawa, ORAE Extra-Mural Paper No. 31, 1984.

problems. In addition, the complicated and ugly problem of drugs, and the international narcotics trade, has been added to this sombre list and has further exacerbated inter-Latin American relations and disturbed the region's links with Washington. As the last decade of the century begins, Latin America offers a series of contrasts between pessimistic and optimistic signs for the future. Mexico's prospects for a more positive role and connection with both the United States and Canada seem brighter than for many decades but the country is reeling from almost all the litany of difficulties listed above. Central America sees hope for peace in all three of its civil insurgencies although democratisation, social stability, recovery from war, and regional integration are still years off.

In Colombia, described by its most famous author as a political "labyrinth", democracy has proven remarkably capable of survival and the economy is frequently held up as an example for the rest of the continent. The reality of multi-faceted insurgencies, terrorism on an unheard of scale and a drug war which threatens the whole fabric of Colombian society, however, can hardly fail to give the lie to some of this optimism. In Venezuela, democracy appears well anchored but social unrest has found on more than one occasion a violent outlet in the last two years. Peru, like Colombia, seems often on the verge of total collapse. Facing the most serious and brutal insurgency in the Americas in the form of the Sendero Luminoso movement which controls a vast percentage of the national territory, and unable to address effectively its debt, social, and political crisis, this country raises question marks at every turn.¹⁷ Ecuador and

17. This issue is discussed in many of its aspects in the excellent work by Alain Hertoghe and Alain Labrousse, Le Sentier lumineux du Pérou.

Bolivia, while more stable, do not escape these problems for which up to the present no solution has been found. In both Peru and Bolivia the drug situation shows no easy means of solution. Chile on the other hand is relatively prosperous and has recently come out from under the military dictatorship headed by General Augusto Pinochet whose regime had lasted nearly two decades. Even there, the survival of democracy is far from certain and the role of the armed forces in the process of re-establishing it is uncertain.

Argentina, while perhaps not presenting the most violent context in South America, may be said to offer the most dismal. Here inflation, international debt, slow but inexorable economic decline, military discontentedness, defeat in war, and the depressing aftermath of the "dirty war", make for a people and government which appear rudderless in the face of the storm which engulfs them.¹⁸ Brazil, the regional superpower as it is termed, has a good record economically although in many ways this is flagging, but its debt situation, its social problems and its potential government paralysis provide far from a clean bill of health.

The small buffer states of Uruguay and Paraguay show dramatically differing evolutions. The coup by General Andrés Rodriguez in 1989 which toppled the decades old regime of General Stroessner has produced a government which seems truly interested in establishing democracy, a state of affairs expected by few analysts when it first occurred. It is hard to imagine this country going anywhere but up from its backward, depressed and isolated position virtually since independence.

18. Jimmy Burns, The Land that Lost its Heroes, p. 226.

Uruguay, on the other hand, seems to share the Argentine malaise despite the return of democracy and no doubt because of the seeming intractability of the problems of debt, inflation, social discontent, and a reduced economy generally. Turning to the West Indies, the situation in Haiti, while improved in some ways since the fall of the Duvalier dictatorship, appears to offer as many negative signs as positive. The obvious desire of the majority for stable democracy and economic progress remains frustrated to date and it is anyone's guest where events will move from here. Sharing the island of Hispaniola with Haiti, the Dominican Republic is in a period of relative boom in industry, agriculture and perhaps especially tourism. Grave doubts however are raised about the extent to which these positive trends are in a real sense shared by the bulk of the population.

Then there is Cuba. Here one of the very last hard-line Marxist regimes, while somewhat less isolated from Latin America at the present, is even more isolated from its traditional sources of aid in Eastern Europe with the perhaps temporary exception of the Soviet Union. The Castro regime, facing abandonment by all its East European friends over the last few months, has needed to look more and more to the Soviet Union to take up the slack in the various aid arrangements which prop up the inefficient Cuban economy. Far from being anxious to do so, however, Moscow is under extremely heavy pressure, and pressure which threatens to grow over the next while rather than decline, not only not to increase assistance to Cuba but in fact to cut it dramatically if not, as some suggest, to abolish it altogether. Castro has been obliged in the recent months to ration bread and to take other highly unpopular measures. If the Soviet Union joins the rest of the Warsaw Pact in cutting

off its aid, or even simply reduces it in large measure, the regime will face extremely serious problems indeed.

As a highly pragmatic and flexible leader, with an admirable record of survivability in the face of grave odds, Castro is nonetheless reacting. He is searching out new economic and diplomatic friends abroad and is doing so with considerable energy. On the home front, his emphasis on Marxism-Leninism and on the defence of socialism, is taking a second place to one stridently declaring nationalism and the need to defend Cuba as a nation, and not just as a socialist state, from what is termed "triumphalism" in Washington.

Thus Latin America, after nearly two centuries of independent existence, offers an overall picture which one author has described as not so much underdeveloped as misdeveloped. As Alain Rouquié, the excellent French analyst and sometime diplomat, has stated clearly through the title of his recent book "L'Amérique latine: introduction à l'extrême occident", the region seems to have all the evils known in the West but to a degree rarely seen elsewhere.¹⁹ Latin America is, and very definitely sees itself as, part and parcel of the Western world and it wishes to take what it views as a proper place among the Western nations. The deep desire for democracy, economic progress, and other Western ideals continues to face the heritage of autocracy, personalism, corruption and dissipated energies which have been endemic in the history of this great land.

19. Mr. Rouquié also wrote L'état militaire en Amérique latine, a classic work on the subject.

ENTER CANADA

It is a commonplace with persons anxious for close relations between Canada and Latin America to insist on what they consider the many ties which bind our country to the republics south of the United States. They emphasize our common colonial heritage, our sharing a Latin language and a West European cultural heritage, and of course our physical presence in the Americas. In fact, however, it is and has been easy to exaggerate the degree of connection and shared experience between Canada and the region.²⁰

It is true, of course, that Canada and Latin America belong to the Americas, that hemisphere "discovered" by Christopher Columbus in 1492. It is equally true that Canada was conquered and settled by powers coming from the West European geographical and cultural milieu and that Canada has as one of its official languages a tongue based on Latin. Finally, it is true as well that Canada looks back to a colonial heritage from which it has largely separated itself.

Behind these seeming similarities, however, there lie many factors which would suggest the difference rather than similarity that characterizes the two sections of this hemisphere. Firstly, with the exception of Haiti, all of Latin America was conquered and overwhelmingly settled by the Spanish and the Portuguese. Canada was, needless to say, settled first by the French and then by the British. The colonial experiences

20. Both of these views are seen expressed in German Arciniegas (Ed), OEA: La Suerte de una organización regional, where that author takes the positive view (pp. 67-77) while another contributor, Donat Pharand, outlines the other (p. 141-142).

of the two regions were dramatically different with Spain and Portugal suffering from a "Leyenda Negra" which whether true or not, has gained great credence. This "black legend" argues strongly that the weight of Iberian colonialism has been heavy and overwhelmingly negative for the countries unfortunate enough to have experienced it. French colonialism, on the other hand, while clearly not as enlightened as some would have preferred, was nonetheless relatively positive as an experience and the loyalty of French Canadians to the *mère patrie* in the Seven Years War stands as a clear reminder of the general contentedness of the Canadian population with French rule right up to the British conquest.

British imperial rule in Canada, while far from perfect, was not only generally accepted but overwhelmingly welcome to Canadians and this again right up to Confederation in 1867. Indeed, many of the initiatives to loosen imperial links came not from Ottawa but from London as the metropolis attempted in the mid-19th century to reduce its commitments abroad and thereby the expenses of maintaining a far-flung maritime empire. Canadian loyalty to the British Empire was such that nearly a century after Confederation, Canadians still readily and massively volunteered to fight in wars where Great Britain's existence was at stake.

The end of colonial regimes in Latin America occurred with discord, brutality, and widespread and savage war, even though Brazil can be said to have escaped most of these horrors. Canada knew no such experience. French Canada did not rebel against France, but rather was yielded by Versailles to London when the impossibility for French naval power to ensure sovereignty in North America became evident. British rule in

Canada did not come to an end through revolution but through an evolutionary process marked by agreements between Ottawa and London, which, while never resolved without differences, were always achieved without great rancour and, it goes without saying, without armed conflict or even the hint of such.

French and British imperial structures left Canada a large middle class, of independent farmer stock, with British parliamentary government, human rights traditions and basic freedoms. Spanish and Portuguese rule, unfortunately, left regimes of great instability, with what we would consider an excessive military role in politics, a powerful position for the Church, and perhaps most importantly a social system marked by a vast impoverished peasantry ruled over by a conservative landholding elite whose propensity for compromise and reform has been markedly absent.

Even geographically speaking, while it is obviously true that Canada is part of the Americas as is Latin America it must be stated that this idea has had relatively recent acceptance from the Canadian population at large. As Philip Windsor of the London School of Economics recently said, Canadians have tended to think of themselves as a fundamentally European people established in the extreme northern part of Americas, with much closer ties to Europe than were ever conceived as existent with Latin America, or in many cases with the Americas "tout court".²¹ It is also true to say that Newfoundland is much closer to Ireland than it is to any part of Latin America and indeed the relative proximity of Europe, and its obvious cultural and

21. Philip Windsor, lecture to Collège militaire Royal de Saint-Jean, October 1983

political significance for Canada, have together reinforced the position to which Mr. Windsor referred. Finally, it must also be said that the vast power of the United States has acted as a screen for Canadians looking south and has tended therefore to be a brake for Canadian thinking where a northern to southern prism existed. Canadians, to the extent they looked to the South, were perhaps mesmerized by the United States' energy and dynamism and it took a leap of the imagination to go beyond to Latin America. Where Canadian thinking did achieve a more southward pattern this tended to involve not the Latin American republics but the British West Indian islands with which Nova Scotia and Newfoundland had had some connection as far back as the 18th century.

For all these reasons then, a more proper analysis would suggest that Canada and Latin America are virtually unknowns one to the other. The Spanish word "norteamericano" means a United States citizen and in no way includes Canadians who are usually seen as somewhere between North Americans and Europeans. Likewise Canadians unfortunately have had a general view of Latin America, no doubt picked up through film and television, as a region of rather dark bandits and mustachioed over-decorated generals. Therefore sophistication of approach and knowledge of reality has been notably missing from both sides of the relationship.

There is of course a political dimension to Canada's stand-offishness where Latin America has been concerned. The Monroe Doctrine did not apply to Canada but did apply to Latin Americans and was the first stage of an attempt by the U.S. to establish a hegemonial relationship with the republics to its south. Canada's recent victory in the War of 1812, as well as

the obvious overwhelming power of the Royal Navy, meant that the American declaration would not have the same effect to the north of the United States.²² Manifest Destiny, the increasing American expansionist policy so dominant in the 19th century, certainly threatened Canada as well as Latin America but with different effects. While nearly half of Mexico fell to the U.S. during this period, British imperial military might ensured that the same fate did not befall Canada and indeed permitted Canadian expansion westward to occur parallel to that of the Americans despite the vastly superior population of our southern neighbours. When the Pan-American idea gained some favour in the late 1880s, Canada was able to reject it while many Latin American countries were increasingly to feel its pull as well as the American continued bid for hegemony which it represented. The founding of the Pan-American Union encountered United States' opposition to the incorporation of Canada into the "American family of nations" specifically because the United States feared the strengthening of British power in the Americas though Canada's membership of this body.²³

Canada was largely pleased with this state of affairs although on occasion Canadian diplomats and businessmen saw the Pan-American Union as a means to increase trade with Latin America, a constant of Canadian policy toward the region since the early days of Confederation. Involved as we were in our own development, and occasionally in the wars felt to be of imperial

22. The Canadian side of this story is well known. A comparative study on the subject has still not been done. For two separate analyses of the Latin American view of the experience, see Orlando Martinez, The Great Landgrab, and Leopoldo Martinez, La Intervención norteamericana en México 1846-1848.

23. This issue is discussed at length by both Canadian and Latin American authors in Aboinagas, op. cit.

concern, Canadians rarely felt the need for further complications in the south even where they did hope for more commerce. While the impact of United States' economic growth particularly in the extraordinary spurt caused by World War I was to affect Canada at least as much as Latin America, the East-West link remained psychologically the most crucial for the Canadians' view of the world. Imperial Preference during the years of the Great Depression simply served to reinforce this state of affairs.

World War II, however, proved something of a watershed for Canada as well. Britain's "standing alone", while a source of great inspiration to Canadians and to the Commonwealth war effort, was followed by, and was indeed largely the cause of, a decline of British power, particularly in economic terms, from which the mother country has not recovered. The contemporary arrival of the United States as by far the greatest power on earth, only marginally, and as has proved only temporarily, challenged by the Soviet Union, was to prove as important an influence for Canada as for the other countries of the Americas.²⁴

The first signs of the new exceptional power position of the United States were nonetheless resisted by Ottawa in the late 1940s, at least insofar as inter-American relations were concerned. Neither the Rio Pact, the continuation of U.S.-Latin American defence cooperation in World War II (from which Canada had stood aloof), nor the formation of the Organisation of American States had tempted Ottawa to sign either agreement.

24. J.L. Granatstein, How Britain's Weakness Forced Canada into the Arms of the United States, pp. 39-40 and 61-62.

Canada showed little interest in finding itself a member of organisations in which the United States was clearly dominant and opted instead for links with Washington through the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation where it could have the advantages of a multi-lateral forum and where it could maintain a structured link with its traditional partners in Europe. By this time, the U.S. was keen to have Canada join the inter-American community as it took shape in the form of an anti-communist alliance. The requirement to be a republic, which had been a sine qua non of Pan-American Union membership, was abolished for the OAS with Canada specifically in mind although later West Indian countries were also to take advantage of this relaxed regulation. The U.S. joined the Latin Americans in trying to convince Canada of the advantages of adherence to the two pacts but, interestingly enough, this was already for diametrically opposed reasons.

The Latin Americans saw Canada as a liberal, understanding, and sympathetic country with considerable resources which would side with them on a number of key issues of development and international relations and which would help to resist any hegemonial designs by Washington. The U.S. on the other hand, saw Canada as a natural, conservative, and loyal ally which would naturally side with them on major questions dividing Latin America from the U.S.²⁵ Into such a potential political quagmire successive Canadian governments were not overly keen to venture and despite temptation during the Diefenbaker and Trudeau governments later on, all Ottawa parties in power eventually opted not to take the plunge and join the OAS.

25. Ibid., p. 130.

Slowly but surely, nonetheless, links were being added on a multilateral basis to the bilateral relationships which Canadian governments were finding preferable to full OAS membership. Canada joined a number of agencies of the Inter-American system dealing with practical matters where Canada felt it could gain advantage and be useful.²⁶ In 1972, Ottawa opted for observer status in the OAS although it should be mentioned that a number of countries, even from outside the Americas, have this rather distant relationship with that body. Indeed even this "rapprochement" was reduced in its impact by the later decision to "double-hat" our ambassador to the OAS and to return him to Ottawa where he resided most of the time going to the OAS headquarters in Washington only when required.

In the various sections of this paper dealing with individual subjects of Canadian concern where Latin America is involved, there will be a discussion of Canadian-Latin American relations as they currently stand. It would be remiss, however, to avoid here a brief description of the two major events which have brought Canada infinitely closer to Latin America in recent years. These are, of course the Central American crisis and Canada's role therein and our joining the Organisation of American States in the autumn and winter of 1989-90.

The Central American crisis of the late 1970s and 1980s has proven to be the first event in Latin America to hold the attention of a large part of the Canadian public over a sustained period of time. While it is true that the Cuban Missile Crisis was the sharpest single moment of Canadian

26. Marcel Roussin, in *Ibid*, p. 150.

interest in Latin American affairs, this was largely the result of the presence of an extra-hemispheric power on the island and a missile deployment there which threatened a nuclear war from which Canada would have greatly suffered. In that sense, the issue for Canadians was only marginally a specific Latin American one and much more a reflection of the dangers in East-West relations as a whole. The Central American crisis, on the other hand, has lasted years, not days, and has been very much "sui generis" resulting in hundreds of thousands of deaths and untold misery. Seemingly hopeless and unending, this crisis has simmered and flamed up in a way which has attracted relatively consistent Canadian interest and a level of such interest which would have been unthinkable where Latin America was concerned at other times in Canada's history. Parliamentary committees were baffled to discover on cross-country investigations that more briefs were received from citizens about Central America than about any other external subject of concern. More Canadians presented testimony on the region's problems and on Canada's involvement therein than did so on Canadian-European, Canadian-Commonwealth, Canadian-United States or even Canadian-Asian relations, despite the topicality and importance of the last of these.²⁷ The Canadian press reflected this new attitude with literally thousands of articles on a sub-region which had been usually largely ignored if not forgotten altogether in the mass media.

The question has frequently been asked as to why this sudden interest arose. This is very difficult to assess. Some argue that there was a lack of other issues with the same "human

27. See Liisa North, Between War and Peace in Central America: Choices for Canada, for a lengthy and generally excellent analysis of the growth of this interest.

interest" stories as the Central American one. Others suggest that the moral issues involved where entrenched oligarchies were trying to crush the legitimate aspirations of reformist movements could not fail to attract attention by their very starkness. Still others thought that Canadians got an almost indecent pleasure from harping on an issue where Canadian policy contrasted sharply with that of the U.S. and where one could, with seeming moral superiority, tweak the beard of Uncle Sam. Whatever the reason, or combination of reasons, governments found themselves under considerable pressure to clearly distance themselves from Washington, to take clear stands on Central American issues and to become much more greatly involved in the region. At a time when foreign aid was under increasing fire, and where External Affairs' budgets were more and more restrained, pressure mounted for a greater diplomatic presence in Central America and support for peace initiatives even where these were opposed by the United States. All this pressure bore fruit as Canada moved into the region as never before.

Ottawa has increased its diplomatic presence in Central America while cutting it in several other areas of the world. New missions have been established and Canadian diplomatic efforts have been numerous and varied. Canada was a leader in supporting the Contadora peace process and the series of accords reached subsequent to Esquipulas II. Political and military advice has been proffered and gratefully accepted on the mechanisms for the verification of these accords and for possible peace-keeping activities in support of them. For the first time, what Canadians would recognize as a peace-keeping force but which has more of the characteristics of a verification operation has been deployed in Central America. Ottawa has provided a large percentage of the officers and other

ranks sent on this mission and, along with Madrid and Bonn, has been active in front and behind the scenes to make the whole initiative a success. Canada's peace-keeping record has allowed it to take a lead in the operation and, despite linguistic difficulties, to furnish key personnel such as the second-in-command of the whole ONUCA (the UN observer mission in Central America) force. Never have so many Canadians been active in Central America, not only as diplomats and military personnel but increasingly as persons involved in aid, education and the more traditional missionary role. Central Americans have come to Canada, through normal immigration and special refugee arrangements, in vastly larger numbers than ever before. It is a truism that never before has the Canadian relationship with a Latin American region been anywhere near so strong.

Membership of the Organisation of American States, promised by the Prime Minister in October in San José de Costa Rica, was made concrete on 1 January 1990 when Canada signed the Charter. While making clear reservations about Chapter V by insisting that the defence commitments involved therein do not apply to Canada, Ottawa nonetheless, by the signature, made Canada a formal full partner in the Inter-American System. Some Canadian diplomats and leaders had been encouraged to join by changes in Latin America generally and in the OAS particularly. A number of Latin American states were involved in initiatives to bring about basic reform in the almost moribund organisation. These aimed at giving a larger social, development, human rights and peaceful solution of disputes emphasis to the working of the organisation and a reduction in the anti-communist alliance elements thereof. They also aimed at a reduction in the role and power of the United States within the Inter-American system. With both of these, Ottawa was of course in basic sympathy.

Also, a move was developing to permit the re-integration of Cuba into the OAS, a process much applauded by Ottawa which had never approved of Havana's expulsion in the 1960s and had continued to maintain relations with the Castro regime throughout its tenure.

Thus, with the beginning of the 1990s, Canada finds itself for the first time in its history an official member of the Inter-American system and of the non-military agencies that system has developed. Equally, it finds itself with Canadian soldiers on Latin American soil on a long-term basis and this also for the first time in Canada's history. Canada's aid effort and non-governmental organisation involvement is growing rapidly, especially in Central America, but also elsewhere. Parliamentary committees have called on the government to help spearhead the re-integration of Cuba into the American family and the furthering of human rights efforts throughout Latin America.²⁸

The key questions probably remain the following:

- a. What does Canada wish to achieve through a closer relationship with Latin America?
- b. Where will Canada stand on the major issues relating to the United States' power relationship with the region?
- c. If Latin America is to increase as a foreign policy priority for Canada, and if budgets for foreign affairs are to remain steady or even decrease, what area of the world is to suffer as Latin America benefits?

28. Quoted extensively in *Ibid.*

In the following chapters, it will be possible to discuss the background and prospects for these relations, particularly as they reflect current trends and Canadian strategic interests, but only the government will in the future be able to define positions which will provide answers to the questions just posed.

Chapter II: Human Rights and Democracy

It is often said that human rights and democracy in Latin America have been subjects of only recent Canadian concern, certainly not arising in any meaningful way before the 1950s. In fact, however, the situation regarding democracy and human rights has affected the development of Canada's attitude toward Latin America as well as its relations with the region.

The perception of the republics south of the U.S. as dictatorial and largely oblivious to those rights considered normal to peoples raised in the British democratic tradition has meant that there has been a tendency to underscore the distance separating Canadians from Latin Americans through a generalized perception of them as somehow not like us politically. The impact of a steady stream of caudillos, civil wars, summary executions, the smashing of labour movements, the hamstringing of women's rights, the ill-treatment of minorities; all these have given an image far from attractive to Canadians, both those more politically aware and the people in general.

This view is of course largely erroneous but it is close enough to the truth to be pervasive and frequently compelling. It is true that Latin American democracy has overall been feeble and embattled. While Costa Rica, Uruguay and until recently Chile had strong traditions of democracy, the bulk of the countries of the region have never developed either institutions or political movements which could stand the test of time and remain democratic through good times and bad. Many factors operated in making this the case. Despite the cabildo system in major cities of the empire, the Spanish had little interest in

developing democratic forms, which were potentially dangerous and with which in any case they were not familiar, before independence. The local legislatures and constitutional monarchy of North American experience were unknown in areas dominated by the centralized bureaucracy, the heavy hand of the Church and the absolute monarchy of the Spanish and Portuguese traditions.

When the Spanish colonies were left rudderless by Napoleon's abduction of Ferdinand VII, the local assemblies and leaders in Spanish America were in general ill-prepared for what was to come even though the majority approved of the theories underpinning democratic experiments in Great Britain and France. It was soon seen that under the impact of revolution, war, and social upheaval, most democratic forms and theories were just that and that the reality of power was very different indeed. Caudillos, local strongmen capable of relatively efficient military operations, became the dominant force and rare was the country where their influence was altogether benign. In Mexico, Central America, Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia and Argentina these local power bosses could hide themselves in the shroud of democracy, and issue complex and high-flown constitutional texts, but were rarely willing to step aside and out of power as a result of the popular will.²⁹ Force tended to be the arbiter of domestic politics and with few exceptions this rule applied throughout the region in the last century.

It was nonetheless the case, however, that the aspiration for democracy was a real one. Leaders who had come to power

29. Marcos Kaplan, in Juan Carlos Rubinstein, El Estado periférico latino-americano, p. 89.

through anything but democratic means explained tearfully that they would prefer to rule in a democratic fashion but that the realities of their country's backwardness and political lack of sophistication, not to mention the legacy of the "leyenda negra", made this impossible. Constitutions were written without the slightest possibility of application but which included the latest and most forward Positivist and Liberal thinking from Paris, London and Washington. Some countries were fortunate enough, when incorporated into the international division of labour, to experience changes which favoured democratization but these did not include the whole region nor was the trend either smooth or unstoppable.

With the dislocations caused by the three great shocks mentioned above (i.e. the First World War, the Great Depression and the Second World War), democracy, while generally advancing in the first half of this century found unending obstacles to its solidification. Traditional elites, frequently allied to the armed forces and often more laterally to the United States, used all the means at their disposal to channel changes into routes which would not threaten their real control of power. Trade union movements, non-traditional political parties and other social groupings critical of the established order faced ferocious, usually violent opposition from those quarters with much to lose. Democracy therefore followed a bumpy path in the midst of a general acknowledgement that it was the best form of organizing society and government.

In this context, human rights were obviously going to suffer. The divisions of colonial society along the lines of race, colour, religion, and social status, may have been damaged

by the revolutions for independence but did not disappear for many decades if at all. The Catholic Church's opposition to Protestantism kept it the official religion, with immense privileges in much of the area. Even where its official position was abolished, its hold on influence rarely was. In some countries the white elite saw to it that Indian, black, mulatto or mestizo elements were kept in check in ways that ensured their percentage of the population was in no way reflected by their share in political power. Indians, often in the majority were almost always excluded from a real role in national life despite rhetoric that they were fundamental to the building of the new societies projected by their political and social betters.³⁰

Despite constitutional guarantees to the contrary, habeas corpus was frequently unknown and, where known, frequently set aside. Conscription was little more than the press and generally included young men from the lower social orders or the non-white populations, which were usually the same thing. There was clearly and starkly one law for the rich and another for the poor. In the context of dictatorial states with ruthless governments and security forces, the prospects for human rights were obviously dim. Nonetheless, brighter examples such as Costa Rica, Uruguay, Chile, and for a while Argentina showed that it was possible to move towards an improved situation for human rights even if it was far from easy.

30. These issues are discussed for a variety of countries in the relevant chapters of Magnus Mörner, Race and Class in Latin-America.

New social forces in the 20th century, combined with immigrants from countries where democracy had developed more fruitfully, made for increasing pressures for democratization and human rights. Latin American partial or complete participation in world wars aimed at defending democracy could, as in Central America, make it curious to see them waged by governments which were anything but democratic.³¹ Before the Cold War, United States influence in this regard could be important. Washington's preference for political regimes of a democratic nature grew as the years passed and its means to compensate the political elite for compromises with other sectors could be beneficial for the democratization process.

All the more disappointing it was, then, to see the events of the cold war give the opportunity to the unrepentant right to counter-attack against progressive forces. Under the cover of anti-communism, the traditional elite, now increasingly allied with the armed forces, attempted to restrict all manner of progress towards power sharing. Leftist political parties and social movements, along with the trade unions, were especially hard hit. The United States was faced with the choice between continuing to press for democratic regimes which might see the left increase its power, or backing regimes of the right which might not allow progress towards democratization but which would, it was felt, halt the spread of dangerous leftist subversion.³²

31. Lefeber, op. cit., pp. 111-112.

32. The military elements of this situation are discussed in Irving Horowitz, "The Military Elites", in S.M. Lipset and A. Solari (Eds) Elites in Latin-America, pp. 173-178.

When the Cuban revolution seemed to give the lie to this way of thinking, as we have seen before, the Kennedy administration in Washington opted for a policy of strong backing of democracy, greatly increased foreign aid to the region but finally greatly enhanced assistance to the military forces in combatting leftist elements. This combination, most visible in the Alliance for Progress, was not to last long. With continued and increasing upheaval, sponsored sometimes but supported always, by the Castro regime, insurgencies spread. The response to immediate problems of guerilla movements was a slow but sure decrease in civic action by the army and economic aid and a priority given to the military defeat of the rebels.³³

As the 1960s advanced, and into the 1970s, military governments were established in most of Latin America normally through coup d'états, and here Washington had difficult choices indeed to make. Such governments were usually repressive and almost always anti-democratic with a concomitant suppression of human rights. However, they were succeeding in closing the door to leftist influence and in keeping the lid on social unrest. Moreover, they trumpeted loudly their undoubted anti-communist credentials and proved thereby very difficult for Washington to abandon. As mentioned, at the end of the 1970s, and through to this day, the tendency has been to see such military dictatorships give way to civilian governments. The details figure in Table I. The first wave of this process occurred over a decade back now and was to lead to democracies in most of the Andean states. The influence of the United States, anxious to rid itself of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, was great in

33. Ibid., pp. 178-180.

pushing Central American militaries to at least widen the room for manoeuvre of political parties in their respective countries. Disastrous war in Argentina led to a discredited military being forced out of power despite its recent victory in the famous "dirty war" against dissidents in the 1970s.³⁴ The Brazilian military, despite its enormous advantages achieved over two decades of control of the state, slowly but surely yielded power to a civilian regime.³⁵ Even the Haiti of the Duvaliers and Pinochet's Chile saw dramatic change and attempts at further democratization.

Table I

DATES OF RESTORATION OR
ESTABLISHMENT OF LATEST FORMAL CIVILIAN DEMOCRATIC REGIME

Argentina	1983/4
Bolivia	1982
Brazil	1985
Chile	1989
Colombia	1948
Costa Rica	1948
Cuba	Dictatorship
Dominican Republic	1978*
Ecuador	1979
El Salvador	1982/4
Guatemala	1983/4
Haiti	Current Evolution under Military
Honduras	1981/2
Mexico	1917 (Constitution)
Nicaragua	1979
Panama	1989
Paraguay	Current Evolution under Military
Peru	1980
Uruguay	1984/5
Venezuela	1958

Many of these countries are of course only formally full democracies and still suffer from very high levels of military intervention in political affairs.

*It is very difficult to date such an establishment. See Augusto Varas (Ed.), La Autonomía militar en América Latina, pp. 377-385.

34. Burns, *op. cit.*, pp. 101-114.

35. Thomas E. Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil 1964-85, pp. 272-273 and Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics, p. 59.

It is felt worth underscoring, nonetheless, one vital feature of this recent wave of democratization of which so many American politicians and diplomats are so proud. In only one republic in the whole region was the army actually defeated by a popular insurrection and the dictatorship overthrown. This was in Nicaragua. In all the other countries of Latin America, the army chose to return power to the civilians, for whatever reasons, and was not obliged to do so in any direct way. This is of course a very different thing from the overthrow of military dictatorship by civilian democratic forces. As a general rule, the military, in most of these countries, feel they have a right, often enshrined officially in the constitution, to take power from the civilians when the latter are incapable of properly conducting the affairs of state. In many countries when such power is returned to the civilians it is seen by the military as permission given to the civilians to try again to deal with the problems of the country. Implicit or sometimes even explicit in the arrangements leading to this return of power to the civilians is that if the latter do not effectively deal with the problems of the country, the armed forces reserve to themselves the right to again intervene and to replace those civilian forces with a new military government.³⁶

Hence, while the trend to democratic government is of course favourably viewed by Canadians, and no doubt softened the opposition within Canada to membership of the OAS at this time, it would be an enormous mistake to see the return of democracy to so many states of the region as either solid or permanent.

36. H.P. Klepak, "A Military Retreat from Government in Latin-America", Armed Forces, November 1986, pp. 494-497.

The cycle of civilian government, military government, civilian government, military government, is not a new one in Latin America and it is certainly premature to consider these positive moves as final.

The army and the right remain enormously powerful in Chile, in Peru, in Bolivia, in Central America, in Haiti, in Paraguay and in Brazil. The control established over them in Argentina, Uruguay and even in Colombia, Venezuela and Mexico can not be deemed unchallengeable even though at the moment things look quite bright. The huge problems Latin America faces, especially with debt, inflation, pollution, and urbanization; and the social upheavals which continue related to them, make for a gigantic task for any government, of left or right, from barracks or parliament.

The appeal of entry into the Organisation of American States and the role Canada has carved out for itself in Central America suggest a major and increasing desire to play a positive role in exactly these trends of democratization and human rights. Failure to be able to help in these areas would no doubt damage Canadian interest and frustrate those hoping for closer relations.³⁷ Non-governmental organizations have become much more deeply involved in Latin America generally through the explosion of their activities in Central America over the last decade. It would be difficult for governments to remain idle when questions of Latin American democratization and especially civil rights become difficult and this itself must be kept in mind.

37. This is certainly the tenor of the Canadian sections of the major report by Peter Blanchard and Peter Landsteet, "Human Rights in Latin America and the Caribbean".

For while Canada is not a great power nor does it have major interests in any traditional sense in Latin America, it is nonetheless a major actor with considerably more international influence than any Latin American government with the possible exception of Brazil. It is well respected as a caring, even idealistic nation which combines national interest with a highly respectable dose of idealism as Albert Legault and Michel Fortmann have shown on the question of arms control and disarmament in their recent book.³⁸ While all of this is of course to the good, it does raise hopes, one is tempted to say exaggerated hopes, that Canada's influence will be brought directly to bear on the problems discussed here. Needless to say, this is just what human rights groups in Canada interested in Latin America are hoping for as well. The reality, unfortunately, is that this is far from easy to implement or even to analyze. Latin American politics is complex and fraught with dubious information, political intrigue, propaganda, and self-interest disguised as idealism. Canada is to all intents and purposes a "new boy" and despite considerable diplomatic expertise in some pockets of External Affairs, of some commercial knowledge in a number of banks and other enterprises, and some general understanding in Non-Governmental Organizations; Canadians frequently have difficulty finding their way in the back streets of national political situations in Latin America.

This must be accepted as such and the limitations of our influence understood. To achieve objectives related to human rights and democratization in Latin America is not easy and

38. Albert Legault and Michel Fortmann, Une Diplomatie de l'espoir.

local people have the right to suggest that Canadians have a limited role in the evolution of political systems and social progress not their own. Canadians would be unlikely to be happy if they were accused of throwing their weight around, of interfering in the domestic affairs of states or of not recognizing the sovereignty that these states jealously guard as their own.³⁹ In general it can be expected that it will be the left which expects the most from Canada and the right which is most fearful of what it will doubtless consider meddling by outsiders in its own affairs.

Care will have to be taken to ensure we get this right and that while being able to be a force for progress and for the consolidation of democracy, we are not seen as pushy intruders and particularly not seen as do-gooders who should set their own house in order before telling foreigners how to do so with theirs. Permanent enemies of major social change, such as the landed aristocracy, and those usually seduced into being opponents of such change like the armed forces, are powerful and influential elements with which to reckon. Latin America will not change overnight and it is well that this be recognized.

The oligarchy fears that the rising power of trade unions and minority pressure groups, as well as the call for drastic land reform, threaten their inherited wealth, social position and power base and they are no doubt correct in assessing these threats as dangerous for them. Cloaking these views under a call for the defence of Western values and "Christian civilization", they have proven in many countries to be quite

39. Such accusations are occasionally made. See Orlando Henriquez, "Canadá, un pequeño y nuevo 'Tío Sam'", in El Espectador, Bogota, 4 July 1990.

capable of stopping at nothing in order to deal with their enemies. When traditional co-optation and bribery fail, they are not above infiltration and assassination as means to weaken reformist groups and decapitate them through the removal of their leadership.

The armed forces, while typically understanding popular forces because of their close links with them, also are targets for co-opting on the part of the right. In general they are deeply imbued with the "Doctrine of National Security" thinking of the 1960s, which claims that the enemy is not just the foreigner but domestic leftist elements as well.⁴⁰ Despite the existence of groups in the armed forces, or at least individuals, who are of a more liberal bent, most armed services remain essentially conservative, closely linked with the US, anti-leftist, and suspicious of change. Their power as the main national security forces and the legal applicants of force, especially when underwritten by constitutional responsibilities vis-à-vis state security, produce an element which can never be disregarded in Latin American politics. It should also be remembered by Canadians little versed in the affairs of this part of the world that the army's links with the police forces of Latin American countries are usually strong, official and frequently include the posting of senior army officers to hold the key police command positions in their hierarchies. The alliance of oligarchy and army, especially when reinforced by the support of the United States, can prove an unmovable obstacle to change.

40. Colonel Alfonso Littuma, Doctrina de seguridad nacional, pp. 37-44 and Ernesto López, Seguridad nacional y sedición militar, pp. 132-133.

On the other side of the coin, social forces aiming at reform have waited decades if not centuries for real progress and feel extreme frustration at the obstruction produced by the alliance described above of what these movements consider the legitimate democratic objectives accepted verbally by all forces in the state but which are not necessarily in any sense real. Even the moderates among these reformers can be pushed to violence through the unwillingness of entrenched interests to discuss even minor reform. The experience of the last three and a half decades in Guatemala, Chile and Nicaragua in particular, but to some degree throughout the area, suggest to them that any attempt at moderate reform will be construed as radical by the right which will move, generally with American support, to crush it. In this context, the appeal of violent revolution can easily spread from the radical parties to more moderate elements, a process one has seen, sadly, over and over again in recent decades.

None of the above is to suggest that the situation is hopeless. As mentioned, many signs, particularly with demilitarization, are more favourable than at any time for two decades at least. It is notable, however, that in Central America for example the defeat of the FSLN in Nicaragua and the disarray of leftist forces in Guatemala and El Salvador have given the intransigent right the upper hand to, as one Honduran colonel put it, "return to the fifties". While populist power in most South American governments will make that difficult, these considerations will find some reflection nearly everywhere.

Chapter III: Immigration

Perhaps no problem in Latin America affects currently the Canadian domestic scene in the same way as immigration does. Canada, which had traditionally received immigrants primarily from the United Kingdom but increasingly from the continent of Europe, has in recent years been the target of migrants from Asia, Africa and Latin America as well. Reasonably strict immigration procedures have controlled this potential flood with some success but viewing any Canadian city street will show one that the transformation of Canadian urban society at least is under way. Insofar as Latin America is concerned, for the first time in history, Spanish can be heard with great frequency on the streets of say Toronto or Montreal. Latin American social groups are numerous and active and are adding new flavour to most major Canadian cities particularly in the centre of the country. Table II shows recent immigration figures from the Americas. One notes a fairly steady growth in overall figures from the region as well as in terms of a percentage of total immigration.

TABLE IIImmigration from the Americas
in Recent Years

	1981/2	1982/3	1983/4	1984/5	1985/6	1986/7	1987/8	1988/9
North and Central America*	11609	11290	10728	10875	5439	6852	6141	8535
Caribbean	9604	8262	6481	5654	6351	10092	10475	9505
South America	6288	6561	4363	4042	4455	8812	9220	7460
World Totals	131538	113469	86208	87469	85433	114700	150757	165841

*The United States tends to account for roughly half of the North and Central American figures. For 1985-86 to 1988-89, the CPS totals are removed to leave only those for Mexico and Central America.

Source: Relevant years of Annual Reports of Employment and Immigration Canada.

The first significant wave of Latin American immigration probably came as a result of the military coup d'état against President Salvador Allende in September 1971. This however was made up mostly of intellectuals and members of the Chilean bourgeoisie. In more recent years, however, almost all countries of Latin America have been represented strongly in Canadian immigration figures. These migrations have involved very large numbers of Latin Americans and have not by any means been motivated by merely political considerations in the home countries. The Haitian exodus which aimed largely at Montreal had of course some political backdrop but was much more the result of economic hardship in the island republic itself. South American immigration to Canada has reflected a mix of motivations but most experts would suggest, particularly in recent years, that the bulk of these people leave to achieve a better standard of living even where some political motivation may exist.

Central America has of course provided the main turning point in this pattern of migrations. Well over a million Central Americans have fled their homes in the last decade and while many have settled in more peaceful regions of their countries, hundreds of thousands have headed north.⁴¹ The economic dislocation caused by the wars, fanned by the widespread poverty and hopelessness already characterizing much of the Central American scene, reinforce this war refugee problem and mix a variety of factors into the migration phenomena.

The overwhelming majority of Central Americans going north has of course aimed to settle in the rich land of opportunity which is the United States. A number of reasons reinforce this tendency. Firstly, American culture is felt to be well known by Central Americans who are exposed to the United States in televisions programmes, films, radio and to some extent the written press. The United States' reputation as a land of plenty and a welcoming country for immigrants is of course an old one and one widely believed in this sub-region. More importantly still perhaps, is the fact that large Spanish-speaking communities already existed in the US long before the latest spate of wars in Central America and it was natural for Central Americans to look for a wealthy country, but one in which their language was widely spoken and their ethnic groups well represented, in order to settle. Lastly of course, the United States is the first wealthy country which the Central Americans reach when moving north, has a good climate similar to the one in which the migrants were raised, and has a ready

41. This figure is a conservative one. Liisa North places the figures between 1.8 and 2.8 million in her Between War and Peace in Central America: Choices for Canada, p. 131.

network of agents willing to find jobs (frequently illegal at first) for the hungry and miserable arriving migrant.⁴²

All of these factors have made for Canada remaining a secondary choice for Central American immigrants. Canada does not as yet have a large Spanish-speaking population nor does it have an easy network through which immigrants could get jobs. The distance for Central Americans to reach prosperous regions of Canada can be twice as far for that of even richer portions of the US. Equally important perhaps, Canada's reputation as a country with a savage climate is a well established one and this has also proved daunting. It should also be mentioned that the very lack of Canadian diplomatic representation in Central America meant that the local population would find it much harder to apply to come here even if some of its members actually thought of it.

A number of factors have changed the previous situation where immigration to Canada is concerned. The very extent of the war's damage has created such a number of refugees that the population base of potential migrants has expanded tremendously particularly those wishing to come for essentially economic reasons. Secondly, the US's tightening of its immigration regulations has made it more difficult for Central Americans to go there and for Central Americans already there to bring north their relatives.⁴³ The reputation of the US as welcoming immigrants has suffered accordingly and tales of exploitation

42. Some elements of this situation are dealt with, country by country, in Sergio Diaz-Briquets, "The Central America Demographic Situation: Trends and Implications", in F.D. Bean et al (Eds), Mexican and Central America Population and U.S. Immigration Policy, pp. 40-47.

43. Liisa North, op. cit., pp. 151-153.

of immigrant workers by unscrupulous American businessmen have received wide press coverage in Central American media. Thus the ease with which Central American immigrants could achieve an immigrant status in the US has been lessened in recent years. At the same time the demand to come north has increased. Concurrently, the number of Central Americans who know Canada and who have come here has created at least the beginning of a new network of relationships from which future immigrants might benefit. In addition, the increase in Canadian diplomatic representation from Guatemala in the north to Costa Rica in the south lets Central Americans see more Canadian interest in the region, especially true since the ONUCA deployment, and have much easier access to immigration facilities in their home countries.

For all of these reasons then, Central Americans are coming to Canada in ever increasing numbers and have become a significant percentage of the Canadian immigrant community. While hopes for peace in the region may suggest that such a movement will decline, such an analysis may well be off the mark. Central America is a long way from economic recovery and even perhaps from political stability. An increasing knowledge of the advantages Canada offers, especially in the light of increased difficulties with immigration to the US, may well mean that far from seeing a decrease in the demand, one will see a continuation in its steady increase.

In the context of much criticized immigration policies, which an apparently increasing numbers of Canadians find too lax, there may be pressures, especially as peace returns to the region, to restrict such migrants' facility of entry into Canada. If this proves to be the case, one can expect that

Central Americans will watch events closely and will draw their own conclusions about the sort of relationships they wish to build with Canada. This may well apply to our relations in this area with Latin America as a whole.

Table III
Some Immigration Figures
For Selected Latin American Countries

	<u>1985-86</u>	<u>1986-87</u>	<u>1987-88</u>	<u>1988-89</u>
Argentina	211	353	517	425
Chile	513	889	1297	949
Colombia	215	292	386	367
El Salvador	3182	3458	3059	2313
Guatemala	1041	1472	881	735
Haiti	1329	1906	2079	1829
Mexico	386	721	806	1059
Peru	335	768	838	1453

While war is not nearly so widespread in Latin America as a whole as it is in Central America, poverty and economic crisis most definitely are. Table III shows a breakdown of certain key sources of immigrants to Canada. It will be noted how the strength of the Haitian figures is relatively constant and high for such a small country with the main jump happening as disorder spread in early 1986. El Salvador remains consistently even higher despite an even smaller population base. Peru's figures, on the other hand, seem to reflect the continuing downward spiral of that country's economy, the increasing loss of hope, and the growth in the fighting with Sendero Luminoso.

Chapter IV: The Economy

There is no such thing as a Latin American economy. There are instead of course a series of Latin American economies and ones which, generally speaking, match national territorial states. A discussion has already occurred putting emphasis on the history of the Latin American economies starting from the days of "El Dorado" under Spain and to some extent Portugal, carrying on through the settlement based on latifundio and mines and ending up with the international division of labour and finally the sequence of disruptions associated with its dislocation. It is necessary to speak very briefly about regional and national conditions in order to understand where one is at this moment.

Starting in the southern cone, Argentina was for long considered the success story of all of Latin America and the competitor even with the US but certainly with Canada where development was concerned. From a sleepy colony under Spanish rule, the impact of cattle products and wheat, joined to an explosion of immigration in the last decades before World War I, transformed Argentina and made it a dynamic economy based on trade and agricultural products above all. The shocks to the international division of labour helped it build a large bourgeoisie connected with international commerce and industries of the import substitution kind. Political instability, the weakness of post-war Europe, followed by European Economic Community import restrictions and the inefficiency of local manufactures, led to economic decline and eventual crisis since World War II. A succession of civilian and military governments has been able to do little to arrest the slump which continues

apace despite all sorts of proposed solutions being tried. Huge international debt, rampant inflation, social disorder and general malaise dominate the Argentine picture.⁴⁴

Similar circumstances afflict the once wealthy Uruguayan state whose agricultural products and local industry have faced the same sort of decline. While the malaise may be slightly less deep in Uruguay, it is still quite deep enough.

Chile has benefited from its natural resource base in minerals of a variety of kinds, especially copper. With a large middle class, impressive national cohesion, a long democratic and stable political tradition, and a hard-working overwhelmingly European population in origin, Chile has faced the economic crises of the last two decades with better results. Despite periods of political crisis, the fall of mineral prices, labour unrest, a lack of energy resources, and the like; the Chileans have in recent years bounced back and have by Latin American standards a relatively prosperous economy although with a hefty international debt with which to deal.

Further north, in Peru and Ecuador, traditional agricultural economies supported by some mineral resources have stagnated for many years. The oil boom of the 1970s permitted both countries to develop their energy wealth in petroleum but the fall in prices in more recent years has caused a sustained crisis from which the countries have been unable to escape. The massive international debt contracted in setting up the infrastructure for the oil industry, as well as for other

44. Burns, op. cit., pp. 209-225.

projects, hangs as a huge dead weight on the overall national economy.

Further inland, Bolivia is in some ways in even worse shape although its economic backwardness is of such longstanding that it is not so often commented upon in the press. Here again mineral wealth is the basis of the economy, tin especially. Boom or bust is the result of fluctuations in the price of this mineral and very few other commodities and at the moment, despite some signs of a favourable nature, the scene is not a promising one. Both in Peru and Bolivia the informal economy is the area of great growth, particularly related to the production of coca to be converted to cocaine generally in Colombia to the north. The president of Peru has even quipped that the only successful Peruvian multi-national is the cocaine trade. Billions of dollars circulate and hundreds of thousands of people earn a living wage through the production of the basic crop behind this drug traffic.⁴⁵

Colombia is usually held out as a success story in Latin America and indeed in many ways it is. The economy has retained a certain buoyancy over many years and Colombia has an enviable record for the repayment of international debt. The country depends on a variety of products ranging from traditional agricultural ones such as bananas, coffee and cattle right through to petroleum. Here too, the economy benefits from the final processing of the coca plant into cocaine in a vast informal market, largely controlled by Colombians, supplying millions of addicts particularly in the US. Despite violence of

45. Alejandro Leusma, El Narcotráfico y el interés nacional, pp. 38-40.

all kinds ranging from right-wing assassinations of political leaders through to leftist insurgents, the Colombian economy soldiers on to this day.

As mentioned previously, Venezuela is a country of great natural resources, particularly its famous petroleum reserves, and has lived in recent decades experiences common to a number of other petroleum producing countries. In the last century, Venezuela was a backwater of Latin America after having been the same for the colonial empire before independence. Cattle and subsistence farming were the rule before petroleum became a major product in the 1920s but once it had done so, the vast wealth it brought to the country made it receive the greater part of governmental interest with a consequent leaving behind of the agricultural sector. This was to have grave consequences as before the oil boom of the 1970s, only a small percentage of the Venezuelan working population found employment in oil or petroleum-related work.⁴⁶

While this situation no doubt improved somewhat after 1973, the oil glut of the last decade has had highly disruptive effects on the country. Successive governments borrowed heavily abroad and the fall in oil prices had a dire impact on the country's ability to pay back these loans. As so often elsewhere in Latin America, so too in Venezuela, stringent austerity measures strongly suggested by the International Monetary Fund and other multilateral lending agencies have been badly received by the population as a whole and by the lower classes, who feel they bear too large a share in the suffering

46. Judith Ewell, Venezuela: A Century of Change, p. 11.

imposed and have led to widespread rioting and heavy handed police repression.

Given the dependence of Venezuela on petroleum, and the relatively unlikely event of greatly increased prices on a sustained basis, the country can expect to continue to live hard times from which an exit is at the moment difficult to see. Here again, the dangers of a single commodity economy, or at least something very close to it, can be seen very starkly. Brazil offers quite a different picture. The extraordinary expansion of the Brazilian economy in the 1960s and 1970s, frequently referred to as the "Brazilian Miracle", has no doubt slowed in recent years. On the other hand, the progress of the Brazilian economy remains impressive in general and particularly when compared with this regional giant's neighbours.

Although it is obviously true that huge portions of the Brazilian population have not benefited from this progress, as witnessed by the huge favelas (shanty towns) surrounding most of the country's cities and the vast regional disparities between the prosperous South and the poverty-stricken North-East, progress there has been. Despite favourable signs, however, it must be emphasized that Brazil also has a massive international debt problem, the servicing of which causes headaches galore in Brasilia. The main difference between Brazilian debt and that of other countries is that the overall strength of the national economy yields some potential for actually paying it back, a situation almost unique in the region. Here also, IMF-inspired austerity programmes are opposed virulently. Brazil's southern neighbour Paraguay is, as mentioned, just coming out of a long period of isolation and

dictatorship. The new Rodriguez regime seems anxious to open the country not only to foreign political influences but especially to foreign investment and trade. An essentially agricultural country, Paraguay has suffered somewhat less from the debt crisis than its large neighbours and has remarkable social cohesion or has had up to the present. Cattle and other agricultural pursuits remain the basis of the economy which is only really now being modernized, a process slowed by Paraguay's lack of institutional links with more dynamic regional economies.

Moving north, little need be said of Central America. It has already been seen that the countries there are in some cases ravaged by civil war but in all cases have suffered the flight of capital and the general disruptions caused by political instability, international tension, widespread destruction and nearby or home-grown civil war. As also seen above, the traditional monocultures of the region, based on bananas, coffee, sugar, and few other products, had already been buffeted by falls in international prices and the rise in the cost of imported manufactured goods and particularly petroleum, before this decade. While Costa Rica has kept its head above water, despite grave dangers particularly caused by the impact of international debt, and while Honduras has escaped direct damage from war, neither is in good shape overall. Honduras has become so dependent on American economic assistance that the term "debt republic" has been coined for her and her neighbours just as the country had the dubious honour of having the term "banana republic" applied first to her nearly a century ago. The current reduction in U.S. aid, joined to the

continuation of long-term economic decline, augurs ill and suggests even further years of hard times.⁴⁷

Much more serious is the situation in Guatemala where the civil war, despite promising signs, still simmers and where the social fabric of the country continues to pose the problems inherited from colonial times. While the actual physical destruction of plant and buildings is no longer very great and is generally speaking centred far from the main cities, this country also faces depressed prices for its products, widespread poverty and highly unequal development. El Salvador is perhaps worse placed still in that there the destruction caused by the civil war has often been to the infrastructure of the economy including hydro-electric plants, dams, power lines, bridges and other essential installations. This has struck directly at El Salvador's international trade particularly in coffee, the country's traditional primary product for export. Here again, a situation of nearly total economic dependence on the U.S. for aid, coupled with the current decline in the latter country's interest in the Central American region as a whole, gives pause. U.S. and other foreign loans are to all intents and purposes impossible to imagine paying back and their mere servicing is far beyond national potential for many years.

Difficult as it is to imagine, the Nicaraguan situation is even worse. Here of course, one is not recovering from one civil war, but from two and these are wars stretching back 15 years. Nicaragua was never as prosperous as El Salvador or Costa Rica and it is only now coming out of the most severe

47. "Boletín informativo Honduras", September 1990, pp. 4-5.

economic warfare ever waged in the Americas with the possible exception of that directed against Cuba. The Cuban economy, however, was stronger going into the 1960s and its autarchy was more possible than anything one could imagine for Nicaragua. Managua's economic situation is desperate with inflation out of control although the new coalition government is hopeful to bring it vaguely into line in the medium term. Sandinista economic incompetence, when added to the effects of the US embargo, war and virtual total male military mobilisation, has left a sorry mess from which again it must take years to recover.

The situation is truly extraordinary in Mexico where the economic picture, after many years of dark times, seems to be brightening more than somewhat. The political cost has been great in the abandonment of highly-institutionalised traditions of controls on foreign investment but the economic benefits seem to be being seen in record time. After years of stagnation the economy is moving quite rapidly at the moment despite a large international debt here also. Negotiations with the United States, and to some extent Canada, on a free trade arrangement have made much more progress than was frequently thought possible. Investment is again coming into the country and despite the long-term fall in price for Mexican oil, confidence in the economy is growing apace. Much of this is stimulated by the highly successful setting up of industries in the belt of towns south of the United States border in a special scheme taking advantage of low Mexican wage rates and proximity to southern United States markets.⁴⁸ The Brady Plan for adjusting

48. Alan Robinson, "La Conexión mexicana", in América Economía, IV, 40, June 1990, pp. 10-14.

the debt burden is also helpful in psychological as well as purely economic turns.

This does not mean the whole situation is rosy. Mexico still faces one of the largest international debts in the world particularly if taken on a per capita basis. Traditional export commodities continue to suffer from low prices and the country is exporting vast numbers of dynamic young workers to the United States and indeed to Canada. Despite the proverbial patience of the Mexican people, violence has not been absent from frequent social disturbances and this will not end overnight.

Hispaniola's two republics offer very different economic pictures just as they do political ones, as noted above. Haiti is the poorest country in the Americas and has had that dubious title for decades. The bourgeoisie is small and relatively weak and suffers from a high level of emigration which takes the best brains and most active entrepreneurial spirit to the United States, France and Canada. The vast majority of the population lives in abject poverty even by Latin American standards, and the small elite has shown remarkable staying power and ability to halt reform which threatens its interests. The safety valve of emigration is also influential for the peasantry although their ability to move provides tragic results frequently in the waters separating the republic from the Bahamas to the north and the United States to the north-west. Barring effective political reform and a major aid effort, it is very difficult indeed to see significant progress in economic terms made here.

On the other side of the island's only border, as briefly discussed, the Dominican Republic enjoys a tourism boom which

gives an impression of great economic growth but which is not fully reflective of the economic conditions of the majority. While agriculture receives some spin-off effects from the tourism industry, many observers point to the traditional scourges normally accompanying major tourist development (excessive dependence on service industries, corruption, prostitution, etc) as being as damaging for Dominican society in general as the development itself is positive for the economy and the balance of payments.

Cuba, the last country to be discussed, is the most difficult to analyze. Traditionally, the island republic has had a relatively strong economy and before the 1959 revolution had what was arguably the strongest middle class outside the southern cone. While the economy has always been by far too dependent on sugar, nickel, hemp, tobacco and cattle have helped to reduce some of the worst aspects of the island's monoculture.⁴⁹

Despite the obvious improvements the revolution brought the bulk of the Cuban population, as is well known, the traditional bourgeoisie simply fled the island in the years following the Castro takeover. This body blow to the economy has in many ways not been fully countered but it is the extraordinarily harsh economic embargo established by the United States in the early 1960s which has done the most to damage the Cuban economy. The overwhelmingly most important market and source of goods for Cuba disappeared from national economic calculations virtually overnight and at the stroke of a pen. The inefficient economy of the Soviet Union and other socialist

49. See Jean Stubbs, Cuba: The Test of Time.

states was simply not able to make up the loss incurred through United States' severance of ties and despite very generous terms of trade established for political reasons by Moscow and its allies, the economy Havana manages is a shambles.

Sugar quotas of production are virtually never reached and while some areas of diversification of the economy have prospered, relatively speaking in recent years, the overall picture has been a negative one. This state of affairs was fairly static until the autumn of 1989, after which time a series of severe shocks has struck the Cuban state and economy and has left it reeling. The non-Soviet sources of assistance for Cuba have traditionally included all the East European states. But one by one these states have severely curtailed, limited in future duration, or cut off altogether, barter or other trade and indeed aid accords with the Cuban state. As Eastern Europe had provided a significant proportion of Cuban economic aid and trade, the importance of these blows would be difficult to exaggerate. Worse still, at a time when Havana looks to Moscow to take up the slack created by Eastern Europe's abandonment of Cuba, the Soviets show less and less interest in doing so. Indeed some observers suggest that internal pressures, especially those from the Russian-speaking population, will lead to a major curtailment of trade and aid with Cuba in the next months, if not to the nightmare of a total cut-off altogether in special arrangements between the two states.

The results of this have been the most severe economic crisis Cuba has lived in decades. For the first time in living memory, rationing of bread was declared in February 1989.

Cubans, who had been accustomed to rationing in a number of other areas of consumption, have been taken off guard by these moves which are, it should be added, extremely unpopular and bring the regime's economic efficiency under increasingly negative scrutiny. At the moment, Castro is attempting to find capitalist countries who would be willing to enter into barter arrangements with Havana whereby the island could receive vital imports but where unavailable foreign exchange is not available. His success in achieving this, while doubtful at the moment, is essential.

Thus the Latin American economies are passing through a seemingly unending period of dislocation and near despair despite the existence of bright spots here and there such as in Mexico and to some extent Brazil. It is hard to imagine how such states, without a major overhaul of the terms of international trade, can be expected to operate as prosperous and stable members of the international economy.

Hardly surprising, then, that quite revolutionary economic solutions are not only being put forward but actually acted upon. The integration of the economies of Brazil and Argentina has begun and is moving along steadily, as discussed in the chapter on the end of these two countries' traditional rivalry. Such is the impact of this trend that first Uruguay, and more recently Paraguay, have joined in the programme in a much wider sense than was ever contemplated previously. Chile, which left the Andean Pact in the days of the military dictatorship, is being forced now to choose between reintegration into that "poor man's club" and the more dynamic, inviting Buenos Aires-Brasilia axis with its two smaller but

important members. Traditional differences with Argentina make the choice a difficult one but economic punch will probably prevail.

President Bush's proposals for an economic grouping of all the Americas have not fallen on deaf ears either and the Latin American reaction as far has been quite favourable. Economic events in the region are therefore moving quickly with Mexican incorporation into the North American free trade arrangement increasingly likely. Canada's links with the area will necessarily grow if such trends continue.

Chapter V: Instability

The chapters so far put forward; those on democracy and human rights, on immigration and on the economy, leave little doubt that to some extent the popular perception of Latin America as a region endemically suffering from political and social instability is not altogether wide of the mark. This is of course of direct concern to Canada. Ottawa's foreign policy has perhaps a constant in the search for stability and this reflects our concern for a prosperous world capable of trading with our country, a desire for peace where international war would lead to disaster for us, and for a general world situation wherein humanitarian values related to social progress, economic prosperity, human rights, and democracy can flourish and where Canadians can feel that they contribute to this state of affairs.

While Canadians generally have not been overly ideological in these terms, that is to say Canadians have not opposed radical change in any concerted or violent fashion; they have been suspicious of, and unhappy with, trends towards increasing violence as a means to bring about change even when such change is seen as a good thing. The preference for a world at peace and enjoying prosperity, while benefitting from or moving towards democracy, is as Canadian as ice hockey. Nonetheless, Canadian governments have been aware that this is not a perfect world and that often drastic change and reform is required if the pressures for violent upheaval are to be avoided. Hence, Ottawa could be said to practise a more welcoming policy towards change, and less suspicion of instability than more conservative countries have. While

seeking stability, Canadian policy supports peaceful change and is even, however reluctantly, willing to understand the need on occasion for violence in bringing about vital changes where political systems have no peaceful and legitimate means to effect reform. If Latin America has traditionally been the area of instability which it is so often judged, Canadian policy has adopted a cautious but relatively flexible policy towards change in the region. While sharing in recent years the concerns that radical socialist regimes might establish themselves widely in Latin America, Canada has not felt that its preference for liberal democratic regimes implied that it must back the centre-right and right on all occasions. The acceptance of the establishment of the Castro regime in 1959 proved this point earlier on and this stand was taken again in the acceptance of, and help given to, the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua over the last decade. Canada has been able to work with socialist regimes just as with others and has been able to gain profit from relations with stable leftist governments just as it has with stable rightist ones.

As with the British foreign policy tradition of recognizing regimes as and when they gained effective control of their countries so, with nuance, does Canadian policy extend recognition generally to those governments enjoying real power in their states. In keeping with this tradition and with others, Canada has placed the emphasis on trade in recent years as it has in the past. As discussed in the now classic book by James Ogelsby on Canadian-Latin American relations entitled Gringos from the Far North, Canada has consistently aimed first

and foremost to increase trade in the region.⁵⁰ Long before Canada felt particular political pulls in the direction of closer relations with Latin America, it felt the drive to export to the region and to some extent to invest in it as well. While the hopes for profits from such trade and investment have been frequently dashed, the Latin American market and investment opportunity have frequently resurfaced and never completely disappeared.

To the extent that instability has threatened that trade and investment, the Department of External Affairs has been under considerable pressure to line up alongside conservatives trying to maintain the status quo. Despite the thesis underlying the recent book Northern Shadows, our foreign policy has not by any means consistently backed such conservative desires.⁵¹ While obviously anxious to protect Canadian investment and trading interests, one of the major roles after all of any foreign ministry, Ottawa's policy has more often than not tried to find middle ground between the exigencies of action in aid of our businessmen abroad and the sympathy felt for countries in the throes of domestic strife.

The crises through which Latin America is currently passing, dating back to the 1970s and therefore of considerable duration already, have provided special challenges for our foreign policy where instability is concerned. Virtually the whole region has suffered major elements of instability over

50. J.C.M. Ogelsby, Gringos from the Far North, published by MacMillan in 1976.

51. This work by Peter McFarlane, Northern Shadows: Canadians and Central America, is, in the view of this author, far too harsh in its criticism of this country's role in Central America.

this period and the outside world has been confronted by a bewildering series of events of a destabilising nature with which it must come to grips. This has not been particularly easy for a Canada whose diplomatic representation in Latin America has been quite modest until recently. In addition, pressures at home as a result of increasing public interest in the region, referred to above, have made Canadian governments more circumspect than ever before. The press and the wide variety of non-governmental organisations follow closely the current evolution of events in Latin America and insist on a major emphasis being given to the humanitarian and liberal aspects to the detriment, on occasion, of "realpolitik" considerations.

Despite democratization, some would argue as a result of this democratization, political stability is far from generalized in Latin America. As we have seen, a state of political stability is the exception rather than the rule in the region and while the rise of democratization has no doubt recently channelled discontent and the desire for reform into more peaceful approaches to politics, overall stability can hardly be said to have been the result. Dramatic labour unrest, terrorism, drugs and the war against drugs, military interventions, economic crisis and the rest of the litany of woes which Latin America has to face preclude easy political answers of the West European and North American colouring. The issues which divide Latin Americans are major ones and the stakes are high.⁵² Reformist elements demand real change and

52. This point comes out most strongly in the most war-torn region of Latin America - Central America. The depth of the struggle comes out forcefully in the thesis presented by Edelberto Torres Rivas, Crisis del Poder en Centroamérica.

insist on it with the same vehemence traditional elites and the right deploy to halt or at least delay such reform.

Peaceful change normally requires a sense of compromise and as has been seen in Central America and much of South America, a recognition of the need to compromise is not necessarily yet present. If the crisis were to worsen, it is easy to imagine instability getting out of hand and the violent elements unleashed thereby changing the picture of political progress very radically indeed. The weak democratic political institutions of the area are challenged in the most fundamental ways by the current difficulties and the movements they spawn. If progress and compromise cannot be more firmly established, it can be expected that instability will grow and take evermore violent forms of expression.

As alluded to before, the challenge for Canada is to find middle ground where one can assist democratic forces and permit change without an explosion. Only this is good for trade, good for investment and good for the humanitarian goals the public expects the country's foreign policy to further.

Chapter VI: The International Relations Context

The previous four chapters have attempted to give a general context involving largely internal affairs, although often with an external dimension, for the overall situation in Latin America in which Canadian policy must find its place. The rest of this paper, as mentioned in the introduction, hopes to give a more detailed view of the foreign policy and security issues evolving now in Latin America, or likely to appear in the future, which will have an impact on Canadian foreign and defence policies.

In this next chapter, a tour d'horizon will be given of the international relations issues and framework behind these events of interest to Canada with a view to being able later to raise the specific issues of greatest concern. The first point to make in this connection is that Latin America has a very old and established context of international relations dating back to independence almost two centuries ago. Analysts have discovered traditional European patterns such as balance of payments relationships, conservative or liberal alliances, "next nation but one" phenomena, and the like. The countries of the region, especially those with significant threat perceptions or sophisticated elites, have produced flexible and imaginative responses in their foreign, and indeed defence, policies in the past and this continues at the present and in all likelihood will do so in the future.

In the years after independence, Latin American countries were often involved in attempting to restrict the potential for intervention in their affairs by the European great powers. In

this connection, it is worth mentioning that Spain did not finally give up its claims on the continent of the Americas until the late 1860s and even then retained colonial possessions in the Antilles until the very end of the last century. Other European powers greeted Latin American independence as little more than an opportunity to economically, and occasionally politically as well, supplant the Iberian powers with their own more dynamic influence. Anglo-French machinations in the River Plate and the French, Spanish, and British intervention in Mexico leading to the ill-fated Habsburg monarchy there, are merely the most well-known of these attempts.

Later in the century, European economic penetration was accepted and indeed welcomed by the dominant elite, although not without some opposition, and Latin American diplomacy was active in encouraging loans, technical assistance missions, investment, immigration and trade from the Europeans. With the increase in the United States' power and influence in the region, firstly in Central America in mid-century and later in much more of the region from 1898 on, Latin American diplomacy frequently opted to find ways to counter-balance US power with that of the Europeans and occasionally vice-versa. The Pan-American idea expressed by Washington in what is usually seen in Latin America as a thinly disguised means for achieving hegemony, was generally accepted in principle by Latin Americans but in practice efforts were made to reduce its impact on practical policies and particularly on the freedom of manoeuvre on national states governments.⁵³

53. This practice is described in Pierre Queuille, L'Amérique latine, la Doctrine Monroe et le panaméricanisme.

Within Latin America itself, power political combinations became the rule. Conflict on the Pacific coast of South America led to a balance of power relationship brilliantly described by Robert Burr in his book By Reason or Force.⁵⁴ Argentina and Brazil, after conflict early on in their independence periods, were encouraged to accept the existence of a traditional, European style buffer state in the form of Uruguay as a means of reducing border tensions between them. Paraguay on the other hand was able to become the "Prussia of South America" before its astounding struggle but inevitable defeat in the War of the Triple Alliance where it stood alone against Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay from 1865 to 1870.

In the northern tier of the continent, Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela were able to reach an uneasy acceptance of one another's territorial borders after the confederation of the three broke up soon after independence. The Caribbean states waited for independence, with the exception of Haiti, for much longer. While Cuba won its independence from Spain in 1898, this formal status was fictional until at least 1902 when US forces, which had come into the war to assist the Cubans against Spain, withdrew leaving a Cuban government in charge. Later another American intervention in the island completed a process of US effective domination of Cuba's government and foreign relations which was only reversed by the Castro regime's coming to power as late as 1959.

54. This work, whose full title is By Reason or Force: Chile and the Balancing of Power in South America 1830-1905, has become the model for such studies on Latin America since its first publication in 1974.

The Dominican Republic, after early independence, eventual reintegration into the Spanish Empire, then independence again, also saw its sovereignty restricted through US military intervention and political pressures on a virtually constant basis. Haiti, while nominally independent before any of the other Latin American states after its rising against France in the 1790s, lived in such a state of anarchy that it was a standing target for US interventions repeatedly during the early decades of this century. The foreign policies of all three of these states reflect clearly the geopolitical demands which they faced.

In Central America, after the dissolution of the confederation in the late 1830s, the tiny independent republics had difficulty maintaining nominal independence in the face of US and British attempts to establish their national power in the sub-region. It is debatable indeed whether the fact of both these powers being active in the region was not a sine qua non of the retention of some degree of real independence for these states. Among themselves, the Central American republics made shifting alliances and unmade them with bewildering intricacies reminiscent of Balkan diplomacy earlier in the century.

Mexico's diplomatic challenge was arguably the most difficult of all those faced by Latin American states. In the way, as it were, of US expansionism linked to the Manifest Destiny ideology, Mexico needed allies to confront successfully the task. Such friends were not forthcoming and, as is well known, the loss of nearly half of the national territory to Washington in what has been term "the great land grab" was the result. Nonetheless, to avoid an even worse fate, Mexico took its diplomacy and foreign affairs seriously and has been at the

forefront of inter-American and international fora where the issues of non-intervention and peaceful settlement of disputes have been debated.

This challenge of a US drive for hegemony in the Americas, while initially faced largely in the Antilles, Mexico and Central America, was eventually to spread to the whole of South America as the US' relative power in the world increased as the century wore on. The various Latin American countries reacted differently, according to their perception of the threat and their potential to actually do something about it. After initial hesitations, Colombia, Brazil and later Venezuela came to accept close cooperative ties with the US within the region and many diplomats argue that this policy served them well. The Andean republics further south, while less under US pressure, also generally fell into line with major US initiatives hoping no doubt that distance would protect them from the worst aspects of American power. Argentina on the other hand, as a reflection of its status, European links and its pretensions to regional leadership, tended to resist US influence in the Americas offering itself as a different pole of attraction within the hemisphere.⁵⁵ Argentina economic power and success underwrote this policy until the Second World War.

Indeed it was in time of war that the test of American influence became most stark. Whereas in 1917, it was essentially only the Central American and West Indian states of Latin America which followed Washington into the conflict, by 1941 most of South America joined the others in declaring war on

55. James R. Scobie, Argentina: A City and a Nation, pp. 212-213.

the Axis after Pearl Harbour.⁵⁶ No clearer indication of the growth of US influence could have been forthcoming and by 1945 even Argentina and Chile, countries which had been far from convinced of the advantages of war with Germany, were to all intents and purposes forced to enter the conflict on the side of the allies.

Intra-Latin American relations suffered something of a decline as the Pan-American Union developed both its organs and its legal instruments. The ideological basis of Pan-Americanism was of course that the Americas were an island of peace far from the corrupting influences of the warlike and avaricious states of Europe. While patently false, this assessment provided a green light for the establishment of mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes, arbitration and the offering of good offices which served US interests well in both promoting the Pan-American idea and in limiting conflicts among Latin American states which could be embarrassing for US foreign policy and damaging for that country's trade and investments.⁵⁷ In such an international context, as said, relations among Latin American states had less reason to develop as forcefully. When one adds to this the fact that trade among the Latin American states was, generally speaking, very limited because of the similarity of most of their economies, one sees that the focus of major international relations policy came to be increasingly relations with the US, particularly when war and economic crisis reduced dramatically European influence in the region.

56. Lars Schoultz, National Security and United States Policy toward Latin America, pp. 175-177.

57. Queuille, *op. cit.*, p. 198.

In the two years before war broke out in Europe, the US acted to establish an increasing alliance structure for the Pan-American system. At a series of conferences of the American states (as always without Canada), the US rallied Latin American support for a policy of neutrality and cooperation against any European states which tried to change the status quo in the Americas. After the rapid and dramatic fall of France and the Netherlands in the Spring of 1940, a joint declaration was made whereby the American states said they would not permit the transfer of European colonies of one state to another. In practice this meant that any German colonial gains involving the Americas would not be recognized by the American republics. Such diplomatic unity was underscored, as will be discussed later on, by military agreements and the eventual setting up of an Inter-American defence zone involving the armies, navies and air forces of all the American republics. Building on the military mission arrangements made before the war and the strengthening thereof after Pearl Harbour, the US now applied lend-lease and bilateral cooperation arrangements in the creation of a limited but increasingly formalised alliance. The tardy arrival of Buenos Aires and Santiago de Chile into the United Nations at war completed the ground work for this process.

If these arrangements seemed impressive before the war, the Inter-American system as it was to develop as a regional organisation within the United Nations after 1946 was truly striking. In 1947, the Rio Pact, or more formally the Inter-American Treaty of Mutual Assistance, gave a fully concrete and peacetime form to the alliance arrangements made in wartime. Never had Latin Americans accepted the constraints on their sovereignty and freedom of movement diplomatically as they did

in this document which made an attack on one American state automatically an attack on them all. With the signing the next year of the Charter of the Organisation of American States, the previous defence arrangement became a much wider one for cooperation in social, economic, political and military matters and created a distance between the Latin American states and Europe to which they had previously only been prepared to pay lip service. There was now no longer a possible counterforce to US influence in the Western hemisphere and Latin American states saw the writing on the wall and, in some cases swallowing their pride, joined them since they could not beat them.⁵⁸

As mentioned above, the real meat to these arrangements where defence was concerned were the Mutual Assistance Pacts signed bilaterally with most Latin American republics during the Korean War. This point will be discussed more fully later on but must be seen as tying Latin American diplomacy closer to that of the US in the 1950s as a whole. Washington's dominance in the region was proved again and again diplomatically but perhaps especially in the way criticism was muted about the overthrow of the reformist Arbenz government in Guatemala in 1954, the attempts to destroy the Castro regime in Cuba in the early 1960s and failing that, its isolation and expulsion from the OAS a little later on, and finally Latin American cooperation with the US' intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965.

The resurgence of Europe, however, did produce some inroads where US dominance was concerned. By the mid-1960s the European Common Market was threatening the US trading position

58. Ibid., pp. 211-216.

in a number of areas within the Latin American markets. In a way not seen since before the First World War, European commercial interest attempted to maximise the trading potential offered by Latin America and had some success in doing so, generally at US expense. In addition, aid and technical assistance began to come from European sources again and not solely from Washington. Indeed, in the weapons procurement and nuclear energy fields, the European option permitted the Latin American governments to bypass US restrictions on sophisticated weaponry and progress with nuclear energy thus frustrating Washington and demonstrating national independence in strident and generally popular ways. It should be noted that Canada joined Europe at this time in trying to find a larger place for itself in the commerce and investment picture in Latin America. The Diefenbaker initiatives in this regard were not abandoned when Mr. Pearson became prime minister in 1963.

Slowly but surely, the Latin American states reasserted some degree of greater independence frequently taking the lead from Mexico which had not hidden its criticism of the evolution of the Inter-American system into what Mexico City saw as a US dominated diplomatic and military alliance. The European link, the later growth of Japanese economic power, and even to some extent the socialist bloc, permitted a growing space in which Latin American diplomacy could again operate. The negative side of this was greater difficulty on Washington's part in controlling conflict in the region and the 1960s saw war break out between El Salvador and Honduras and military adventurism by Venezuela in Guyana. In that decade and in the early years of the 1970s a variety of other disputes arose as well or heated up involving Venezuela and Colombia, Chile and Argentina and Peru and Ecuador. Increasingly sophisticated weaponry, military

governments and, some would say a need to deflect popular passions onto outside problems and away from internal issues, made the international relations within Latin America considerably more dangerous than had been the case in the heyday of US influence.⁵⁹ Indeed, the 1960s, marked as they had been by an almost generalized threat of subversion and insurgency, had seen the Latin American governments (frequently military in any case) in basic agreement with Washington where threat perception was concerned. Latin American governments were also pleased that significant amounts of aid, awaited since the end of the Second World War, were finally beginning to come available in the context of the Cuban threat and America's Alliance for Progress and military assistance responses thereto. With the decline of the Cuban-inspired export of revolution threat, the reasons for such a congruence of policies became less clear, and with US aid again at low levels, many governments felt free to act more independently.

In the late 1970s and 1980s, the dominant international problems for regional governments became increasingly economic what with the fall in prices of export products, the debt crisis and the overwhelming impingement of domestic affairs on international relations. Countries which had adopted, or at least flirted with, independent policies were increasingly brought into line with Washington's view at least where major issues were concerned. The US's power in international lending agencies ensured the continuation of this situation overall

59. These points are discussed by the writer in a piece published at the time in co-operation with another author. It was entitled A Strategic and Economic Analysis of Canadian National Interests in Latin America (authors H.P. Kiepek and G.K. Vachon), pp. 49-51. The context is also discussed in my article, "Menaces à la paix internationale en Amérique latine," published in 1976 in Etudes Internationales.

despite an increasing tendency to elect populist governments, at least in South America. The handling of the debt crisis, the refusal to embark on a major restructuring of international trade, involvement in the Central American embroglio, and certainly most dramatically the United States' eventual support for the United Kingdom in the Falklands War of 1982; all made for a decade in the 1980s of reassessments of the Inter-American system. Despite denunciations by most Latin American countries of the above US positions, however, reality tended to prevail and little real manoeuvre was available to states anxious for Washington's good will where loans and aid were concerned. Much was made especially of the US's supposed treason in what was generally seen as the "colonial" war waged by the British against legitimate Argentine interests. Disregarding the long period of US neutrality on the issue, a stance which stupefied most NATO countries not to mention the vast majority of US public opinion, Latin Americans placed the emphasis on the diplomatic and to some extent military, direct assistance eventually afforded Great Britain during the later stages of the conflict. Latin Americans asked how it could be that with the Rio Pact in operation, an attack by Great Britain on Argentine soil could not only find Washington unwilling to come to Argentina's defence, but would actually find the US actively siding with and assisting the non-American attacker.⁶⁰ It goes without saying that this reflects little truth as obviously it was not the United Kingdom that attacked Argentina but the other way around. This is not, needless to say, how it is viewed in Buenos Aires, nor is it the way it is interpreted in most Latin American milieux.

60. Virginia Gamba, El Peón de la Reina, pp. 152-154.

Standing clearly out as a lesson of this conflict is the fact that little could actually be done to affect US actions once Washington had decided on them. However, on the issues of Central American war and crisis, Latin Americans could and did join together in new internationally active groups with specific objectives in mind. Originally the four nations of the Contadora group (Mexico, Panama, Colombia and Venezuela) aimed at bringing about a peaceful solution to the crisis and intended to do so in spite of US opposition to a solution which did not include the removal of the Sandinista regime in Managua. Despite this, the Contadora group carried on with its efforts, and was later sustained by the formation of a Contadora Support Group consisting of Argentina, Peru, Uruguay and Brazil. The amalgam of these countries came to be known as the Group of Eight whose frequent meetings to discuss Central American issues have become solidified in a number of ways and now permit the discussion of wide-ranging issues of common concern to the eight countries involved.⁶¹

The implications are great for the OAS of the formation now not only of separate economic groupings, a process over 20 years old in the Americas, but also of separate political groupings well outside the OAS and having no connection, at least in any formal sense, with that international organisation. Also in the Central American context, the accords leading on from Esquipulas II have been described as Central America's "second declaration of independence" in the sense that the process made great progress without the endorsement of the

61. Cristina Eguizábal, América latina y la crisis centro-americana: en busca de una solución regional, pp. 277-278.

regional superpower and in many ways and at several stages despite that superpower's preferences.⁶²

Thus one is seeing a truly major shake-up in the international relations structures in Latin America even if the loan weapon is still a powerful one in keeping the region's capitals from going too far in distancing themselves from Washington's wishes. The US is of course perfectly cognisant of these trends and is not averse to using the means at its disposal to try to maintain the OAS and the other elements of the Inter-American system in as good working order as possible as interpreted by the State Department. The country faces different pulls where Latin America is concerned. The public wish for government austerity, the removal of the Sandinista regime, the end of the Noriega government in Panama, and the moves towards peace in El Salvador and Guatemala are stimulating moves to reduce the American presence in the region. At the same time, one sees moves afoot aimed at reinforcing the American diplomatic and indeed military role in Latin America through pressures to look at the Panama Canal Treaty again, attempts to achieve permanent status for US forces stationed in Honduras, renewed efforts to topple Castro, and most dramatically an increase in the war against drugs.

Latin Americans are equally aware of the advantages and pitfalls of this tug-of-war the US is going through where Latin America is concerned, and involving either a lessened or increased US presence in their region. The "debt republics" are fearful that peace in Central America will lead, as indeed it has already begun to do, to greatly decreased aid packages

62. North, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

coming from the US. Many Latin Americans fear that the US will reduce its presence so far as to in effect turn its back on the region and on its potential role in helping to solve the area's problems.

At the same time, many Latin Americans are very uncomfortable with the idea of further permanent US installations south of the Rio Grande and are particularly worried about the high profile the issue of the war on drugs is obtaining, especially among military circles in the US. The desire for a reduced US military presence but increased US economic assistance in the region may be unattainable. The Congress in Washington is, as always, interested in cutting expenses abroad and unfortunately this is likely to hit those areas not considered to be vital to United States interests. Latin America will have difficulty being considered of only secondary defence interest but of primary interest in terms of areas of the world deserving of increased assistance and a favourable eye on economic issues.

With all this, one must emphasize again the special situation into which Canada is moving by increasing its connection with Latin America at this time in history. The above trends are unlikely to go away and the confused evolution of relations among the Latin American countries as well as in their relations with the US can be expected to continue for some considerable time given the difficulties of these trends finding a smooth path. As mentioned above, Canada's reluctance to become a full partner in the Inter-American system, a long-standing tradition of Ottawa's foreign policy, has been abandoned as a result of a perception of things improving on the Latin American scene, in the OAS and particularly in the

capabilities Canada has to influence events to our south. Whether this assessment ends up being accurate in the long run is of course an open question but as the decision has been made to strengthen links and to join the multilateral organisation which the OAS is, it behooves us to consider where we stand.

Canada remains interested in helping with Latin American democratization, its human rights progress, its economic situation and its attempts to reduce instability. Our foreign policy considers these objectives as falling relatively easily within the context of our political and economic interests and responding at the same time to our humanitarian inclinations. Our own situation in the international relations context discussed above must await further definition by Canadian governments but has already stimulated a fair degree of Latin American interest.

The republics to our south have long looked at Canada as a potential counterpoise to the US. Reformist elements look to us as a liberal influence in the Americas and as a country of sophisticated diplomatic skills and a much less "Cold War" approach than the US. All hope for further trade, investment, technical assistance, and aid as a result of the shift in Canadian interest which our increased involvement in the region and our membership in the OAS logically expressed. But in each of the areas mentioned above as areas of difficulty in Inter-American relations, Canada will be expected to play a role and this may be more difficult than many suspect.

Most dramatic in these challenges will be a requirement to establish a position vis-à-vis the US's legitimate role in the Americas. Canada has of course never accepted the Monroe

Doctrine although we were pleased to be connected with elements of it just before and during the Second World War. Nonetheless, the US tendency to arrogate to itself a police role in the countries south of its border has been one fairly consistently challenged by Ottawa when it was felt necessary to do so. Even at the height of the Cold War, Canada was less than impressed with the toppling of the Arbenz regime in Guatemala in 1954. Attempts to unseat Castro were also viewed with concern and occasionally alarm by Ottawa. The Dominican intervention of 1965 found the Pearson government less than sympathetic and anxious to make clear our disagreement with the US's perception at that time that it could unilaterally decide on the make-up of governments, and the future of countries, in Latin America.

Later on, Canadian policy in Central America diverged radically from that of the US and constant calls for an end to "all foreign intervention" in that sub-region left no doubt in observers' minds that this was critical of the US even if it might also be aimed at Cuba and to some extent the Soviet Union. The Trudeau and Mulroney governments alike, despite increasingly good relations with the US overall, found the Latin American scene to be one where this trend did not fully apply. The 1983 invasion of Grenada was added to the Central American crisis as an event fraught with embarrassment for Canada, which as a fellow Commonwealth country with a large stake in the Caribbean, was more than a little concerned with the direction events eventually took.⁶³

It is also true that Canada shares many US concerns about the region but on the issue of the US's position therein, there

63. McFarlane, *op. cit.*, p. 192.

is considerable room for doubt as to what extent Ottawa and Washington can find common ground. Canada's relations with the US have of course been very good for almost the whole of this century and the combination of close ties on a number of fronts, common participation as allies in wartime, a perceived similar way of viewing the world, an interest in economic expansion, and a history of over a century of peaceful sharing of the continent; all make for this country having bilateral relations with our enormous neighbour of a kind beneficial to both.

The Latin American experience is of course a very different one reflecting their relative weakness at a time of great American expansion and power and the perception on the part of Washington of the region as unstable, potentially dangerous, and needful of a careful eye in order to ensure US interests therein. It cannot be overemphasized to what extent the US feels that Latin America is an area of absolutely vital interest to it. This is of course not at all the case for Canada which as has been shown, and will be shown later still, Canadian levels of interaction are limited in terms of personal contacts, trade, investment, and general historic connection. As has been mentioned, Canadians with relatively few exceptions, have never felt very close to Latin America and indeed even the recent decision by Ottawa to become closer brought forth little public comment and certainly no public euphoria.

Latin America is, then, not a vital interest to Canada even though it can be seen as important. There is clearly room for difficulties here with the United States. Washington logically expects that since its vital interests are involved in Latin America, or so it is perceived: and that Canada's vital interests are not so involved, that Ottawa will naturally, as a

good friend and ally, yield to American preferences when major issues arise. This is of course quite natural. On the other hand as the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs have repeatedly made clear in public declarations since the Autumn of 1989, Canada has no intention of playing a second fiddle role to the US in Latin America and has every intention of being an independent voice expressing an independent foreign policy toward the region.

It is precisely the kind of dangers inherent in this kind of dichotomy that previous governments have attempted to avoid through not becoming too close to the OAS or to Latin American issues where collisions with the US might be expected. It is in this sense that so many analysts await a further definition of Canadian policy in the region and a clearer idea of what kind of role Ottawa intends to seek in the Americas. The Free Trade Agreement with the US points the way to a Canada much more closely linked to the US and to the effective abandonment of what used to be called the Third Option. Nonetheless, the desire to hedge one's bets has led to major initiatives to improve trade and other economic links with, to some extent Europe, but particularly with Japan and the ASEAN countries. In Latin America however, one has not limited oneself to economic links but rather has moved on to join a major multilateral international political organisation. Many observers were profoundly disappointed in December of 1989 when the Canadian government showed greater backing for the US intervention in Panama than did any country in the Americas save El Salvador.⁶⁴ Concern was expressed across a broad spectrum of

64. "Central America Events of Note", Capa Memo, February 1990, pp. 1-2.

political viewpoints that Canadian acceptance of the US police role in the hemisphere had never been positively viewed before and yet here one was, in the midst of statements about the independence of our policies, taking a stand of a dramatically different kind, and of an exceptionally more pro-American kind, than those taken by Canadian statesmen in the past.

On the issues of international economic difficulties, Canada may also find itself in somewhat problematical circumstances. While relatively liberal on issues related to the freeing of trade and international debt, Canada could still find itself stuck on questions of the overhaul of the international economic system, the possibility of a moratorium or similar arrangements regarding international debt, and with regard to aid. Canadian banks, as is well known, have a major stake in the resolution of the debt problem which does not leave them high and dry. The Canadian public is probably already paying for this crisis in the exceptional increases that have occurred in bank charges in recent years. Be that as it may, the banks will be less than anxious to see excessive generosity shown the Latin Americans on the debt issue when such kindness comes at the banks' expense. Canada benefits greatly from the current international terms of trade and the Canadian consumer may not be much more keen that his US or European counterpart to see the price of Third World products rise in relation to those produced at home. Lastly, as has been seen in the most recent budget, foreign aid is far from the sacred cow it was once thought to be and Canada's position as a donor, already

stretched thin around the world, may simply not be able to do other than disappoint Latin American hopes from us.⁶⁵

On the issue of colonialism there is also room for potential difficulties. While the situation has calmed in recent years, even a short memory will remind us of the dramatic events related to the Falklands in 1982 and to the difficulties until very recently involving the United Kingdom and Belize, two Commonwealth partners, with respect to a series of Guatemalan governments. Guyana also is a source of dispute between it, occasionally the United Kingdom and Venezuela. Nor is the Surinam-Brazil relationship one without complications.

Argentine-British relations have recently been re-established although Argentine animosity towards Great Britain is still great. Anglo-Guatemalan relations have also recently been put on a roughly normal basis but here, as with Argentina, this reflects not so much the end to disputes as the necessity to re-open the door to cooperation with the European Economic Community, an improvement which can only be achieved with British blessing.⁶⁶ In 1982, Canadian support for the United Kingdom was complete and unquestioned. On the UK-Belize-Guatemalan dispute, Ottawa's pro-Belize point of view is well established and well known. Choices on these matters had been relatively easy to make when Canada was merely a part of the United Nations in whose agencies these issues were debated. If they arise again in the future, as they may well do, Ottawa may have to confront Guatemala City and Buenos Aires in a forum very

65. These questions on aid, access to markets and the Canadian consumer are discussed in Liisa North, *op. cit.*, pp. 118-126.

66. See H.P. Klepak, "Obstacles to Peace in Central America", a CIIPS study to be published autumn 1990.

much less friendly and very much less pro-Commonwealth than was the case in the past.

When considering the formation of separate economic groupings for Latin America in which the US is excluded, there is also reason for moving with care. The main reason, at least the main publicly expressed one, for wishing to establish such groupings without the membership of the US, is that American inclusion would swamp the smaller Latin American economies and destroy the whole purpose of such economic linkages. Pro-Canadian Latin Americans argue that Canada's economy is small enough, and its political credentials innocent enough, to allow for such membership for Ottawa even where Washington is unwelcome. This is of course difficult to square with the recent Canada-US Free Trade Agreement and with geographic and economic realities. Canada is a long way from Latin America and has no common border with the region. Canada is a member of a free trade arrangement with the very superpower of which Latin America is fearful. Canada likewise would not be interested in being excluded from yet another trading bloc developing in the world. With all these considerations to keep in mind, the evolution of our thinking on Latin American economic integration must remain attentive to its likely impact on Canadian trade and investment whatever our pleasure at seeing economic progress occur in Latin America.

On the thorny issue of defence and security cooperation, one is again in something of a quandary. The US has worked long and hard to establish multilateral and bilateral defence relationships with all of Latin America. Even with those republics most reluctant to take part where Washington has been unsuccessful in getting mutual assistance pacts signed with

individual republics; it has had complete success in getting the formal establishment of a defence system under-written by the Rio Treaty and generalized membership of the Inter-American Defence Board and its related institutions. Indeed the only country whose regime is excluded from Inter-American defence cooperation is Castro's Cuba whose setting apart from the system was the work of the US itself.

Much to Washington's chagrin the defence elements of the Inter-American system and of the Organisation of American States in particular are the target of some of the major reform efforts within the OAS.⁶⁷ Canada is on record as having reviewed its OAS membership option, and having accepted to take that option up, on the basis of our interest in a reformed institution. The fact that we have included reservations to our signature of the Charter, not to mention rejected completely any idea of signing the Rio Pact, shows a clear intention on our part to de-emphasize the defence and military aspects of this inter-American system. While this will be welcome to a number of democratic regimes, particularly reformist ones, it will not be to either the US or conservative and military regimes in Latin America.

While the drugs issue will be discussed in greater detail in a separate chapter, it is also necessary to say a word about it in this specific international context. While the US has recently trumpeted the need for international, and particularly inter-American efforts to combat the drug traffic, Canada has been more circumspect about the prospects for success and about

67. This is discussed repeatedly in Edgardo Mercado Jarrin, Un sistema de seguridad y defensa sudamericano, pp.

the complications of an excessively military response to the problem of international narcotics transfers. US internal pressures, which have become so powerful in recent years and which press for rapid and complete "victory" in the drug war, are not reflected very much in either Canadian political priorities or in foreign policy.⁶⁸ The dominance that the drug issue has had in the US's relations with most of the Andean republics, with Mexico and with parts of Central America has virtually no echo in Ottawa's perception of things. The views of the US on how to resolve this difficulty tend to be squarely opposed to those of the Latin Americans, particularly the Peruvians and the Bolivians. Canada can expect to be under pressure from the United States to back its way of thinking on these matters and to also call for Latin American action in support of this perspective. On the other hand, many Latin American governments will look to Canada to show a better understanding of the complexities of the drug issue and to work to calm what might be US excesses in attempting to deal with this scourge.

The challenges then are great for Canada to strike a balance showing both independence and understanding in its relations with Latin America while at the same time demonstrating to the US that one remains a partner fully cognisant of the legitimacy of many US interests in the region to their south. These challenges will require careful study and contemplation by diplomats and politicians alike.

68. It should be mentioned that such issues are, however, far from absent from Canadian concerns. See the interview with Bill McKnight, the Defence Minister, in "Jane's Defence Weekly", 20 October 1990, p. 788.

Chapter VII: The Military Context-Domestic

There can be few areas of the world where the military context impinges more on domestic and international matters than in Latin America. The key role played by the armed forces in Latin America dates back to independence and expresses clearly the dangers for civilian governments of weak national cohesion, insufficiently developed state structures, and civilian institutions which are either corrupt, inefficient or both. When Canadian relations with Latin America were at a less developed level, and where their future seemed less of a priority for governments, there was a tendency to accept the military role in Latin American events as a given but to do little to come to grips with it. No Canadian embassy in Latin America for example has or has had a military attaché among its staff despite the well-known relative capabilities of military attachés as opposed to civilian diplomats to break into the corridors of decision-making where armed forces dominate governments.

As seen above, the wars of independence left caudillo-style governments in power in most Latin American countries and these were only superseded by more "normal" regimes after the passage of several, and in some cases many, decades. While Argentina and Chile managed to rid themselves of the phenomenon relatively early once their national state structures were in place, other countries, such as Mexico, most of Central America, Venezuela and the other Andean republics made much slower progress and, some authors argue that the tradition of the caudillo is still with us in the more backward states of the

area.⁶⁹ When national armies were made more professional and generally improved in the years prior to World War I, and as a result of international threats of war and a desire to shore up regimes, the caudillo tended to give way especially at the local level. European military missions, soon accompanied by US and Chilean ones, produced much improved forces capable of more than just policing their countries and keeping their regional boss in the President's chair. One of the reasons put forward for this increasing professionalization and improvement of the armed forces was that, it was hoped, such moves would tend to interest the officer corps in professional matters rather than in politics and that democracy, or at least civilian regimes, could expect to progress under less of a threat from their armed forces. This way of thinking, while not without some truth, tended to ignore that in the absence of strong and efficient civilian institutions which appeared capable of addressing major national problems, a more and more effective and self-confident army and officer corps might be even more tempted to interfere in politics than a less impressive one had done in the past.⁷⁰

In the face of social upheaval, revolutionary ideas, international crises, corruption, and the series of blows to Latin American prosperity so often raised already in this paper; these modern military forces have in recent decades been sore tempted to intervene in politics in order to "save" the country and address its difficulties with efficiency and honesty given the lack of such qualities within the core of civilian

69. S.E. Finer, The Man on Horseback, p. 210.

70. See Frederick M. Nunn. Yesterday's Soldiers for a lengthy discussion of this issue in the South American countries.

politicians.⁷¹ With Washington frequently watching on with an approving eye, and with the justification provided by the infamous Doctrine of National Security developed in the 1960s, armed forces could exercise their constitutional or self-given right to intervene in politics, set up governments of national salvation and rule by themselves or in combination with "right-thinking" civilian political groupings.

Thus, far from seeing a modern era of democracy and advancing civilianization of the political process, until very recently military governments have been more common than exceptional. While Costa Rica, Mexico and Venezuela have all enjoyed decades of civilian rule, and while Colombia has remained generally democratic, no other Latin American country can boast as much. Even now, with the wave of democratic regimes re-established recently in the region, the military is far from absent. In Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras, civilian governments remain in power on the sufferance of the armed forces who have effective veto power on important national issues such as relations with the US, dealings with insurgence movements, the defence budgets and size of the army, and relations with Nicaragua. In this last country, an army still dominated by Sandinista leadership is taken very seriously indeed by the civilian government of Violeta Chamorro.

On the South American continent, the Colombian example is troubling as the duration, violence and complexity of war with the guerillas combined with war with the drug lords makes for a government almost totally dependent on its armed forces which operate, in many instances, virtually as an independent

71. S.E. Finer, *op. cit.*, p. 251.

force.⁷² Recent democracies in Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru make a point of not pushing the army too hard and of leaving security matters squarely in the hands of military commanders so as to give their fragile regimes time in which to get solidly established.

Brazil's military are likewise pampered by a democratic government which only achieved power through the acceptance by the military that such a process should take place and which understands well the potential of the armed forces to make trouble if their concerns are not kept in the forefront of their government's mind. It is nonetheless true that the military have been cooperative with the new government and have accepted, for example, large reductions in their proposed defence expenditure programmes.

The first civilian government to take office in Argentina after the disastrous Falklands War faced two attempted coups d'état during its term in office and although the new government of Carlos Menem has so far not encountered such ferocious resistance (and has been much less anxious to punish guilty military officers for their role in the 'dirty war'), the military are clearly seething under the strong restraints programme imposed by the civilians. At the moment the virtually total discrediting of the armed forces as an institution as a result of the "dirty war" and defeat in 1982 makes it difficult to imagine them succeeding in getting the kind of widespread support necessary to mount a real challenge to the government.

72. Jerry Pearce, Colombia: Inside the Labyrinth, pp. 238-249.

Their discontent is extremely disquieting and must be addressed if Argentine democracy is to find stability in the future.⁷³

In Chile, the worst pessimists have been proven wrong in that the civilian Aylwin government has received power peacefully from the outgoing military regime of General Augusto Pinochet. However, it may be a little early for rejoicing as Pinochet has retained his position as armed forces commander and is surely keeping the government from too dramatic changes which might threaten the military institution. The strength of the anti-democracy vote in the referendum which permitted the transition back to a civilian regime is still of concern to specialists watching the evolution of Chilean politics.

In Paraguay, as mentioned, the Rodriguez regime, while headed by a military man, is clearly out to democratize the country as soon as practicable. Real efforts are being made much to the surprise of many pundits who expected the "golpe" against the former dictator General Stroessner was merely a palace coup with Rodriguez the new military man at the top. In Uruguay as well, the end of military rule has been accomplished with relative ease and the government seems stable. However, the deal not to press investigations and charges against military officers who had been excessively involved in the repression of the post-1973 military regime leaves many disappointed and fearful that the armed forces will not have learnt their lesson in Uruguay and may consider themselves still above the law. In both Uruguay and Paraguay, whatever the direct involvement of the military is, the armed forces' voice

73.

See the nature of these demands in Horacio Verbitsky, Medio Siglo de proclamas militares, pp. 162-168.

counts especially on the issues which it considers vital to itself as an institution. Governments are unlikely to try to tackle it directly.

In Venezuela, the military were thrown out of politics in a formal sense in 1958 and they have remained out except in the usual sense of Latin America, that is that they tend to be pampered by a government which is not keen to have difficulties with this very powerful grouping, the strongest in the state. The armed forces have proved loyal to the regime but the regime has earned their loyalty through a policy which does little which would annoy them and much with which they are contented.⁷⁴

The Cuban situation is much more complex. In theory the Cuban forces are merely the servants of the Party and the State. They do not have formal institutional status which could, again in theory, provide them with any justification for an overthrow of the government or even a role in policy formulation outside the usual one expected for the strong arm of the State. Reality, however, is somewhat different.⁷⁵ In Cuba, the armed forces are well treated and respected. There is little doubt that the question of the succession when Fidel Castro dies will be largely settled through the views of the armed forces. Castro's own brother Raúl is the head of the defence apparatus in the country, a key indication of the place the institution has in the eyes of the "máximo líder" of the Revolution.

74. José A. Gil Yepes, "El Encaje político en el sector militar: el caso de Venezuela", in Augusto Varas, op. cit., pp. 136-137.

75. Raúl Benítez et al., "Fuerzas armadas, sociedad y pueblo. Cuba y Nicaragua." in Ibid., p. 299.

Given the threats that the Cuban forces face in the presence of the greatest power on earth 150 kilometres to their north, with an avowed policy of bringing down the regime; it is hardly surprising that the views of the general staff have the ready ear of the head of state. Be that as it may, the results are clear. Cuba is not a military dictatorship but it is a state where the military view on things tends to be dominant anyway, and this because of the general situation of the island and its government.

In Haiti, military government with the declared intention of yielding power to the civilians is the order of the day, at least in a declaratory sense. However, as has been seen ever since the fall of the Duvalier regime the unexpected is more frequently the case than the predicted. In the Dominican Republic the calm of recent years is reflected in a retiring attitude on the part of the armed forces, an attitude whereby they demonstrate that their previous control could be reimposed if required and especially if leftist elements took advantage of rapid social and economic change and the disturbances these trends could cause.

Moving on to the international elements of the military context in Latin America, it must be said that here again there is a mixed story to put forward. Generally speaking in South America, the replacement of military regimes by civilian governments, the lack of hard currency caused by the debt situation and the economic crisis in general, the generally improved international environment reduced tension in the major conflict situations on the continent, and a certain degree of self-restraint on the part of the armed forces themselves; have all led to frozen or even reduced defence budgets in the very

recent past. South American officer corps, while far from happy necessarily with these trends, appear to in many cases accept the need for tightening the belt as a result of all the changes themselves. In this context however, it is necessary to underscore that the Latin American forces have been growing steadily for, in most cases, three decades and that they have in many ways been the spoiled children of the state apparatus in the majority of these countries since the 1960s or even before.

Money seems to be the key in these changes even though it may appear on occasion that the political role of the military, and who is actually in power, dominate. Whatever the truth of this, the fact is that in the late 1980s as shown in Table IV, South American armed forces (and defence industries and defence budgets) grew less quickly than had been the case and in some countries actually declined.

Table IV
Comparative Total Armed Forces
Strength of Latin American Countries 1955-90

	<u>1955</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1990</u>
Argentina	131500	133500	153000	95000
Bolivia	12000	27000	27000	28000
Brazil	107200	254500	274000	324000
Chile	41500	73800	96000	101000
Colombia	16700	64300	69700	130400
Cuba	23400	117000	153000	180500
Dominican Republic	18500	15800	23000	20800
Ecuador	19800	22300	39300	42000
El Salvador	6900	5130	41650	56000
Guatemala	3400	11400	40000	42200
Haiti	4900	6550	6800	7400
Honduras	3700	11200	17200	19200
Mexico	47800	82500	120000*	141500*
Nicaragua	10000	7100	61800	80000
Paraguay	3500	14500	16900	16000
Peru	37500	56000	135500	120000
Uruguay	6450	22000	29800	24400
Venezuela	17250	44000	44250	50500
TOTALS	512000	968580	1409500	1478900

Source: Klepak, op. cit., Regional..., p. 55, Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America and The Military Balance of appropriate years.

The Central American circumstances are of course peculiar given the fact that war has been going on in three of the states of the sub-region and the other two have felt heightened senses of danger and threat throughout at least the last decade. As shown in the same table, the armed forces of Honduras have roughly doubled, of El Salvador are over ten times as great, and of Nicaragua eleven times, those of 15 or so years ago. Up to this time the peace process has given only moderate results in terms of reversing this extraordinary growth in defence expenditures, military personnel and military equipment stocks.

Guatemala's domestic insurgency, after a long period of relative quiescence following the victory campaigns by the army in 1983 and 1984, knew an increase in activity in 1989 only to

be cut back very much again in early 1990 following negotiations between the government and the insurgents and a seeming agreement to end the three decades old struggle. Many other factors, however, come into play when discussing the impact such a decline in fighting might have on the actual strength and deployments of the Guatemalan armed forces. This country's military is one of the most pampered in the Americas having an officer corps with extraordinary privileges and an institutional place in society second to none. Promotions for officers have come often and they carry with them lucrative pay increases and access to economic and social gains on a number of planes.

Thus the Guatemalan military, with only a weak and fragile democratic government to deal with, has institutional strength which will probably slow any attempts to reduce the armed forces' numerical strength and may, with the spectre of renewed fighting, justify still the maintenance of an army infinitely larger than that existing before the recrudescence of the guerilla war in the late 1970s.⁷⁶ US experts on the military and civilian scene in Guatemala suggest that institutional pressures will keep the forces at no less a level than 30000 men whatever the consequences of the peace negotiations.

El Salvador's army, although perhaps not quite as well treated in the recent past as has been the Guatemalan, is also an institution dealt with in a special manner by the civilian government. A small force before the late 1970s its rapid expansion since then has here again led to rapid and easy promotion and, with massive US aid, also to great economic

76. "Ejército podría incrementar efectivos", in El Gráfico, 22 June 1990.

advantages to the officer corps. The Salvadorean situation politically and militarily also seems to be turning relatively favourable following negotiations between rebels and government in recent months. Here also the likelihood of reductions in military manpower is significant but whether those reductions themselves will be is another matter. The Salvadorean military also feel, like the Guatemalans, that they do not wish to let down their guard too much and therefore open the door to renewed rebellion against which they would be ill-prepared to defend the state. Thus they suggest that force levels will have to be maintained higher than those proposed by the insurgent Frente Farabundo Martí de Liberación Nacional, which would be a mere 12000 men.

The Honduran situation is somewhat different. While its forces have more than trebled as a reaction to the expansion of those of its neighbours, especially the Nicaraguans, there has not been in recent decades a serious insurgent threat in this country which one Canadian diplomat has called the "sleepy hollow" of Central America. The existence of large numbers of Contra rebels in the country has also produced a destabilising effect generating a perception of a need for a larger army. Honduran officers, for the first time in history benefiting from real modernisation and massive improvements in their individual and institutional conditions, are not anxious to see those advantages disappear with generalized reductions in troop strength. On the other hand, the rapid decline in US assistance makes some reduction likely.

The Nicaraguan case is of course the most interesting of all. The original plan of the Sandinista government to cut the forces to levels lower than under the Somoza dictatorship soon

gave way to the requirement for rapid mobilisation and expansion caused by regional disapproval of the FSLN regime, the mounting of the Contra war against the regime and US sabotage and subversion.⁷⁷ The Esquipulas process, the FSLN-Contra peace negotiations, and now the election of the Chamorro government have completely turned upside down the military situation in the country. The FSLN, in a highly criticized posture, had made the army and the army's title reflect Sandinista as much or more than Nicaraguan status. The new government is thus faced with a military force which has seen itself as the arm not only of the Nicaraguan state but of the Sandinista movement itself. Thus both institutionally and politically the cuts one could expect as a result of peace and an improved international situation have been slowed by distrust on the part of the high command of the new people in power in Managua. It is no surprise then that the Chamorro government, in a major compromise, left in the key post of defence minister Umberto Ortega, the former president's brother. He perhaps more than anyone that Chamorro could name, may be able to effect the reductions which should come.

Even Costa Rica, formally without an army, had increased its forces in the wake of the tensions engulfing the region over the last decade. These forces are not either highly trained or heavily armed but are nonetheless more than a police force.⁷⁸ The institutional weakness of this Civil Guard in a demilitarized republic means that here at least it will be

77. The points discussed here are dealt with in greater detail in this author's Verification of a Central American Peace Accord, published in February 1989.

78. See the chapter on Costa Rica in Adrian English, The Armed Forces of Latin America.

relatively easy to produce reductions in the size of security forces. In fact it would be no exaggeration to say that both the government and opposition political forces within Costa Rica would be delighted with any possible decline in regional conflict and its concomitant savings in security expenditures on the part of San José.

Perhaps the major official stumbling block remains the traditional international rivalries which have plagued Central America since the breakup of the original Confederation in the late 1830s. Increases in the forces of countries actually facing insurgency brought about nearly automatic increases in those without such domestic strife and this expresses as clearly as possible the distrust that previous discord and indeed recent wars have produced among the Central American states. Guatemala is unhappy with a Salvadorean army for the first time in history larger than Guatemala's own. El Salvador, in turn, is uninterested in seeing its forces decline where it sees those of its neighbours increase. Honduras provides perhaps the most dramatic example of military growth as a reaction to traditional threat perceptions of an international kind. Tegucigalpa has watched with alarm its enemy in the 1969 "soccer war" expand the quantity of its forces and vastly improve their efficiency and combat readiness, not to mention combat experience, in the last ten years. El Salvador had been the victor in the 1969 war with forces infinitely smaller, less well-armed, and less well-trained than those she has today. Needless to say, this is not reassuring to Honduras.

A region such as Central America, which has known repeated outbreaks of international war among its constituent states since independence over borders, ideologies, local

rivalries, migration issues and the like, will not escape power political considerations in the future. It is unlikely that even with the disappearance of the major source of ideological discord, the Sandinistas, from power in Managua, that traditional differences will remain below the surface. Indeed, it could be argued that the end of the ideological groupings resulting from the Central American crisis of recent years will bring about more and not less of the historic disputes about boundaries for example. Both Honduras and El Salvador are unhappy with the U.S. imposed peace agreement of early on in the 1980s. It is far too soon to conclude that peace has broken out in this region and continued doubts on the subject, and on the intentions of governments and armies locally, will feed the tendency for a slowed reduction in armed forces. While in no way as dramatic, similar considerations may help to explain the slow, if any, decline of armed forces strengths in South America. Despite democratization and international peace in the region the armed forces have not, except in Argentina, faced dramatic cuts.⁷⁹ While it is true their budgets have frequently been frozen or in some cases been marginally reduced, this is not the case for their overall strengths. Yet the reasons for the retention of heavily armed and numerous armed forces have been reduced. The anti-communist alliance embodied in the OAS has been the target of most of the thrust for the reform of that organisation. The Doctrine of National Security, although in no way gone, is nonetheless neither as visible nor as relevant in today's world of a reeling international communist movement whose influence on events has been either reduced or eliminated.

79. Argentina's certainly have. See the author's "Argentina's Army Since the Falklands War", Armed Forces, IV, 8, 1985, pp. 293-295, and Augusto Varas, *op. cit.*, pp. 59 and 65-66.

The armed forces themselves show little sign of being interested in taking power from the civilian governments even though, a cynic might remark, that this is only because the situations facing Latin American governments are so intractable as to make any logical human being shy away from suggesting he has answers for them. Both the rhetoric and seemingly the reality of the international relations of Latin America at the moment reflect the desire for an era of peace which will finally allow economic priorities to be dominant and give a chance for development at a rapid rate without the threat of a military coup or the weight of massive military expenditures holding back progress. As mentioned, Latin American governments are seeking new political and economic groupings which will help them get out from under the difficulties they have. These hopes fit uncomfortably with strident nationalism of the military or rightist varieties and require an openness and straightforward dealings which should build confidence rather than distrust among the governments of the region.

Thus one can see a context for international relations in and of Latin America dominated by a drive for economic progress and an attempt to improve the region's prosperity and relative status in the world. Relations with one another, with the US, and with the rest of the world including Canada, will show the strength of this deep-felt desire whereby Latin American governments hope to create an international environment which by favouring economic progress will also reinforce democracy and reduce the military role in local politics. Canada's role in all of this, if she is to have a significant one, will be expected to fit in to this pattern of design.

Chapter VIII: The Military Context-International

Difficult as it is to separate the military from the international relations context for Latin America, it is important to underscore the relevance of the defence situation of the Latin American states if one is to understand how it will impinge on diplomatic relations with the rest of the world. It is of course well known that the armed forces in Latin America, generally speaking, have a major policy role and great influence. What is less known is that the armed forces of the region achieved this position with a remarkably low percentage of the national population actually under arms. Few are the Latin American countries which are required to conscript anything like all or almost all of their available young men. Indeed only Cuba, and to some extent Nicaragua, are current examples of conscription at a European or former US level. Most Latin American forces make do with under one percent of the population with the colours at any one time and while some Central American states obviously are the exception to this rule at the moment, historically even their forces represented a small portion of national male youth.⁸⁰

There are a number of factors involved in this state of affairs. It is of course expensive to maintain large armies, to train and to arm them. In a society where family links are strong, conscription can be an annoying part of family life for a very large number of people even where the number of conscripted youths may appear small. In addition, international threats are usually sporadic and have tended in recent decades largely to be settled off the battlefield although there are of

80. "El Gráfico", Guatemala, 20 December 1988, p. 27.

course exceptions to this rule. Even where domestic conflict is concerned, regular armies have found it possible to at least contain, if not defeat, insurrection without mobilizing in any way the nation's full military manpower potential to do so.⁸¹

In addition to these factors, one must remember that in some countries national cohesion is not great and the difficulties of making national service legislation have a writ which runs out into the countryside in any efficient way, are very great indeed. In many smaller countries, where conscription is the rule but where the bureaucratic structures to implement it are weak and inefficient, the methods for applying conscription differ little from the press gang with its accompanying arbitrariness, application of force, and frequent brutality. Here as well, particularly where insurrection is present, the dangers of applying a conscription law may become obvious as domestic opposition to it feeds the insurgency it is meant to fight.

For this combination of reasons then, armed forces are small as well as influential. Through the lack of NCO cadres, the role of the officer becomes more and more crucial. Few other ranks are tempted to sign on again after their conscripted period of service is completed. Hence the pool of senior NCOs is of erratic worth and size. Into the void has moved historically an officer corps willing to undertake jobs and give instruction in fields normally dealt with by NCOs in white Commonwealth or NATO armies. Indeed in most senses the professional backbone of all Latin American armies with the possible exceptions of Cuba and Nicaragua is the officer corps.

81. Gabriel Aguilera, El Fusil y el olivo, p. 23.

Benefitting from long academic and technical training, the officers produce a body of influential, disciplined and organized uniformed leaders whose cohesion offers a stark contrast to most other national institutions. In almost all Latin American countries, the only entrance into the officer corps is through the military academies where the courses are long. The officer-cadet is taken in young, and this is where the sense of esprit de corps is developed fiercely in a lengthy process of indoctrination and suffering in common.⁸²

Officer-cadets are encouraged to build lasting friendships with their colleagues and in many cases to both accept the protection of more senior officers and, as time goes on, to offer their own to those more junior to themselves and who show promise. Loyalty to the military college from which one comes is usually life-long and in most countries a large number of officer-cadets will be the sons of either officers who had gone there themselves or of senior NCOs who would have done so if they had been able to do so.

The armed forces officer corps is also often strangely both of and outside the civil society. As young officer-cadets or officers their lives are dominated by military courses and a lifestyle wherein the profession is far more than just a job. They are not at this stage encouraged to develop links with the outside which might tend to loosen the cohesion of the officer corps as a whole. At the same time, more senior officers are frequently thrust into the political or even economic limelight

82. Jan K. Black, op. cit., p. 132. For a close look at a particularly influential military college, see "The Guatemalan Military and the Escuela politécnica", in Armed Forces and Society, XIV, 3, 1988, pp. 359-390.

by national events, by military involvement directly in the economy, and by the senior circles of the community with which they are increasingly expected to deal. Their powerful position also attracts the attention of those seeking favours from the influential military establishment and this also creates links between the upper echelons of the armed forces and those of the society at large. Normally in Latin America, armed forces officers are not from the upper classes so that exposure to the traditional elite can be an important moment for the officer anxious for a successful career. The advantages of these links to the officer make it difficult for those without very strong moral fibre to maintain their distance and to refuse the emoluments proffered frequently.⁸³ The troops on the other hand express very much more specifically national situations in the individual armies of the region. In Argentina, Chile or Uruguay, conscription produces a lower middle class or working class family's son who is frequently from an urban background and is relatively integrated into his society. He has a reasonable amount of education, can almost always read and write and is aware of the major trends of the day. In the Andean republics further north however the conscript is likely to be Indian and usually from a rural background, frequently without more than a smattering of education, and often with difficulties with reading and writing, and even with the Spanish language which is at times not his first. He is not fully integrated into the national society on occasions and is frequently not aware of major national issues.

In Brazil, there is a mix of both. The rural unemployed rubs elbows with the working class lad from the southern cities

83. Aguilera, *op. cit.*, pp. 24-25, 33-34, and 41-42.

and the range of backgrounds the Brazilian army faces is truly great. The Central American republics with the exceptions of Nicaragua and Costa Rica offer perhaps the best examples of the press gang method in operation producing a soldier who is young, fit, and enured to hardship, but one who is brought in unfairly and given what is often ferocious training. He is never a member of the bourgeoisie or any influential group but is usually the son of a peasant or worker.

While Costa Rica has of course no conscription, Nicaragua's system under the Sandinistas has, whatever its faults, been a model of just treatment applied across the board. In stark contrast with the rest of Central America and much of Latin America in general, Nicaraguan sons of businessmen and government ministers serve alongside those of peasant families and generally run the same risks they do.

Mexico's experience is closer to the general Latin American run where the army's conscription system is applied sufficiently gently and on the surface so as to cause little negative effect. Maintaining a 75000 man regular force in a country of almost 90 million where the percentage of young people is so high is not in any sense difficult and while conscription is definitely still on the books, voluntary enlistment is at least as important in filling the ranks. The impact of conscription is felt rather in the context of the manning of the reserve army of nearly 200 000 whose "weekend warrior" status is a very special one unique in Latin America and much connected with civic action programmes in the countryside.

Cuba, as almost always, is the great exception. The Cuban army is a massive conscript institution involving in one form or another virtually all young males in the country and a large number of females as well. For a country of 10 million to maintain a permanent defence establishment of over a quarter of a million and a reserve force several times that number requires a national effort and an acceptance of the real impact of conscription unheard of elsewhere in Latin America except during some of the years of the recent Nicaraguan-Contra conflict. All Cuban males can expect to serve in the army both in the regular force and in a militia system with numerous training periods following regular service. Militias are organized in the cities, in the neighbourhoods, in the villages, and in the workplace and, given what is perceived as the ever-present danger of US invasion or domestic subversion this large force is kept at a high state of readiness. No place in the Americas at any time in the continent's history has ever lived the militarisation of society which Cuba has over the last three decades.

Size is of course not the only key element in an armed forces' posture and importance. The degree of readiness and the quality of weaponry and training are also important factors and here again Latin America offers a wide range of experience at national levels. Chile was seen as the "Prussia of the Americas" from 1870 when Paraguay was crushed by the Triple Alliance of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay and nine years later when Chile thoroughly thrashed the larger armies of Peru and Bolivia in the War of the Pacific. Its army not only received the largest number of German military specialists to assist in its training of any country in Latin America but such was their impact that by the end of the last century, Chile was able to

send out its own military missions, which were much sought after to train other regional armies in the German methods with which the Chilean forces were so thoroughly imbued. The quality of this army was such that despite Argentina's massive population and wealth superiority over the last century, Buenos Aires was always obliged to take the option of war with Chile (frequently a potential conflict) seriously. In addition the opportunities for Peruvian revanchism regarding its southern territories lost in 1879 or of Bolivia irredentism vis-à-vis the famous route to the Pacific, were not to present themselves in a realistic way exactly because of the quality of training and armament of this relatively small but efficient army. Here we see the classic example of military influence on inter-state relations in the region as Chile, seemingly threatened by the overwhelming power of a potential Argentine-Bolivian-Peruvian alliance, was through military strength and a threat of a Brazilian alliance to take the enemy from behind, able to deter those countries from an attempt to redress the territorial status quo in the southern cone.

The Argentine army has, despite the above, also been considered a very serious force within the region. While Argentina's population was not able to match Brazil's, the former country was always considered much more modern and technically advanced than its Portuguese-speaking neighbour and was thought to be able to more than hold its own in any conflict between the two. It was felt that the Argentine conscript, an educated and modern individual, would easily best a Brazilian whose background was likely to be rural and ignorant. In addition and in general it was felt that the Argentine forces were better equipped than the Brazilians and better trained as well.

The poor showing of the Argentine forces in the Falklands War in 1982 gave the lie to this assessment with dramatic results on Argentina's relative power position vis-à-vis Brazil. The army's conscript was shown to be modern but with a tendency to also be molly-coddled. The Argentine forces suffered from strategic myopia and appeared incapable of producing a joint plan applying energy and force at the right moment against the British. The Navy was frightened out of major operations other than by air through its losses early on. The Army's showing on the islands themselves was dismal to say the least with accusations of officers being too concerned with their own luxuries and too little interested in their men's well being while showing scant regard for the requirements of tactics. Training at junior NCO and other rank levels was shown to be poor and leadership higher up little short of hopeless. With some honourable exceptions the army came home in deserved disgrace. Only the air force showed throughout courage and tactical skill particularly at junior officer level and efficiency and hard work at NCO technical levels.⁸⁴ Even strategically the air force fared better than the other two services although the insistence on attacking escort ships of the Royal Navy rather than the crucial transports bringing the troops to shore and supporting them there remains a decision thoroughly baffling to strategists today.

Paraguay's army was for decades after independence probably the best man for man in South America. The Guaraní indian who filled its ranks was a model of endurance and

84. See Martin Middlebrook, The Fight for the Falklands, the best book on the Argentine side of the war published so far.

soldierly skills. The army was able to establish the Paraguayan state despite predatory neighbours and caudillo influences and as discussed above was able to defend the country for an extraordinarily long time despite the massive superiority of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay in the War of the Triple Alliance.⁸⁵ The massive losses sustained by Paraguay in that war required several generations after 1870 to effect full national recovery. Nonetheless when in 1930 Asunción went to war with La Paz, the latter's army was unable to secure a victory despite the views held about it by most experts. Indeed Paraguay by the end had the upper hand in the War of the Chaco.⁸⁶ Since 1935 the army has had to act essentially as a buffer of the regime and has not been a major actor in international areas of concern.

Brazil has what is formally the largest army on the Latin American mainland. With nearly 300 000 men under arms, and with a more than respectable fleet and air force, the Brazilians are now the undoubted regional power par excellence. Part of this is as a result of the Brazilians' efforts themselves in improving their armed forces in numbers, training, weapons, and equipment. Part of it is also the result of the relative decline of Argentina mentioned above. Brasilia has not had an occasion in which its army has been tested abroad since the expeditionary force was sent to Italy in the Second World War to fight on the Allies' side. Nonetheless with Argentina a spent force, or at least generally viewed as such, Brazil has become *faute de mieux* the only power in Latin America which can truly

85. This amazing story of heroism and determination is well described in Gilbert Phelps, Tragedy of Paraguay.

86. Roberto Querejazu Calvo, Historia de la guerra del Chaco, pp. 14 and 176.

be considered significant. The country's geopolitical situation, with a vast Atlantic coast and a border on every state in South America except Chile and Ecuador, also helps the country to have a regional role of immense importance even if, as Brazilians hasten to add, this does not come with hegemonial designs. More important however than either the military or geopolitical situation but related to both is the relative importance of Brazil's population and its economy. Roughly one third of Latin Americans and one half of South Americans are Brazilians and the Brazilian population is growing apace. In addition, Brazil's economy has proven to be not only the largest but also the most dynamic in the region and to have sustained this growth, despite reductions in its rate, for decades. Such economic strength means the prospects for the Brazilian forces to remain significant and to be able to back up political initiatives by their government, remain impressive.

Peru's army does not have a particularly successful history with defeats at Chile's hands on two occasions and indecisive conflict with Ecuador on further occasions in the last century and this. It is reasonably well armed and not small, however, and has on occasion worried the Chileans. Its influence in the state is great as former president Alan Garcia discovered and it has remained a pampered institution which civilian presidents are wary of either criticising too harshly or seeking to control too closely. The army seeks autonomy to get on with its war with the Sendero Luminoso and is not especially concerned about the drug war, which it considers a minor affair not threatening to the state and perhaps largely

the United States' problem anyway.⁸⁷ The war against Sendero, it must be said, is not going particularly smoothly and is engaging the army's resources massively as it has done for well over a decade. Vast areas are well under the control of the insurgents and the challenge of maintaining, let alone re-establishing, government rule over the rural spaces is a great one.

The Bolivian army has had a record in foreign war little less than catastrophic. Defeated twice by Chile in the last century and once by Paraguay in our own, Bolivia has been shown to be too weak to resist even diplomatic pressures, a state of affairs which has proved costly to her on her eastern border as well. The only land-locked country in Latin America, Bolivia suffers psychological as well as geographical isolation, despite its position at the very centre of the South American continent and its borders with Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina, Peru and Chile. The army has had no significant subversion campaign, much less insurgency, to deal with since the mid-1960s and in this sense shows the value of the agrarian reform and other changes to the system implemented in the 1950s and the 1960s. This may be just as well as the armed forces are not well-equipped nor do they appear especially well-trained.

Ecuador's reduced status geographically speaks as eloquently as anything could of its army's historic weakness relative to the country's neighbours. Quito feels that it has been robbed of its natural boundaries especially in the Amazon and this is of course the direct result of Ecuador's inability to defend itself in its various conflicts with both its northern

87. Roberto C. Noel Moral, Ayacucho: Testimonio de un soldado, p. 176. This work is the defence of his actions by one of the army commanders accused of wrong-doing in the anti-Senderista campaign.

and southern neighbours. It has not been easy to create national cohesion in the difficult topography of this nation nor in the light of the divisions between coast and hinterland and between the rival cities of Guayaquil and the capital. The army took many decades to get organized after independence, a process probably completed only with the Second World War and US assistance. The oil boom of the 1970s created an extraordinary situation wherein the moneys available to the Ecuadorean military were suddenly and dramatically increased. At that time, major improvements were made particularly in the modernisation of weapons and equipment. The boom years were however not to last and both country and armed forces have had more recently to accept belt tightening measures.

Venezuela remained caudillo-dominated well into the 20th century and developed organized military structures slowly and painfully.⁸⁸ Military colleges and military organization came about in the teeth of the opposition of entrenched political groupings less than anxious to see the central government having available an effective military force which could be used against local strongmen. Once established and right up to 1958, the Venezuelan army had a major role in politics and could make or break heads of state. After that year, however, it has learned to live quite comfortably with a civilian democracy which makes sure that the forces are well treated particularly in pay and weaponry terms. The army has no internal enemy and while boasting some key thinkers in the development of the Doctrine of National Security has not been required to apply it very greatly at home. Nonetheless, the civil disturbances of

88. Robert L. Gilmore, Caudillism and Militarism in Venezuela 1810-1819, p. 60-68.

the last two years have given the army pause and have placed internal security to the fore as a potential renewed role for it. Another role, and one involving a considerable body of troops, has been the deployment of Venezuelan paratroopers and selected officers to duties in connection with ONUCA's disarming of the Contras and more general responsibilities in Central America.

In neighbouring Colombia, the armed forces could hardly be more involved in internal security. Firstly, there is the war with various Marxist or populist rural insurgencies which have called on the army's efforts for many years. These groupings, particularly the infamous M-19 and the FARC, the latter backed by the Colombian communist party, proved of long life and great activity in the 1970s and 1980s. While the M-19 eventually reached a compromise with the government (though dissidents did break off from it) the FARC continues to struggle and has proved both ruthless and efficient.

Adding to these worries, the armed forces must also face the drug war. While some argue that both the FARC and the drug bands are in some sense an allied force against the government, as will be seen later on, most expert opinion seems to suggest that the drug barons have little in common with the leftist guerillas and are unlikely to wish to cooperate with them. What seems more likely is that the FARC takes advantage of smaller growers and distributors in some limited areas of the countryside but is unconnected with, and even opposed to, the drug barons of significance. Be that as it may, the army is immensely busy trying to maintain order and trying to put into effect the "declaration of war" on drugs issued by former President Virgilio Barco last October after the assassination

of a presidential election candidate. The drugs chapter of this paper will discuss this issue in more detail but at this stage it should be emphasized that this conflict threatens to be long and has already proven very bloody.

The military situation in Panama is of course in great flux. The US invasion of December 1989 led to the arrest of many senior officers and the formal abolition of the National Guard, as the army was then styled. The US, for the first time since the 1930s when the practice was common, has followed this intervention with a direct role in the establishment of the new armed force charged with Panamanian security. It is too early to say what this military force will look like but it appears from reports so far that its armaments will be less sophisticated and its assigned roles more internal security-oriented than was the case with the institution it is meant to replace. The questions this raises regarding the canal and its security will be discussed later on.

The Central American states have militaries whose situations have been looked at to some extent already. Suffice it to say here that in Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras, inflated armies look apprehensively at potential civilian moves to reduce their strength, and perhaps more importantly, their political influence over the next few years. Successes by the right in dealing with the extraordinary challenge mounted by the left in the last decade and a half would suggest that forces can be very much reduced. The fearful Sandinista challenge, which was not so much military but rather the example of a relatively successful leftist handling of the problems of uneven distribution of income, poor health facilities, illiteracy, and a housing crisis; has disappeared at least for the moment

leaving the right, or at best the centre right, solidly in the driver's seat. Forces will now be maintained to ensure this situation remains the case, to deter those who would see it changed, and to operate within the historic Central American context of mutual suspicion and territorial discord which has dominated so much of the sub-region's history over the last 150 years. US military assistance will prove crucial in guiding the developments of these armies for some time.

To the north, Mexico's army, despite internal security roles on occasion in recent decades is living a quiet life. While concerned on occasion with events on its border and with refugee activities in the South, the army shares the general Mexican view that military threats to the state are not serious. Mexico's pro-Cuban stance since the Castro revolution meant that, despite temptation, Havana never sought to destabilize the Mexican regime. Recent real democratization of the system of elections in Mexico, de facto if not de jure, has led to a belief in many circles that it is actually possible to effect change in Mexico despite the dominance of the PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional). While the army, closely linked to the PRI over many decades, shares some of the fears of change which are shaking that party, the ability to see moderate change occurring through the successes of moderate parties appears to make the military willing to adopt a wait and see attitude and, in some cases, actually welcome current trends. As with Brazil, Mexican prosperity may be the best guarantee of the army's continuing high status.

Cuba's military share the tremendous nervousness at recent world events discussed above in relation to Havana's diplomats. Cuban generals are concerned that Washington's

string of victories visible to all in Eastern Europe, Afghanistan, Africa, and most notably Central America, these have encouraged a feeling in Washington that the US can do no wrong and that Castro's regime is the obvious next government to fall from the former communist world. Military men in Havana are willing to discuss openly what they see as a reinforced US campaign to raise the level of tension in the Caribbean and force Cuba to maintain an even higher level of national mobilization and state of alarm. They point to the increasingly harsh terms of Washington's trade embargo, the heightened tone of American propaganda about Cuba, US policy on Cuba in the United Nations, increased espionage overflying over the island, the re-enforcement of the US military installations in the Caribbean basin, the firing on a Cuban merchant ship in international waters off Mexico a few months ago, and the encouragement given to Radio Marti in Florida as the clearest of indications that the Bush government is determined to rid the Americas of the last leftist regime there. Although Cuban officers are obviously very circumspect about discussing such matters, there is also no doubt that they feel that the increasing tide of anti-Cuban sentiment in the Soviet Union is being pushed along by the United States in its negotiations with Moscow on a whole series of accords between the two superpowers.

The Castro regime has never been without a degree of paranoia but as the quip goes, there is such a thing as justifiable paranoia. With the world turning its back on Cuba, and with only Latin America showing some slight increase in improved ties with the island, Havana faces a United States which is more than ever able to use its influence to hurt the Castro regime. From the Cuban point of view, Washington is showing no reluctance in doing so and this may be a prelude to

a more military dimension to these manoeuvres. The response of the Cuban military has been an increase in exercises, especially those training for anti-amphibious, anti-paratroop, and anti-subversion operations. The infamous CRDs (the neighbourhood committees for defence of the Revolution) have come under direct military command and many normal institutional activities of trade unions and other groupings are currently held in uniform and have a distinctly defence oriented atmosphere.

The reduction, real or likely, in Soviet military assistance may not cut too deeply too soon if stocks of spare parts and fuels are maintained at a sufficient level. But in the long run, it is hard to see how relatively efficient, well-organized and well-armed revolutionary armed forces will be able to maintain a posture which demands so much from them.

In Hispaniola, the Dominican armed forces remain relatively inactive and appear to have little to fear. The Haitians, on the other hand, will need much more time before a reformed army can have a normal role in the democratic state and this is hardly surprising given the role of that institution over the last six decades.

Latin America then shows a large number of different military situations which viewed from outside appear to be not without hope but also not without more than their fair share of potential problems. It would be difficult to say that there has not been enormous improvement over the last decade. Both in a reduced role for the military in politics and in a lower level of international tension, one can see the roots of this improved situation. Nonetheless the issues this chapter has tried to underscore must remain with us if a proper view of future

possibilities is to be kept in mind. The US is less able to control or restrict conflict among Latin American states than it has been since the late 1930s. The end of a unifying threat from abroad has the potential to make historic border and other rivalries come to the fore again. The lessened role for the military in politics is one which they have chosen for themselves and one which they could at least theoretically decide to reduce at a later date. The causes of social unrest have in many areas not been reduced and if democracy can not address this challenge disorder could grow and the military be required to respond yet again. Finally institutional pulls may make it impossible, at least in the short run, to get the maximum profit from the era of reduced tensions in which we are currently living.

The Canadian military in the past has been virtually excluded from Latin American concerns. Firstly, Canada was not interested in taking part in the wartime arrangements for hemispheric defence within the context of the Pan-American Union and the special conferences of the late 1930s and early 1940s. Canada was also uninterested in the defence aspects of the Rio Pact and the setting up of the Organization of American States in 1947-48. When an Inter-American Defence Board and an Inter-American Defence College were set up, as when the Mutual Assistance Pacts came into play in the early 1950s; Canada stood aloof and played no role at all. Nor were Canadian diplomatic missions provided with military attachés even when military governments were in power in countries with which we wished to trade, and even where that trade was likely to have a major military component. Canada has not been impressed with many US military initiatives in the Caribbean region, particularly the invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965 and the isolation of

the Cuban regime over the last three decades. In brief, Canadians have been reluctant to see their armed forces as it were "sullied" by contacts with what had been viewed as excessively militarized governments of a very foreign and unsavoury kind.

The founding of ONUCA, and the military advice given to the Contadora and Esquipulas peace processes beforehand, constituted the first real military connection between Canada and Latin America in history. While it is true that Canadian reserve regiments were tasked with replacing British regulars in British Honduras, British Guiana, and several imperial possessions in the Caribbean during parts of World War II; and that a Royal Canadian Navy shore party landed for some hours in El Salvador during the Revolution of 1932 in order to protect the lives of British subjects; these Commonwealth-related events made for no lasting impression on either Canada or the Canadian armed forces.

ONUCA, however, was eventually to involve dozens of Canadian Forces personnel, particularly officers, in a long and constant presence in all five Central American countries and in close collaboration with the armies of Venezuela and Colombia also part of the verification groups sent. In addition, the Canadians were actually under the operational command of a Spanish army officer and worked alongside many more.

The Canadian Forces discovered a number of things as the ONUCA operation swung into gear. Operating for the first time in Latin America and with armies with comparatively little peacekeeping or related experience, the Canadians were also obliged to work in countries where the presence of "Blue Berets"

was a new phenomenon. Later on this issue will be discussed in more detail but a key point in Canadian activities in support of the United Nations or anyone else in peacekeeping or verification terms is that the word peacekeeping can have a very negative connotation in Latin America. This surprises many Canadians, accustomed as they are to operate in peacekeeping environments having widespread popular support at home and abroad for these activities. In the UN context this of course makes perfect sense. In Latin America however, peacekeeping activities before ONUCA were not UN but OAS-sponsored and reflected the domination of that international organization by the foreign policy objectives of the US. Thus in Central America observers on the ceasefire lines after the El Salvador-Honduras war of 1969, and the Latin American forces deployed to the Dominican Republic in 1965 in the wake of the US invasion, as well as other missions, could and were seen as little more than military deployments designed to "cover" US objectives. While the 1969 events in Central America had at least generalized support, the 1965 Dominican multi-national force was widely criticized throughout Latin America.

Particularly on the left, peacekeeping has been associated with US attempts to justify the maintenance of the status quo in Latin America. They would point to the almost desperate attempts by the Carter regime as recently as the Spring of 1979 to deploy a "peacekeeping" force from a variety of American republics between the victorious Sandinistas and the nearly finished-off National Guard of the Somoza dynasty. Even the right will acknowledge that this has been the experience to this day. It must also be said that the Contadora, Esquipulas and other accords sustaining the peace process recently in Central America have been unique in the history of the region

in the sense that they specifically left the exclusively OAS framework and were widened to include a major UN and tripartite (Canada, West Germany and Spain) cadre as well.

The US, in line with the Monroe Doctrine and following on to the suspicions of the UN that it has harboured since the end of the pro-American orientation of the organization in the 1960s, has consistently opposed the UN's having a role in the settlement of disputes in the Americas. In effect, the UN is treated as simply another foreign organization which should be excluded from the American "family". The US had worked hard to make sure the Monroe Doctrine was not threatened by the UN's prescriptions when the organization was founded and in its first years of operation. The OAS, as a regional organization authorized by the Charter, was looked on by Washington as a way of retaining the special nature of the US relationship with its southern neighbours. This general picture held true right into the 1980s and might have continued to do so were it not for a series of events which weakened American resolve and capacities in the Central American embroglio.

After 1984 an increasingly suspicious Congress placed more and more restrictions on the White House's freedom of manoeuvre in Central America especially following the CIA mining of Nicaraguan harbours. The Hasenfus affair followed by the much more serious Iran-Contragate scandal, shook confidence in national policy towards Central America and produced greatly enhanced room for action on the part of the Central American governments themselves. The result, the Esquipulas Declaration of 1987, brought the peace process not only away from the outside Latin American Contadora powers, but also, and much more importantly, out from under the strong guiding hand of

Washington. Even El Salvador and Honduras, countries whose views in previous negotiations had reflected embarrassingly closely those of the US, found it possible to agree on steps forward in the peace negotiations which had previously been considered impossible.

While Washington was no doubt unhappy with this turn of events, congressional cutting of aid and other restrictions, and an upsurge of criticism in the public regarding US-Central America policy, made the White House hold its hand at least to some extent. Even the local armies recognized that the peace process would have to be given a chance and hence room for manoeuvre was widened even further. It was here that the UN was able to take advantage of the evolving situation of what soon became the senior partner in international assistance with the development of the peace process and of the verification aspects underscoring it. The fact that Canada was very active at this stage in support of this process, and that West Germany and Spain wished also to help, and that none of these three countries was a member of the OAS although all were conservative NATO members; meant that a UN presence would be both stronger and less threatening to conservative interests than might at first have been thought likely by the US. Be that as it may, the OAS, invited to take part as well, was far from dominating the peace process. In addition, the OAS itself proved to be a more independent body than in the past and made a number of moves which were neither liked nor fully accepted by Washington.

The presence of Canadian, Spanish and Irish troops as well as civilian German airmen, alongside soldiers from Colombia and Venezuela, was made possible exclusively through this perhaps unlikely combination of events. Thus Canada's first

real foray into a Latin American military presence is in fact the direct result not of any welcoming by Washington of such a presence but rather as an inability on the part of the US to sufficiently influence events so as that presence should not take form.

To sum up then, for Canada the military context in Latin America will have an influence in the future where we are concerned which has not been the one known in the past. It is interesting that now more than one Canadian embassy has suggested to Ottawa that the appointment of a military attaché to the capitals to which they are accredited would be a good initiative. Canadians, at first somewhat hamstrung by linguistic difficulties in Central America, proved to be flexible and are now working as a matter of course not only with the Spanish, Colombian and Venezuelan armies, but also with the four armies of Central America and the Costa Rican Civil Guard. For anyone interested in Canadian-Latin American relations over the last century, the revolution in Canadian direct contact with the region could hardly be exaggerated.

After recent testimony to the Committee of the House of Commons on External Affairs and International trade, this author was questioned about whether there is not still a danger of Canada's forces being improperly influenced by working too closely with armies closely involved in politics, very much under the influence of the US, and allied to rightist groupings throughout the Americas.⁸⁹ There is no doubt that this question reflects the old reluctance of Canadians to get involved with

89. Minutes of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, House of Commons, Ottawa, 9 November 1989.

what is seen as a somehow distasteful situation south of the Rio Grande. Nonetheless, the decision for OAS membership has been taken, and the ONUCA deployment has been made. Our interests are now to deploy our efforts to achieve those things Canada wishes out of Latin America, and there is no doubt that this can best be done by recognizing that the military dimension of Latin American affairs is an enormous one and that ignorance of this dimension can lead only to misjudgments and an unfulfilled capacity to influence events.

There will be a need to capitalize on what one has learned from ONUCA and from the OAS negotiating experience, and to base our policy on a true understanding of why events happen as they do in Latin America and how they can be influenced in ways favourable to us. In this process ignorance of military events will simply reduce the limited weight we might otherwise have even further.

Chapter IX: The Brazilian-Argentine rapprochement

Having now dealt with a series of general chapters wherein one has hoped to have crossed national boundaries and found contexts of importance, this chapter will be the first to address specific areas where strategic interests of Canada may be involved and where major changes of truly dramatic scope are affecting the Latin American region and the general situation in which closer Canadian-Latin American relations must develop. The Brazil-Argentine rapprochement is chosen because it is the view of this paper that this trend is the most important single element of hope and of change in the whole international relations context of Latin American affairs.

Brazil and Argentina had hardly achieved independence before they were at war. The extraordinary Bandeirante phenomenon, which existed for centuries, found a group of first Portuguese and then Brazilian adventurers and colonisers pushing back the frontiers between Portuguese-speaking and Spanish-speaking Latin America (at the expense of the latter, needless to say) and making the Treaty of Tordesillas a "lettre morte". Hundreds of thousands of square kilometres of the interior of South America were occupied by these daring small parties of men, and Spain proved unable to use its superior military strength at home in an effective way in countering these moves in the interior of the New World.

With independence the relatively unstable successor states of the former Spanish Empire had their hands full with local separatism and civil wars and Brazilian expansion, as a result, remained unchecked. Only in the South-East, where it faced Argentine opposition of a determined kind, was a check

placed on it. Even there, however, it was the intervention of European diplomacy (and military force) which brought about a compromise in the creation of the buffer state of Uruguay. Continued Brazilian westward movement at the expense of the weaker states of Paraguay and Bolivia carried on almost without hindrance.

The two countries then, from birth, were at loggerheads over territory and over national ambitions and rivalry more generally. With time Argentina began to see itself as the natural major power in the region and saw Brazil as a backward but large obstacle and a rival for that status. While the Argentine-Brazilian war of the 1820s proved to be the only direct military conflict between the two countries, the rivalry for status and influence in the buffer states which Paraguay and Uruguay were to become brought the countries close to war on more than one occasion and served as the basis for the bulk of strategic planning and military preparations for war throughout the whole of the period from independence until the mid-1980s.

It has already been mentioned that this adversary relationship had a role in the general balancing of power in the southern cone by creating the potential for two blocs namely one of Chile and Brazil opposed to one of Argentina, Peru and Bolivia. And while this potential was never fully brought into play in any military sense, it underscored much diplomacy in its time. In the days when Argentine pretensions to the role of protector of Spanish-speaking America against the supposed hegemonial designs of Brazil were to the fore, this relationship was fundamental to Buenos Aires' relations not only with Uruguay and Paraguay but with Bolivia, Peru, Colombia and Venezuela as well.

It is important to note what exactly has happened to change this adversarial relationship and it is difficult not to come to the conclusion that the key element is Argentina's defeat in the Falklands war. As one has seen above, this shock to the Argentine psyche and to Argentine military pride was such as to make it difficult for Argentina to continue to suggest that it was in a position of rough equality or even of superiority in strategic terms with Brazil. Argentina's economic and political decline starting at the latest in the 1940s and rapidly worsening in the late 1970s and early 1980s, took place in its later years while Brazil was experiencing the "economic miracle" to which reference has already been made. While Argentina's political situation has been one of crisis, confusion and self-doubt for most of the last six decades, Brazil has lived relatively peacefully although for a long period under a military regime. Finally, while the Brazilian population has increased dramatically in recent decades, Argentina, while increasing somewhat, has been in relative stagnation.

Into this unpleasant picture came first the "dirty war" against urban guerillas in the 1970s and then in 1982 the war with Great Britain. In the first of these conflicts the Argentine army came to be seen as a repressive force whose excesses went far beyond those actions required to combat terrorism. In 1982, unspeakable incompetence at the strategic level, and diplomatic assessments of almost unbelievable naiveté, led to a conflict from which Argentina emerged near to bankruptcy, totally humiliated, branded the aggressor, and with armed forces whose reputation had simply disappeared.

Under such circumstances, the relative position of Argentine and Brazil had shifted unquestionably in favour of the latter. And while some in the armed forces claimed that this change in fortunes required desperate remedies, such as the nuclear weapon option, the civilian government ushered into power a year after the Falklands war defeat would hear none of it and instead cut the forces starkly and made crystal clear its intention not to develop nuclear weapons if international events did not force it to do so. With no semi-magical "great equalizer", Argentines were forced into facing, in many cases for the first time, the dread reality of their country's relative weakness. As civilian leaders became more certain of their survivability, the acceptance of the inevitable became more widespread and Argentina sought to reinforce those small steps taken at one time or another in the past to build a bridge of friendship between Buenos Aires and Brasilia.

The need was obvious and visible to all who care to read the signs. For example, while in 1955 Argentina had 131,500 men under arms, Brazil had only 107,200. In addition, Argentine weapons and equipment sophistication was at a higher level than Brazilian throughout most areas of military force. By 1975, the situation had reversed itself completely as can be seen from Table V.

Table VRelative Military Power Figures
of Argentina and Brazil - 1975

	<u>Argentina</u>	<u>Brazil</u>
Army Strength	83500	170000
Navy Strength	33000	49500
Air Force Strength	17000	35000
Total Military Strength	133500	254500
Tanks	240	350
Combat Aircraft	132	160
Transport Aircraft	107	180
Major Fleet Units	24	32
Minor Fleet Units	49	35

Source: Gugliamelli, Juan E., "¿Y si Brasil fabrica la bomba atomica?", Estrategia, No. 34-5, Mayo-agosto 1975, pp. 5-21

The worst was not over, however, for Argentina. Defeat in the Falklands came soon after the 'dirty war' had its severe impact on military prestige. Unable to prove their value in government, in an internal role or in an international fighting war, the armed forces proved equally incapable of stopping severe cuts in their strength and quality after the civilian democratic Alfonsín government took power. The financial crisis through which Argentina has been passing merely reinforced this military decline and by 1990 the relative military power position of the two countries was as shown in Table VI.

Table VIRelative Military Power Figures
of Argentina and Brazil - 1990

	<u>Argentina</u>	<u>Brazil</u>
Army Strength	55000	223000
Navy Strength	25000	50300
Air Force Strengt	15000	50700
Total Military Strength	95000	324000
Tanks	295	630
Combat Aircraft	200	287
Major Surface Fleet Units	14	17
Minor Fleet Units	20	32
Submarines	4	7

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance
1989-1990

Since 1984, the re-establishment of increasing links between what were to be two civilian regimes replacing the military ones in both Buenos Aires and Brasilia, one witnessed a series of ground-breaking political visits, particularly those at presidential level, between the two capitals. Discussions began on cooperation and even on eventual integration of the two economies and surprised analysts watched a half decade attempt to do away with centuries of distrust. While there were recalcitrant elements in both countries, with many predictably coming from the armed forces, the bulk of both Argentine and Brazilian public opinion seemed to accept the drift to close relations as a favourable trend and one much to be encouraged. For Brazil these events proved relatively easy to accept. That is Brazilians could look to the joining of their powerful economic machine to the weakened structures of the Argentine

economy. Brazilian businessmen and diplomats looked on the Argentine market as an attractive one and viewed their southern neighbour as no threat any longer. Such are the comforts of victory.

For Argentines, the situation was both more difficult and more prone to negative interpretations. Some Argentine businessmen feared that Brazilian competition would lead to their own inefficient industries being driven out of business, rather than, as the government proclaimed, having the benefits of access to the giant Brazilian market. Others felt that Argentinian society and labour conditions might lose out as cheaper Brazilian workers and products came more easily to the country. Nationalists often felt that Argentina was doing little less than surrendering by cooperating with the three times larger neighbour to the north and that integration was really no such thing but was rather the incorporation of Argentina into a Brazilian economic and political powerhouse. Be that as it may the Argentine governments of both major political colourings, the Radicals under President Alfonsín and the Peronists under Carlos Menem, saw the issue as one where Argentina really had little choice and where if some stimulus were not added to the economy, continued depression would necessarily result.

The areas of cooperation have been extraordinary and the advantages at least in appearance great. Fearful of being locked out of the major developing economic bloc in Latin America, Uruguay moved quickly to join in at least sectoral arrangements among the now three partners. In February 1989, with the fall of the Stroessner regime in Assunción, Paraguay also began to investigate its possibilities of linkages with its

two great neighbours. The principle partners moved to cooperate in the further mutual development of their border hydro-electric and river development schemes and added to these a number of development projects near to these great centres. Chambers of commerce and ministries of trade and industry began to exchange information and coordinate policies across a broad spectrum of commercial activities. In some sectors, Argentine sophistication was much sought after by Brazilian industries. In others the dynamism characterizing Brazilian recent economic experience attracted great Argentine interest. At a state level, cooperation between nationalized industries began, a state of affairs which was eventually to include even the relatively secretive fields of arms production. This last move was of course resisted by many on both sides of the border as a threat to national security. But if this appeared worrying to nationalist opinion and many sectors of the military, there was more to come.

In the late 1980s, cooperation began in the highly secretive and extremely sensitive area of nuclear energy. If Brazil appeared to be offering more expertise in more areas to Argentina than Argentina was to Brazil, the nuclear field offered room for redress of the balance. The Argentine peaceful nuclear programme had made much more progress than had Brazil's and here at least Argentine claims to superior sophistication were largely accurate. However in no area of activity was suspicion so great or concern so widespread than with the nuclear. For too many years influential sectors of both national societies had seen the potential at least for nuclear weapons as one well worth producing and maintaining and as one without which aspirations for significant power status were mere chimeras. For Argentina indeed, as we have seen, the nuclear

option had been felt to be perhaps the only eventual equalizer in the power competition with Brazil.

Despite the signing of the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1968 and the setting up of the OPANAL control and verification organization, and not withstanding the signature of the non-proliferation treaty in 1969 by almost all Latin American countries, Brazil and Argentina had refused to ratify either instrument. While the wording differs, the reality was that Brazil would not sign until such time as Argentina had, and that Argentina was taking its own good time to decide that it was in its interests so to do. Nor was Brazil in any hurry to sign either, it must be remembered.⁹⁰

Thus for two decades and more the two countries had been suspicious of one another, and these suspicions had been largely grounded in the nuclear issues as one will see later on. It is therefore clear how important a step and a signal it was for the two countries to move together on this most questioned area for cooperation.

There is of course some reason for Argentine concerns about the economy of the country being in some senses swamped in the much larger Brazilian whole. The dynamism of Brazil's economy has already proven to be an unbeatable pole of attraction for the smaller economies of Paraguay and Uruguay which have increasingly turned in recent years toward the north rather than the south despite historic, cultural and linguistic links to Argentina and the rest of Spanish-speaking America.

90. H.F. Klepak, "Potential Regional Strategic Considerations regarding Nuclear Proliferation in Latin America", p. 14.

Similar trends are occurring with other states bordering on Brazil although the specific role of the great southern cities makes the pull particularly strong for Asunción and Montevideo. Some Argentines feel that the northern provinces will be increasingly pulled into the Brazilian economy and will have their links weakened with the far away metropolis of their own country, Buenos Aires. Equally, some economists feel that Argentina is simply not strong enough economically to sustain unbridled competition from Brazil in general or in crucial protected industries. They see Brasilia's keenness for integration as clear proof that the Brazilians can see vastly more advantages for themselves than for the Argentines from such cooperation.

A major factor in the acceptance of the trends discussed has been the largely successful campaign by Brazil to disabuse its Spanish-speaking neighbours of the perception of it as a country seeking a hegemonial position in South America. The Itamarati, Brazil's foreign ministry, has deployed clever and convincing diplomacy over many years to assuage the fears of the country's neighbours about the dangers posed by Brazil. Whereas three decades ago anything like the current relative power position of Brazil would have been greeted by its neighbours as little less than horrifying, it is truly extraordinary to see how little negative reaction there is to Brazil now as its economic hegemony appears to come closer and closer. Probably also lying below this favourable reception of current trends is the fact that the rest of Latin America now perceives Brazilian greatness, and to some extent that country's dominance, as natural and in any case inevitable. There is virtually no discussion in Spanish-speaking America today of ways and means to curb Brazilian power or to build a common front to resist

that country's growing influence on its neighbours.⁹¹ In that sense the Argentine reaction of the last half decade may also be seen as merely coming into line with the other Spanish-speaking states in accepting a situation which in any case can not be changed.

This is not to say however that there are not elements in Argentina, and indeed in most other states bordering on Brazil, which feel keenly the threat of Brazilian power and would wish to do something about resisting it. But whereas years ago such sentiment would have had many sectors about which to coalesce, today only certain sectors of the armed forces and fringe nationalist groups make a point of resisting the overall drift to full acceptance of Brazil's power position on the continent. Assuming the continued clever handling of circumstances by the excellent diplomatic service the Itamarati deploys, one can imagine an acceleration rather than the slowing down in the improvement in Brazil's overall relative position.

91. A striking example of what resistance remains is the recent publication of Alvaro Avila Bernal's Corrupción y expoliación en América latina, where three chapters (pp. 325-368) attempt to detail the significance and methods of Brazilian hegemonial designs.

Chapter X: Nuclear Proliferation

It is perhaps appropriate at this stage, having discussed certain nuclear elements behind and concerned with the Argentine-Brazilian rapprochement, to broaden the story somewhat to include other factors in an issue always close to Canadian diplomatic concerns, that of nuclear proliferation in general and nuclear proliferation in Latin America in particular. As is well known successive Canadian governments have been greatly concerned by the issue of nuclear proliferation and Ottawa has been most active in international fora in trying to maximise restraints on countries not now nuclear powers but moving towards joining that club.

This has become particularly true since the explosion by India of its first nuclear device in 1974 and the embarrassment caused to Canada which had of course cooperated in India's peaceful nuclear energy development programmes up to that time. Given our not dissimilar role in the Argentine nuclear projects, it was also natural that Canadian attention focus especially on the Latin American context as well. For many years Brazil and Argentina were considered likely candidates for the development of nuclear weapons and this assessment seemed particularly compelling as both countries resisted strong pressures to come in to the Tlatelolco, NPT and IAEA arrangements. This resistance saw the concurrent development of peaceful nuclear energy projects in both countries and the acceleration of such programmes and their growth to a considerable scale by the mid-1970s.⁹²

92. Hopes were high in both countries where nuclear energy was concerned. See, in the case of Brazil for example, Paulo Nogueira Batista, "A politica nuclear do Brasil: um programa em marcha", A

Latin America's status as perhaps the most developed area of the Third World, and Brazil and Argentina's position as threshold countries closer in many ways to the first or second world than they are to most of the rest of the Third World, led observers to consider this region an even more likely one for nuclear weapons development. Argentina especially appeared to the outsider to be remarkably European, almost Parisian in its capital of Buenos Aires and even calling "Argentina underdeveloped" seems to be a misnomer. Argentines quip that while they are underdeveloped perhaps, they "can afford to be underdeveloped". Brazil's explosion in economic growth, while taking place in a country whose modernity is less striking than Argentina's on the surface, proved the capabilities of the Brazilians by the late 1970s in areas where such would not have been thought possible a few short decades before.

All this sophistication, however, existed against the backdrop that in real terms Latin American interstate tensions were actually maintained at a fairly low level compared to most areas of the Third World and especially to the Middle East, much of Africa and South east Asia. While it is true that large-scale international wars have taken place since independence between almost all the states of the region, these traditional conflicts and sources of discord have not in recent decades excessively dominated the international relations of the region. As has been discussed above, the inter-American system, the United States domination in the region and a common anti-communist ideology shared by dominant elites, have all made for levels of tension generally kept under control and only rarely

exploding into inter-state violence. The only dramatic example of a conflictual relationship in embryo is the existence of a communist regime in Cuba since 1960 but that situation hardly justified a nuclear response from any Latin American country particularly given the even more adversarial nature of the relationship between the United States and Havana. Indeed most conflict in Latin America has in recent decades been internal and so far at least nuclear weapons have been considered less than useful in domestic conflict.

As has been mentioned as well it was really only the Argentina-Brazil relationship which appeared until recently to have factors in it, both political and technological, which could conceivably lead to a situation where nuclear proliferation occurred. As Brazil grew in all political, military and economic terms into being the regional great power, and while concurrently Argentina slipped steadily downward in its power position, the temptation for Buenos Aires to opt for some kind of equalizer for itself was very great.⁹³ As seen, by 1975, after decades of relative parity between the two countries, the Brazilian army had grown to twice Argentina strength. In addition, Brazil's navy was one and a half times as strong and its air force over twice as strong. By this date, Brasilia disposed of nearly half again as many tanks, and many more aircraft and major fleet units than did Buenos Aires. It was hardly surprising then that analysts often considered that the temptation for Argentina to at least reserve for itself the nuclear weapons option might be irresistible.

93. Klepak, op. cit., "Potential Regional...", pp. 7-8.

Despite such considerations, however, the point made before continued to hold true. That is to say, while tension there was in the relations between the two states; as generally elsewhere in Latin America that tension was far enough short of reaching violent levels as to reduce the drive for the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Argentina would have had to face even worse international opprobrium than India had the country opted to develop nuclear weapons. The reaction of the United States and of Argentina's European and Canadian partners would have been little less than horror. While India could at least argue the threat from a nuclear armed China as well as a hostile Pakistan, Argentina could hardly propose that the Brazilian menace was at anything like this level of threat. It is nonetheless necessary to point out that while the Argentine military government remained in power, that is up until 1983, Argentina did reserve to itself the nuclear weapons option and was progressing in the development of nuclear-powered submarines as well.⁹⁴ When these features of the Argentine military situation were seen in the context of a healthy national arms industry, and one active in the development of short and medium range surface-to-surface missiles, concern was perhaps not all that misplaced.

Certainly Brazil took Argentine nuclear potential very seriously indeed despite the context of its geographical position where its major centres were much less vulnerable to Argentine attack than were Argentine centres to possible Brazilian assault. For example, from Brazilian territory to Buenos Aires it is only roughly 300 km, to Cordoba only about 650, and to Rosario only just over 400 kilometres; while from

94. Burns, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

Argentine territory it is some 800 kilometres to Sao Paulo, 1200 to Rio de Janeiro and 1300 to Brasilia.⁹⁵ Argentina would therefore need a superiority in missiles or bombers in order to make good its nuclear pretensions if Brazil also were to opt for nuclear weapons.

Fortunately the end of military rule in both Brazil and Argentina in the mid-1980s brought less nationalistic and less militarily-minded governments to power and, particularly under the impact of the need for economic restraint, high prestige projects without excellent justification in economic terms were bound to be set on something of a back burner. While nuclear lobbies in both countries made great use of the nationalist argument, not to mention the prestige one, neither Alfonsín nor Sarney was willing to press forward in a rapid way on either project, that is nuclear weapons or nuclear-powered submarines. As seen above, this key element of competition between the two countries was eventually to be chosen as a hallmark area of cooperation and while this has not as yet become fully concrete in the military sphere, the overall nuclear cooperation between the two countries makes it less and less likely that independent weapons research will go on in any meaningful way.

Brazil and Argentina, while certainly the leading powers where nuclear pretensions were concerned, were not the only ones. Discussion had also occurred on the possibility of the Peruvian-Chilean rivalry bringing about some sort of nuclear presence on the continent. There had also been some consideration of the possibility of Venezuela and Colombia finding nuclear factors involved in their traditional

95. Klepak, "Potential Regional...", op.cit., p. 28.

competition. Throughout discussions of Latin American nuclear options, strategists pointed to the opportunities nuclear weapons offered in a Latin American context. The development patterns of these countries offered many obvious targets of great relative value and often of great size as well. Such targets are considered ideal for nuclear weapons. Equally the infrastructure of most Latin American countries is centred around dams and other energy facilities as well as on core projects for development and transport links. As mentioned in a previous paper on this subject, "the loss of any such centres would be disastrous for developing countries in a sense which is not the case for more developed ones."⁹⁶ In addition, questions of prestige have always counted a great deal in Latin America and it is conceivable that if one country were to opt for nuclear weapons, the other might follow simply to be in the same league.

Chile and Mexico have significant nuclear energy projects and other countries have begun work in this area as well. But it is hard to imagine that Arg and Bra can bring to a virtual halt their programmes related to the military use of nuclear energy, that the much less dramatic rivalries elsewhere in the continent will spawn nuclear weapons acquisition. It is even possible to imagine Argentine and Brazilian reservations about their signatures on the Treaty of Tlatelolco being reduced and eventually removed.

Thus in this area of Canadian concern not only in Latin America but in the Third World in general there is room for considerable optimism. While nuclear energy for peaceful

96. Idem.

purposes is being used increasingly in the region its military use as either the source of propulsion for submarines or as an explosive in nuclear weapons is far from a reality and likely to remain so while the diplomatic context remains as it is currently. The danger of proliferation would only become imminent again if a series of negative factors were once more to come into play. Military or nationalistic governments, particularly in either Brasilia or Buenos Aires, could create situations of tension where the nuclear option might again appeal to one or both powers. But barring this, Canadian concerns can be put in the background and normal safeguards remaining in place should suffice as guarantees that Canada will neither be directly embarrassed nor overly worried by nuclear events in Latin America.

Chapter XI: The Canal

There is a tendency in Canada to consider the Panama Canal to be of relatively little importance to this country. And this reflects demographic, geographical and historic factors which are easily understandable. Firstly, Canada does not have the historic interest in the Canal that the United States, for example, has. Washington has been keen on a shorter route from the east coast of the US to the west coast since early in the 19th century and especially since the vast acquisition of territory in the West resulting from the victorious war against Mexico ending in 1848. The further development of the US East-West connection in the half century after that war reinforced this interest especially up to the time of the construction of railways across the breadth of the continent. Even when this occurred toward the end of the last century, other strategic issues arose which heightened still further the interest in a trans-oceanic canal. The most dramatic of these was the long journey of the USS Oregon from the Pacific to the Atlantic during the war with Spain in 1898. This reinforcement deployment took so long to leave northern Pacific waters, pass through the Strait of Magellan, and reach U.S. Atlantic ports that before the journey could be completed the war was over.

At exactly the same time that the United States was becoming a world power with extensive Pacific, Atlantic and Caribbean interests and territories, the requirement for a quickly reinforced fleet on both coasts made itself starkly felt. The growing navy lobby as well as trading and investment interests created an increasing clamour for a U.S. dominated canal in Central America and political events in Colombia's Panamanian province in 1903 allowed the United States to

engineer an independence movement culminating in a highly favourable canal treaty between the new state of Panama and Washington. In 1914, this canal was opened and was indeed completely dominated by the United States although international guarantees of rights of access were given to the British and others in order to calm their fears and pay at least lip service to previous Anglo-American treaties on the subject.

While Canada had of course also known continental expansion in the mid and late 19th century, and British Columbia had in fact been incorporated into the Dominion as late as 1873, the rapidity of the construction of trans-Canadian railways and the less populous nature of British Columbia as compared to the US south-west, made for a completely different conception of the need for a quicker maritime route to the east coast. In addition, the Royal Navy's dominance of the seas was such in this period that if its deployment on the Pacific coast of North America needed reinforcement, such ships could come from the Admiralty's resources in the Pacific, Australia, or the Asian mainland colonial possessions rather than from Halifax or the British West Indies. In World War I the percentage of the Canadian war effort which sailed from British Columbian ports was certainly much less of the national total than was the case from United States ports on the west coast vis-à-vis the total U.S. war effort.

Even in more recent years the growth patterns in Canadian trade have not brought the Panama Canal into a greater limelight in this country. The explosion of trade with Japan, and investment from that country, as well as the increased interest in the Pacific rim as a whole, has by definition not been overly dependent on the Panama Canal for access to these relatively new

sources of international economic links for Canada. Generally speaking, Canada's historically efficient railways continued to make if not redundant, at least less crucial the maritime link between British Columbia and the Far-East. Hence the Canal has remained a secondary issue to this day.

This is not to say that the Canal is of no interest to Canada if only because of its major importance for our key NATO ally and neighbour. The US used the Canal enormously in both world conflicts as well as in the Korean War and considers its defence to be a constituent part of that of the US as well. The Canal Zone territory was used for a variety of purposes connected with Washington's position in Latin America and has housed military schools and other training establishments, intelligence centres, deployment forces, air and naval resources and command, control and communications facilities of many types. Indeed the Canal's defence is considered to be the basic justification for further US deployments in the Caribbean at spots along the route from the Canal to the continental US. Equally, the US used potential threats to the Canal as justification for military activities in Central America, northern south America and the West Indies during the period of the growth of the Axis threat in the late 1930s and early 1940s and later on from the beginning of the cold war the international communist threat was viewed in a similar light.⁹⁷ Most recently the underpinnings of much of the US argument for a forward posture in Central America have revolved around the supposed threat of sabotage and subversion posed by leftist regimes nearby.

97. Schoultz, op. cit., pp. 199-201 and 217.

Panama has permitted the US to have a forward base right at the key juncture between South America and Central America and to deploy into this crucial zone military power far surpassing that of the countries of its immediate neighbourhood. This deployment of resources has enabled the US to dominate until recent years the Panamanian domestic scene as well.

After long and difficult negotiations in the wake of growing Panamanian unrest in the 1960s and 1970s, President Carter eventually signed a new Panama Canal treaty with General Omar Torrijos in 1977. This allowed for an eventual transfer of sovereignty over the Canal Zone and, in the year 2000, for Panamanian control of the Canal itself. This accord was savagely attacked in the US particularly by the right and the naval lobby. While eventually ratified its acceptance by the strategic community and the Pentagon has been far from forthcoming and many analysts have hoped to find a way out of its restricting clauses. Republican administrations of both Reagan and Bush have included numerous important lobbies pressing for a fresh look at the treaty as the period ending in the year 2000 becomes progressively shorter. The prospects for a real handover of power over the Canal, seemingly remote in the mid-1970s, appear at least as distant in the early 1990s.

On the other hand, the Canal Treaty signature of 1977 was received jubilantly in Latin America and was the source of a major honeymoon in US-Latin American relations. The signing itself saw a very large number of leaders from the region come to the ceremonies and much was made of the new era in these relations. It is therefore very difficult to imagine going back on the accord without doing major damage to what the US was able to achieve through its negotiations. Nonetheless, US

nervousness over the future of the Canal must be a concern for Canada and all Washington's allies as time passes.

The future of the Canal may be seen in a different light since the events of December 1989. The US intervention, justified by security issues and the war on drugs, has brought to power a democratic government but one whose legitimacy in the long run may be weakened by its exceptionally close ties to, and dependence on, the US. Panamanian nationalism is unlikely to be a spent force and it would be extraordinary to see a man like General Noriega end up being considered some sort of hero in the struggle with US imperialism in Panama. Nonetheless, there are signs already that the American role in Panama is seen increasingly in negative terms and certain moves the US has implemented have given fuel to the fire of criticism from those opposed to that country's presence and influence in Panama. One of the first actions taken by the US, with the tacit support of the newly entrenched democratic government, was to abolish the old National Guard and sack the majority of its senior officers. This was done in the name of cleansing the security forces of wrongdoers and of those most closely connected to the Noriega regime. Up to this point a considerable amount of public support was forthcoming for these actions.

More sinister, however, in the view of many has been the subsequent effort not only to establish new forces from the junior ranks of the old but also to give those forces a much more internal security function as briefly mentioned above. Heavy weapons have been withdrawn from the force, its title changed to a civil guard, and its training and Standard Operating Procedures oriented to very low intensity conflict

indeed. This may all appear innocent enough except when it is analyzed in the context of the Panama Canal Treaty of 1977.

In this treaty it is laid out that the US withdrawal from the Canal area will be implemented only with the proviso that the Panamanian security forces are capable on their own of ensuring the defence of the Canal against both direct attack and sabotage. In the case where Panama City does not have available forces capable of operating in the sophisticated environment which might be the one applicable in the case of an attack on the Canal, the US could find justification for preserving its forces in the area and ensuring the defence of the Canal itself. It is difficult not to conclude that such a highly desirable result was not accidental and that, if not the invasion, certainly the reorganization of the Panamanian forces was achieved with just this objective in mind. Thus, this analysis would suggest, that the December 1989 invasion not only rid the US of the thorny problem of the Noriega regime but may also have laid the ground, work for a resolution of the security difficulties which would have been posed by a Panama Canal under the control of, and defended by, Panamanian citizens.

Whether this interpretation is correct or not it is likely that the future of the Canal will remain an issue in US-Latin America relations and will therefore be one of those means Latin Americans use to test the sincerity of US intentions in the region. Canada's increased involvement in the OAS will make us more a party to discussions on this issue than we would ever have been in the past. It is easy to imagine in the next few years the growth of a debate on the Canal which takes the results of these recent events as its backdrop. Once again, one

is forced to the conclusion that Canada may well be uncomfortably placed in discussions of this kind.

On the one hand, Washington will obviously expect its ally and friend in North America, a country which shares the valued use of the Canal, to also share a concern for its defence. The US will surely press Canada hard to get Ottawa's support for American policy on the matter of the Canal's use and security. The Latin Americans, on the other hand, will press Canada equally hard to support their view that an American evacuation of the area is both correct and is in keeping with the solemn treaty signed not so long ago. Ottawa will be hard pressed to find a way to square this circle. Many Latin Americans already express amazement that Canada, alone except for El Salvador, supported the US invasion of the tiny republic in 1989. Their understanding for Canada's doing so would no doubt dissipate if Ottawa appeared to be following a temporary stand on a specific event with a more generalized and long-term acceptance of and support for US military objectives in Panama and its neighbourhood. Such a policy would destroy our credibility with the majority of Latin American regimes when it comes to the difficult questions of the U.S. role in the region and the legitimacy of its intervention in the affairs of another state of the Americas.

Chapter XII: Arms industries

Latin America until the Second World War showed few signs of ever becoming a source rather than the market for armaments. Under the Iberian colonial regimes defence had been centralized in the mother countries although of course, particularly for the Spanish, the steady increase in British, French and Dutch incursions into the empire's territory meant that local defence arrangements grew over time. Procurement for such defence efforts remained in most senses peninsular based, with little done in the colonies. There small powder factories established in some major capitals but foundries for the construction of weapons especially artillery were not available and were not developed. While local sources could provide uniforms and many basic supplies for the sustenance of an army, weaponry remained Spanish or Portuguese. Under the impact of the wars of independence this changed although not perhaps to the extent one might have imagined. Relative ease of access for much of the wars' duration to European sources of armaments made it possible to continue a dependence on foreign sources and made the difficult task of providing good quality locally produced weaponry less of a priority than it might otherwise have been. Nonetheless some basic progress was made and by the end of the wars there was a reduced capability to produce small arms in Latin America.⁹⁸ After the wars, however, most of these projects were abandoned and for the small armies of the period European and later North American sources prevailed over locally established ones.

98. See the appropriate chapters of English, op. cit.

European influence on the question of arms procurement became much more regularized towards the end of the last century for two reasons. The first of these was that large firms such as Krupp and Schneider-Creusot began to place full time agents in key Latin American capitals. Even some smaller firms engaged influential officers or private individuals to represent them in countries interested in purchasing weapons. While the British, despite Italian and French efforts, tended to dominate naval weapons procurement by the Latin Americans; the French and Germans entered into a dramatic race for pride of place where sales of artillery, small arms and equipment were concerned. The second reason for growth in European influence was the hiring by a number of countries of European military missions whose job it was to either improve the host army as a whole or to undertake some major project such as founding a military academy, reorganizing an artillery park, re-writing military instructions, reforming a particular corps, or the like. Germany became particularly popular as a country to call on after its victory in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 and by 1914 had sent missions to Chile, Argentina and Bolivia. Despite Berlin's success the French still received requests for missions of their own from El Salvador, Guatemala, Colombia and Peru. In all of these cases a major reason for giving a positive reply to the Latin American requests received was that it was well understood that having a mission on the ground helped immensely in ensuring that arms orders went to one's own country.

The proof of this came with the slow growth of United States missions at the expense of the Europeans, a trend which sped up mightily on the eve of World War II. The end of European army missions by the end of the 1930s and their replacement by the Americans, was followed almost immediately by

purchases and loans of United States equipment and weapons to supplant that of the previous European suppliers.

The incorporation of Latin American into an Inter-American defence system completed this work, generally speaking, until the 1960s when political and economic factors pushed the Latin Americans to a mix of weapons systems, the most sophisticated of which tended to come from Europe. In the meantime major Latin American states, frequently under military governments reacted to the wartime difficulties of obtaining arms from Europe, by founding their own arms industries at home.

The Argentines were particularly tempted by this sort of arrangement after their enforced semi-isolation of World War II. At that time they in particular, but to a lesser degree some smaller states as well, began making small and not so small arms for their own use. While these industries were rarely efficient they had the enormous advantage of making their countries independent of foreign suppliers.

In the post-World War II world the great profits to be obtained from arms sales tempted several states, but particularly Argentina and Brazil, to begin or continue projects of arms production at home. By the 1970s both these countries were significant suppliers of arms to other countries in the Third World and were opening up markets even in the developed world and even in the forces of their traditional suppliers.⁹⁹ As export earnings in other areas fell during that decade and in the next, arms industries became less a question of assured supply for the countries themselves and more of a now

99. P. Lock, "Brazil: Arms for Export", in M. Brzoska and T. Ohlson, Eds., Arms Production in the Third World, p. 81.

vital source of foreign hard currency. In countries like Argentina the combination of powerful armed forces, frequent military governments, close links between industry and the services, and important arms industries made for an alliance of interests difficult to control and often anxious to see international tension sustained.

With the return of civilian governments almost everywhere in Latin America there has been some improvement in the situation. The military role in industry has been reduced and in most countries arms industries have been curbed as well. It is important, however, to realise that this is not the case throughout the region. In some countries the increasing importance of export earnings has placed more not less emphasis on this field of economic endeavour. Recent trends towards world peace have nonetheless reinforced the trend toward a reduction in the importance of arms industries and this tendency is continuing to affect Latin America as well.

Chapter XIII: New Regional Security Arrangements

One of the new aspects of the evolving security situation in Latin America which has not received any significant attention in Canada has been that connected with proposals for a new security arrangement for the region. Our refusal to sign the Rio Pact, and our distancing of Canada from the defence elements of the Inter-American system, have no doubt been the cause of this lack of interest. Nonetheless in Latin America itself there is increasing discussion of the need for an exclusively regional arrangement which would exclude the United States and would address specifically Latin American security concerns.¹⁰⁰

The recent discussions of this option have resulted from three dramatic events where, from a Latin American point of view, the hemispheric defence and peaceful settlement of disputes provisions of the Rio Pact and the Charter of the OAS have been put aside by the U.S. in the pursuance of its own national interests even when these collided with commitments undertaken within the various rubrics making up the Inter-American security system.¹⁰¹ The Falklands War, considered by most Latin American countries as a case of British aggression against a Latin American signatory of the Rio Pact, should by this view have occasioned United States assistance to Argentina in repelling the British attack. This Pact, which of course

100. See, for example, Carlos Portales, "Seguridad regional en Sudamérica. Escenarios prospectivos", in Augusto Varas (Ed.), Paz, desarme y desarrollo en América latina, pp. 332-334.

101. Héctor Fáundez-Ledezma, "The Inter-American System: Framework for Conflict Resolution", in José Silva-Michelena, Latin America: Peace, Demography and Economic Crisis, pp. 183-185.

provides that an attack on one signatory will be considered an attack on all, was laid aside by Washington in favour of that country's traditional alliance with the United Kingdom, first through the United States' option of neutrality and offer of good offices, and second through direct military assistance on the part of the United States for the United Kingdom's war effort.

While it is of course true that Argentineans, and indeed most Latin Americans, tend to exaggerate the extent of Washington's assistance to London during the war, it is still accurate to say that some aid was indeed given and was most useful to the British. Not only Buenos Aires but most other Latin American capitals expressed shock and great disappointment over this state of affairs and have since the war made clear their view that in many ways the Rio Pact is "lettre morte".¹⁰²

United States actions in Central America, particularly indirect but powerful action to overthrow the Sandinista government in Nicaragua, as well as its at best tepid support for the Contadora and other multilateral peace initiatives, have led to grave doubts as to Washington's sincerity vis-à-vis the peaceful settlement of disputes provisions of the regional security system. Needless to say, former declarations in the sense that Washington would no longer reserve to itself the right to unilateral interventions in the region have lost some of their perceived legitimacy. The O.A.S., dominated by the U.S., and as mentioned earlier suffering from a growing marginalization, has had a relatively minor role in the peace process when compared with either the United Nations or indeed

102. Ibid., p. 173.

with the trilateral initiatives undertaken by Bonn, Madrid, and Ottawa.

Thus it can be seen that where the Central American crisis has been concerned, the impression is generally one where the United States and its security concerns are viewed by Latin Americans as inviting conflict rather than helping to reduce or even end it. Disapproval of the Inter-American security system became nearly unanimous among Latin American states in reaction to United States policy in Central America almost throughout the 1980s.

Most recently the United States invasion of Panama in December 1989 led to a highly negative reaction from almost all the members of the OAS, the exceptions being only El Salvador and the recently arrived Canada. Once again from a Latin American point of view United States concerns over security were not only not shared by Latin American states but were indeed considered to be the source of the security problem of the region rather than part of the solution to that problem. Despite the generalized condemnation of the Noriega regime by all its Latin American neighbours, there was still very widespread disapproval of the United States abrogating to itself the right to choose unilateral intervention as a way of removing a government with which it was not in agreement.

It can be seen, then, that the 1980s were a decade where the already weakened defence arrangements of the continent were nearly shattered by the immense changes in perception wherein an alliance structure of nearly five decades of life seemed no longer to answer the needs of the bulk of its constituents. While the anti-Axis structures put in place a half century ago

were relatively easily expanded and converted into the anti-Communist arrangements of the late 1940s and 1950s, with the end of the 1980s one sees throughout most of Latin America more than a tendency to feel that United States perceptions of their security concerns are by no means necessarily shared by that superpower's neighbours and current allies in Latin America.

A further, external, factor has also recently been added to the equation. This is of course the revolution in international relations occasioned by the collapse of the international Communist movement as a serious element in world politics. The end of regimes sharing this formal doctrine in the majority of countries which had until 1989 existed and cooperated in at least something of a common front, has made the "raison d'être" of the Rio Pact and indeed of the whole Inter-American defence system far less easy to understand or to take seriously. The Soviet threat was always a distant one at best given the geopolitical context of Latin America and the failure of Cuba to successfully export revolution in the region merely highlighted that distance. Now, with the bulk of Communist regimes gone altogether, and the mother country of Communism in disarray and hitherto unknown relative weakness, it is difficult for anyone in Latin America to see the Rio Pact as a true defensive alliance in any traditional sense. On the left, and increasingly in the centre, there is a suspicion that attempts to maintain the status quo where western hemisphere defence arrangements are concerned, are simply a means to retain United States hegemony in the region, and do not appropriately reflect Latin American priorities where security issues are concerned.

This has led to a series of proposals for a new, Latin American only, security system. The most famous of these have

been those put forward by the director of the Peruvian Institute for Geopolitical and Strategic Studies, General Edgardo Mercado Jarrin, and by the Organization of Officers for Democracy, Integration and Freedom in Latin America.

The general lines of these proposals have taken up the overall view expressed above that Latin America must have a security arrangement which answers its needs and not those of the United States. Rejecting the current validity of alliance structures based on a perception of a Soviet direct threat and of Soviet-inspired subversion and revolution, this line of thinking places the emphasis squarely on needs viewed widely in Latin America as essential for the region's overall progress. In this sense security is defined widely as the absence of threat to Latin American democratic institutions, chances for development, territorial integrity, ecological balance, and regional peace. It is easily seen that these priorities lie a long way distant from those traditionally associated with the inter-American security system.¹⁰³ The emphasis here suggests a reduced role for the armed forces rather than the powerful position accorded them under the priorities previously assigned. Indeed there is a recognition that excessive strength for the armed forces in a Latin American context has been more threatening of, and less supportive to, democratic institutions in the region. The costs of such forces have been some of the obstacles to economic growth and development in Latin America and hence have also undermined chances for development. As mentioned elsewhere many Latin American disputes are based on territorial rivalries and the peaceful settlement of such disputes is essential if Latin American states are to feel

103. Portales, *op. cit.*, p. 334.

secure. The ravages of the ecological system so present in the region can also lead to a sense of insecurity for the peoples living therein.

This thinking clearly stresses economic and social issues and reduces the traditional perception of threat as essentially military to a level where strictly defence concerns, while far from absent, are equally far from dominant. Needless to say, up to the present there has been very little indeed on the part of Washington to see this kind of perception gain ground in the south.

For Canada, however, this reasoning is far from strange. Ottawa's own reluctance to have anything to do with the Inter-American defence system underscores this country's basic perception of the problems of Latin America as ones springing overwhelmingly from social and economic ills and not from foreign threat. This perception has guided most elements of Canadian policy in Latin America and has been particularly visible on issues such as the Cuban Revolution, development, regional cooperation, and the Central American crisis. While little has been said or written in Canada on the subject of a new security regime south of the Rio Grande, it is certainly not outside traditional Canadian thinking to imagine that such arrangements might prove more suitable to Latin American needs in the future than will those structures established over the last fifty, and especially the last forty, years.

Canada will almost certainly have even less to do with any such security arrangement on a Latin American basis in the future than she has had with the Inter-American defence system to date. Proposals such as General Jarrin's exclude the United

States and indeed in some cases Mexico and Central America as well because of those countries' excessive dependence on the regional superpower.¹⁰⁴ Canada, finding itself to the north of the United States and with no historical defence ties further south, is hardly likely to be tempted into defence commitments so far from home, so displeasing to the United States, and so uncritical to Canadian national interests. While no doubt some Latin Americans would see advantages to having a relatively weak but economically strong northern country within such a security system, the logic for Ottawa to become so involved is difficult to imagine. It is no doubt true that this country would like to see results come about in the areas of interest to such a grouping. Ottawa would be pleased with a reinforcement of democracy in the area, a reduction in military expenditures, a growth in the scale and speed of development, progress in the protection of the environment and a reinforced structure for providing the peaceful settlement of disputes. It would not, however, be interested in forming part of such an arrangement even though its diplomatic efforts and indeed potentially its peacekeeping capabilities, might be placed at the disposal of those states making up such a security system.

104. See Mercado Jarrin, *op. cit.*

Chapter XIV: Trade and Investment

It is not too much to say that the main historical and current interest perceived by Canadians in Latin America is the prospects the region provides for an expansion in Canadian trade and investments. Canada has for over a century had a respectable investment portfolio in Latin America and in some countries of the area that portfolio has been very significant indeed. There have even been occasions where Canada's weight in particular Latin American countries has led to accusations that it shared imperialist designs similar to those of greater ranking powers. Be that as it may Canadian, firms have been deeply involved in investment in minerals, banking, agriculture and insurance. It is in fact true that after the United States, the country's investments in Latin America are its second largest in the world.

Despite this important status of investment, trade has occupied even more of the Canadian government's attention where Latin American affairs are concerned. Canada is of course a major trading nation heavily dependent on its ability to buy and sell goods and services abroad. This dependence on outside sources and markets has marked the economy of the colony, the dominion and the country in more recent years. The search for sources of needed imports, and even more of markets for our goods, is a constant of Canadian foreign policy and considered by many to be the main motor force for Canadians' outward reach. While traditional links with the United Kingdom, Europe, and the United States have left Latin America to some extent on the sidelines the region has always had some degree of importance as a trading partner for this country. The addition of Japan and

several other Asian countries to the list of major trading nations for Canada has acted as a break on the growth in the importance of Latin American trade in the whole national picture. Indeed despite a considerable growth in recent years in the total value of imports from and exports to Latin America, the percentage of Canadian trade going to that region has not grown steadily and indeed suffers frequent declines. Table VII shows recent trends in Canadian imports from Latin American countries.

Table VII
Canadian Imports
from Latin America
1987-1989
(value in \$000)

	<u>1987</u>	<u>1988</u>	<u>1989</u>
Argentina	113658	123983	132778
Bolivia	3481	22678	6605
Brazil	858082	1193206	1129595
Chile	152680	160556	174138
Colombia	135491	138190	157395
Costa Rica	61899	50829	57706
Cuba	51471	87112	62147
Dominican Republic	27670	36504	40701
Ecuador	95180	85267	107127
El Salvador	44363	41730	28695
Guatemala	33558	38589	41314
Haiti	6543	7484	12618
Honduras	16533	27921	25429
Mexico	1165406	1331250	1680180
Nicaragua	27643	64533	74315
Panama	24027	30883	18627
Paraguay	867	466	707
Peru	74634	85984	89856
Uruguay	137381	11216	79171
Venezuala	559042	459015	596030
Total	3589609	3997396	4515134

Source: "Summary of Canadian International Trade," December 1989

Before the 1980s almost all Canadian initiatives to develop further links with Latin America were based essentially on the drive to expand exports. This was true from the late 19th century initiatives of the new dominion right up to the

Diefenbaker and Trudeau forays of more recent years. The difficulties in expanding trade historically were related to a number of factors. Latin America and Canada both produced minerals and agricultural products which were not easily sellable in the other's markets. The poverty characteristic of most of Latin America precluded great expansion in the buying power of the local population where Canadian goods were concerned. Trading links by sea and other elements of the infrastructure required in order to expand trade were not available with ease to any of the prospective partners nor was it obvious why more traditional trading links with the United States and Europe should be supplanted by ones between two rarely interacting traders. Canada basically needed European manufactured goods and United States foodstuffs. Latin America basically needed European manufactured goods while it imported few agricultural products.

More recently Latin America has imported European and American manufactured goods while its increasingly inefficient agricultural system meant that more and more food products have had to be imported as well. Canada has meanwhile been transformed into a largely industrial country though one continuing to have enormous agricultural riches. In that context food exports to Latin America have increased but with the exception of oil and a surprisingly short list of other mineral and finished products, Canada has not found Latin American exports to be dramatically interesting for it. Nonetheless, Mexico, Brazil and Venezuela have become significant trading partners for us. As shown in Annex A, our exports to Latin America are also dominated by a relatively short list of products and an even shorter list of major markets for our goods.

Chapter XV: Aid

In the early years of what might be termed Canadian assistance to Latin America one finds in effect only one major source of aid: the church. As Canada was itself a developing country technical missions of the kind sent by European powers or by the United States to Latin America were not readily available in the new dominion. On the other hand missionary work on the part of religious orders of the Roman Catholic Church, and more laterally of Protestant and Evangelical groupings did provide some assistance in several countries of Central and South America. A number of authors have indeed suggested that this religious connection, especially fostered by the French-speaking part of the population, has been the most lasting, pervasive, and well-known link between this country and the Latin American region.

What we know as foreign aid in a more modern sense is of course a phenomenon essentially of the post-war world even though certain elements of it have existed for centuries. The Marshall Plan and other recovery schemes of the post-war world found an echo in later colonial improvement arrangements as well as in the competitive efforts of the two great ideological groupings which began to compete for Third World favour in the wake of the success of independence movements throughout most of the world in the 1950s and 1960s. Canadian aid, which had been aimed especially at the recovery of the United Kingdom after the Second World War, experienced a transformation as the international scene was changed by the appearance of dozens of new states. Naturally enough Canada as the second major state in the British Commonwealth of Nations, found that grouping to

be an obvious destination for the vast majority of its aid effort. In this context the British West Indies, as they became independent, came to occupy a privileged place in Ottawa's schemes for international development. As Commonwealth African states gained independence, they also received a priority from this country.

For largely domestic reasons this pattern changed in the late 1960s and early 1970s as French-speaking countries in the newly-founded "francophonie" began also to attract the attention of Ottawa. With limited funds at its disposal Canada developed strategies for the dispersement of aid which attempted, by limiting the number of recipient countries, to have a real impact on those states to which Canadian aid was directed. Thus, while the country's assistance programme was not as extensive in terms of the number of countries to which aid was given, it was nonetheless relatively intensive in its effect, always given that Canada is not a great power in the sense of the major aid-dispersing states.

In this context of a priority given to the Commonwealth and to the francophone states, Latin America obviously fared badly where Canadian aid was concerned. Reflecting the geographic but more importantly psychological distance which existed between Canada and Latin America this situation continued for some years. Most observers simply felt that Canadian assistance especially to the Commonwealth but also to francophonie was simply more efficiently applied in those states than it would have been with a more "broad brush" approach which included major disbursements to Latin America. It was also generally felt that Latin American aid could be safely left to the Americans whose interests in the region were so much more

massive and whose aid priorities had included that region for some years.

The truly major shift in this situation occurred with the increasing public attention focused on Central American conflict in the 1980s. At this time, bowing to public pressure, there was a steady shift of resources to the Central American republics and this increased interest had some spill-over into selected South American countries as well. This trend has continued to this day with significant amounts of aid delivered to all five Central American republics with the result that they all now can be considered as not inconsiderable aid recipients of Canada.

Table VIII
Canadian Development Assistance Programmes
(millions \$)

		<u>Ranking</u>	<u>Ranking per</u> <u>Capita</u>
Argentina	16.7	14	17
Bolivia	49.8	8	5
Brazil	53.6	6	18
Chile	28.7	10	10
Colombia	63.6	4	11
Costa Rica	66.4	3	1
Cuba	6.2	17	16
Dominican Republic	20.3	11	9
Ecuador	19.6	13	13
El Salvador	35.4	9	6
Guatemala	20.0	12	12
Haiti	77.1	2	4
Honduras	53.5	7	3
Nicaragua	61.0	5	2
Panama	8.2	15	8
Paraguay	6.3	16	15
Peru	120.3	1	7
Uruguay	5.5	18	14
Venezuela	1.4	19	19
Total:	\$ 713.6 million		

Source: derived from statistics in "American, Canadian Development Assistance", 1990.

In addition, following the policy of trying to fight poverty efficiently, the Canadian Development Assistance arrangements in Latin America in recent years have targeted especially Haiti, Honduras and Peru, all three of which desperately require aid at this time. Table VII gives the details of this distribution of aid.

It is also clear from these figures that states whose governments are strongly approved of by Ottawa can become major recipients. The cases of Costa Rica, and to some extent, Colombia, are illustrative of this situation.

Chapter XVI: Peacekeeping

It is frequently difficult for Canadians to place themselves in the context of Latin American experience where peacekeeping is concerned. Canada has of course participated in all major U.N. peacekeeping operations in the past, was a major actor in the thinking behind and actual setting up of peacekeeping arrangements in their modern UN sense in 1956, and feels strongly that peacekeeping can be a major positive activity in the world today. This experience is a reflection of our geopolitical situation since the beginning of the Cold War and the structuring of the bi-polar world based on the Cold War. Canadian perceptions of peacekeeping have always existed in this context where any brush fire or small war could conceivably result in a threat to Canada's national survival because the involvement of the Great Powers in such a conflict always carried the risk of escalation and frequently of escalation up to nuclear levels.

Canada, placed as it is between the two superpowers and on the route of most of their weapons systems aimed at their adversary, would be destroyed or at least very severely damaged in any conflict at a nuclear level which involved a central exchange between the Soviet Union and the United States even if Ottawa were to somehow be neutral in such a war. Hence the perception of all Canadian governments since the 1950s has been that anything Canada could do to reduce the risk of the outbreak of small wars anywhere in the world, and if such wars did break out to limit the temptation for major powers to become involved in them; should be undertaken by this country even if our direct

interest in the conflicts themselves were usually very limited indeed.

Peacekeeping, usually seen in a United Nations context but not impossible to imagine in Commonwealth, Francophone or other rubrics, has become a highly popular activity for the Canadian Armed Forces and unquestionably the type of operation most appreciated by the public at large. Polls have consistently shown this to be the case and to be a feature of Canadian international military activity equally valued by both French and English-speaking Canadians and by all the country's regions and provinces.

Thus our surprise is great when it is discovered that the Latin American perception of peacekeeping is very different indeed and often almost the opposite of that shared by most Canadians. In Latin America, and particularly in Central America and the Caribbean, "peacekeeping" has been the term used to describe supposedly multinational military activities imposing the will of the United States on countries of the area and doing so with overwhelmingly U.S. forces involved and with only a token Latin American military presence tagging along. While many on the right in the region support such operations and therefore feel that peacekeeping is a good thing even when viewed in this way, the left and indeed most of the centre feel such interventions to be merely disguised unilateral moves by Washington in the worst tradition of gunboat diplomacy as known up to the 1930s.

It must be remembered that the United States military intervention in the Dominican Republic, followed up quickly with minor contingents from like-minded regimes in Latin America, was

styled "peacekeeping" by Washington and by the United States-dominated Organization of American States. Again in 1979 the United States government attempted to mount a "peacekeeping" operation in Nicaragua when the Sandinistas proved to be on the verge of winning the Civil War and capturing the capital. In the 1980s one saw an invasion of Grenada in 1983 also termed a peacekeeping operation but this time within the context of Eastern Caribbean defence arrangements. There are even those in Washington who claimed the invasion of Panama in 1989 to be a peacekeeping operation as well.

Thus it is obvious that for many Latin Americans peacekeeping has not been a way to help in preserving international peace but has rather been a means to preserve the status quo against reformist governments and to maintain what is viewed as United States hegemony in the Americas. When the United Nations, with Canadian, Spanish and West German particular support, mounted the first truly international peacekeeping operation in Latin America in 1989, this divergence of views in what was meant by peacekeeping came to the fore and much time and effort were expended explaining to Latin Americans the true role of peacekeeping at least as viewed from New York and Ottawa. The Central American peace process was of course helped along by United Nations technical and diplomatic assistance for much of the 1980s and during that period it was found that rightist governments tended to feel peacekeeping operations should somehow favour them while Managua was wary that as in the past such operations might hinder social reform and progress. Canadian assistance and UN patience eventually, with time, made both sides understand that the objective is to gain time for diplomatic initiatives by the military involvement of the UN in

a crisis situation rather than a way to help one or other of the two sides.

No doubt the unhappy OAS experience of the past would have made a peacekeeping operation under the aegis of that organization impossible, if only for the opposition of Nicaragua. Equally, United States opposition would have normally stopped any chance of UN peacekeeping operations succeeding in the area. The latter was made possible, as discussed above, only by the temporary disarray of American policy in the wake of the Iran-Contragate scandal and the confusion resulting therefrom in United States policy toward the region. As it happened the United Nations has been able in recent months to set up ONUCA (the Spanish acronym for the United Nations Force in Central America) and has been able to draw on not only the already proffered assistance of Ottawa, Madrid and Bonn but also of other military forces deployed by Caracas, Bogotá and Dublin.

The ONUCA operation, with both a peacekeeping and a verification function, has been well appreciated in most of Latin America and has, according to most observers, largely eliminated the former negative view of this type of operation and shown that much can indeed be achieved if the political conditions are right. For Latin America, and for Canadian involvement in that region, the impact may be significant.

As mentioned at the beginning of this study, Latin America contains within its borders disputes of almost every conceivable kind. Not only has civil strife been endemic in the region since independence but international conflict has involved almost all the countries of the area since the 1820s and most of

them unfortunately much more recently. Not only have there been frequent conflicts but there have also been relatively few final solutions found of a type to permanently reduce tensions and improve relations among the capitals.

Over half of Latin America's nations have continuing border difficulties with at least one of their neighbours. Many have had ideological disputes in recent years which have either led to indirect conflict or at least to strained relations. Resource-oriented conflicts have also marred the history of Latin America in recent decades and some border disputes contain more than a little background in resource-related issues. In very recent years stressed relations have also resulted from ecological, population movement and drug-related concerns.¹⁰⁵

Thus this region of the world, while profiting from a low level of international conflict when compared with the history of Europe or Asia, can not be considered by any means to be problem-free where war or poisoned relations are concerned. Many recent declarations of peaceful intent on the part of traditional rivals have pointed the way optimistically towards change in these historic conflict patterns. This has been true, as has been seen, in the Argentine-Brazilian relationship, but is also present in Colombian-Venezuelan relations, the complicated triad of disputes involving Peru, Bolivia and Chile, in Central America and in Ecuador-Peru tensions.

Despite these favourable signs, however, moves towards a more peaceful and strife-free environment in Latin America have been bumpy and not easy to advance. There is a true need for

105. See again the whole drift of Mercado Jarrin, *op. cit.*

verification of accords which might underpin the peaceful intentions of much of the region, intentions which are doubted by neighbours or rivals who have little historical reason to believe the publicly expressed statements of friendship coming from capitals little known for their amicable feelings for each other. As has been seen in Central America, and as could be seen in both internal and external threats to nations in the region in the future, there may well be an extensive future role for peacekeeping in the Latin American context. While the end of the Cold War may reduce some assisting countries' desire to aid through the provision of troops for such tasking, the need for such operations may well make itself felt in the not too distant future.

Under these circumstances Canada may find itself very involved in this region of the world as well as more traditional ones where peacekeeping is concerned. In the past, and right up to late 1989, Latin America was the one region of the world where United Nations forces had never been deployed in peacekeeping activities. Therefore, as Canada discovered in the early days of ONUCA, it has been proved necessary to gear up for geographic and linguistic conditions unknown in previous missions. And while in the past Latin American forces have on occasion been acting as part of UN operations outside the region and therefore Canadian Forces have on occasion worked with them, ONUCA is proving that there may be times when Latin American forces are indeed the majority and where more traditional partners such as the Scandinavians and other Europeans are in the minority or are indeed not represented at all.

Again, as shown by ONUCA, a greater military presence in peacekeeping in Latin America may place strains on Canadian

military capabilities which were not obvious in previous UN missions. The question arises, for example, as to the impact of our troops, aircraft and ships working with countries' forces which are at a considerably lower level of sophistication than are our own and perhaps more importantly, without the assistance of a significant military power. In Cyprus for example British logistic and other support allows Canadian military activity to have a "tail" which without the presence of a United Kingdom military force of considerable size, Canadians would be hard-pressed to produce themselves. In African operations as well British and other experience have on occasion also proven valuable. In the Sinai United States air support, surveillance and communications systems and logistics potential has made the United Nations' job infinitely easier and, according to some, had that support not been available, the whole peacekeeping mission would have not been a possibility.¹⁰⁶

Latin American armies have traditionally been lacking in highly sophisticated equipment and although most choose for prestige reasons to have some high performance jet aircraft, tanks and major surface units; the fact is that their major weakness tends to be air transport and logistics, two areas where United Nations commitments generally involve significant resource allocations. Canada could well find itself in some operations looked to as the most likely source for these support functions and it must be remembered that our capabilities in these fields are very limited. In general, then, it can be said that peacekeeping and verification opportunities may be frequent

106. Brian S. Mandell, "The Sinai Model: Lessons in Multimethod Arms Control Verification", in Mandell (Ed), Back to the Future: Lessons from Experience for Regional Arms Control and Verification, pp. 70-73.

and sizeable in a future Latin American scene dominated by the attempt to build a more peaceful environment and a more stable domestic and international situation. The lack of great experience in this area on the part of Latin American armed forces, despite some involvement by Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, Uruguay and the Dominican Republic; and the restraints imposed by reduced defence budgets and somewhat askew force equipment postures, may put Canada under some pressure to be particularly active in this field of international military activity.¹⁰⁷

107. See, for example, H.P. Klepak, "The Applicability of the Sinai Model to Central American Peace Initiatives", in *Ibid.*, p. 113.

Chapter XVII: Access to Strategic Minerals

Canada is an extremely mineral-rich country and Canadians with difficulty imagine themselves as terribly dependent on outside suppliers for keeping our industry going. As a colony, as a dominion, and more recently this country has faced peace and war as a major supplier of minerals, and indeed of agricultural and finished products, to the mother country and to other major importers. Nonetheless the fact is that all countries lack at least some minerals which are considered to be of great value or even essential for their economic activity or for their potential war efforts.

In both petroleum crises of the 1970s, however, Canadians have been faced with at least potential shortages of this vital element in the production chain of any developed country. Indeed those crises internationally stimulated a plethora of books, articles, and government reports on circumstances in which other key imports might be threatened by politically-caused cutoffs. While Canada produced its share of such publications they were not particularly numerous nor were Canadians for long deeply troubled by this issue. In addition, as J.A. Finlayson has pointed out, the 1980s saw interest in these questions fall for several reasons.¹⁰⁸ Most of the 1982-6 period saw a downward trend in commodity prices and an excess in the supply of a great many minerals. Better relations between East and West also led to less concern over supplies. Third World attempts to control supply failed miserably to

108. See J.A. Finlayson, "Canada as a Strategic Mineral Importer: The Problematical Minerals".

repeat the OPEC success and this also pushed down the great interest in these issues of the 1970s.

As a minerals exporter Canada's analysis of these trends was more relaxed than most although, as mentioned, some attention has continually been focused on this matter. The Finlayson paper suggests that this country's most important non-fuel mineral import category is fabricated ferrous and non-ferrous minerals. While Tungsten is mined in this country it is nonetheless imported in fabricated forms. The same is true of nickel and platinum, minerals usually considered strategic. Of the nine frequently defined strategic minerals, only chromium, manganese, bauxite and tin seem to show any propensity for threat. This is usually as a result of a lack of supplier countries from which to choose when political difficulties involving one producing state can be countered by simply changing source.

Chromium and manganese are two minerals the subject of varying degrees of worry in some developed countries. The relative lack of sources outside Africa has made this the case for these two essential materials in the production of steels. In the case of chromium, Cuba, while a small producer, is a source for Canada and could be a larger one. As for manganese, Brazil is already supplying a major portion of Canadian imports.

Latin America is also important where Canadian bauxite imports are concerned and this is reflected by a historic national interest in investments in bauxite mining over many decades. In the production of aluminum, bauxite is the key element and the vast expansion of aluminum production in recent decades has highlighted the importance of this mineral. While Australia and

Guinea are the world's most important producers, Canadian imports have shown an increasing dependence on Latin America, and particularly Brazil, in recent years. Other countries of the region exporting bauxite include the Dominican Republic and Haiti as well as the two Commonwealth states of Jamaica and Guyana.

Most world production of tin is found in only five countries: Bolivia, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the U.S.S.R. Bolivia produces 10.7% of the world's exports of this mineral while Brazil also is a small producer. Important for the steel and chemical industries, tin is usually considered a strategic mineral despite the availability of readily purchased substitutes. The complication here is the transshipment of the mineral through United States ports which distorts Canadian national statistics to a degree where our own dependence is difficult to judge accurately. Nonetheless it is very clear that our dependence on Bolivian sources is significant although South East Asian countries together would appear to form an even more important source for us. The United States takes its dependence on this mineral seriously and indeed keeps a stockpile of it in peacetime.

From the perspective of importing countries Bolivia has shown itself to be a producer of some instability. This is not altogether surprising given the vital role of this mineral in generating export earnings for that landlocked country. In fact however, disruptions such as the Bolivian attempt to organize a producers' cartel, are unlikely to be effective. For a start, as far as Canada is concerned, this country has tin ore deposits which, while not exploited as yet as a result of economic factors, could if need be receive a higher priority. In

addition if tin's price were to increase dramatically through the actions of key producing countries or even of a cartel, there are a number of substitutes which might well be used.

Thus while chromium and manganese offers some prospect for instability of supply in the future, Latin America, though important, would unlikely provide the source for great concern in Canada. The same can not be said for fuel imports. Canadian trade with Latin America is to a major degree the story of oil imports seen against the background of several major exports from Canada to the area south of the Rio Grande.

In this vital area of oil it is Venezuela which has traditionally been the centre of Canadian attention. For most of the previous few decades it has been crude petroleum which has accounted for over 60% and sometimes much more of total Canadian imports from Latin America. And while Venezuela has traditionally provided the bulk of Canadian petroleum imports from Latin America, this situation has changed somewhat since the great price rises of the 1970s. Ecuador, Peru, Colombia and Mexico have all become exporters, in some cases major exporters, of petroleum products. Nonetheless previous practice and geographic location, as well as already established arrangements involving consumption in Canada and supply agreements between Washington and Ottawa, have meant that Venezuela still remains the key supplier for this country. Indeed at times in the 1970s Caracas could boast that its oil exports alone accounted for half of all Canadian imports of all kinds from Latin America as a whole. The disruption of these supplies, especially in the complex context of US-Canadian agreements on intra-North-American trade in this commodity, would constitute a very great difficulty indeed for Canada to surmount.

With the exception of oil, however, it is fair to say that Canadian security analysts rarely worry greatly about access to strategic minerals coming from Latin America. While some authors, and most particularly Lars Schoultz, have argued convincingly that the United States is not especially vulnerable to disruptions in the supply of vital minerals from Latin America, it is still true that the general view in the Department of Defence in Washington, shared by most analysts in the White House, is that this is not the case and that Latin American strategic mineral supplies are important for the United States to preserve.¹⁰⁹ It is perhaps in this context that Canadian concern over this issue might most likely surface again. That is, as usual, when the United States takes a matter as serious for its security, there are almost always repercussions for Canada. When the issue is mineral resources, where Washington and New York view Canada in general as a vast under-exploited region, there is potential for further difficulties if serious disruptions were to occur. As raised so often above our security concerns where Latin America is involved are often only visible through their reflected importance when seen through Washington's prism.

109. Schoultz, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

Chapter XVIII: The Commonwealth and Francophone Connections

It has been seen that, historically, Canadian links with the Commonwealth Caribbean were our most important connections with the area south of the United States in this hemisphere. More recently Canada's increased interest in the French-speaking world, culminating in our membership and then major role in Francophonie, has brought us a much closer relationship as well with some of the French-speaking parts of the Caribbean area. Britain's former colonial possessions are of course more numerous, and France's have tended to remain loyal to the metropolis and indeed to become départements of the Republic, and these facts have meant that the bulk of Canadian interest in this area has still remained with the English-speaking islands and continental states.

The Francophone connection, however, has brought about a much closer relationship as well with the island republic of Haiti, the poorest country in the Western hemisphere but a Francophone one. In recent years this island has attracted a great deal of Canadian aid, civil rights and even military interest.

To turn to the Commonwealth countries first, Canada's links are with the large number of newly independent states stretching from Belize in Central America to Guyana in Eastern South America and supplemented by the extensive former island possessions of Great Britain as well as a number of territories still under the direct rule of London. The major island states; Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, have been recipients of tourism, trade, aid and investment for many years. While those countries still ruled directly by the British have

received less attention from Canada in general, even they feel a special connection to this country based on the Commonwealth connection, a common history, usually a common monarchy, a common language, a British system of law, and finally a similar British model of parliamentary democracy. All these connections have even led one territory, the Turks and Caicos Islands, to apply for provincial status within the Canadian Confederation. This request, needless to say, was turned down.

The first point to be made here is that these countries are not parts of Latin America and do not feel themselves to be so. While several have now joined the Organization of American States, their policies within that organization and their general foreign policies and interests reflect much more their European connections, their hope for a more profitable relationship with the United States in the future, and their Commonwealth status than they do any perception of a shared community with Latin American countries. The reason for including them in a study of strategic interests of Canada in Latin America is that this country can expect its relations with them to affect its future links with Latin America.

Both continental Commonwealth countries have serious border disputes with much larger Latin American states who claim either the whole or a large part of their national territories as their own. Belize, whose population of 140 000 makes it a very small state indeed, has been threatened since long before its independence in the early 1980s, with full incorporation by force into Guatemala. The latter republic has never accepted the results of British commercial and naval penetration of what it considered its east coast, and has on occasion been quite bellicose in demanding that the country be "returned" to it or

at least yield large portions of its territory to the regime in Guatemala City. After the Falklands War, the isolation of Guatemala following the severe repression of the late 1970s and early 1980s, and continued diplomatic failure to win support for its claims, the new democratic government has changed the former hardline approach to one of renewed correct relations with London and a more toned-down propaganda style regarding Belize.

This new policy has allowed Guatemala to reduce its isolation and most importantly gain access to aid from European Community nations and these successes have meant that currently the Belize issue is on a back burner. It is far from certain that this state of affairs will last as concern in Guatemala for the eventual "recuperation" of what is viewed as their territory remains a constant.

The Canadian connection here is a long-standing one. A Canadian Militia regiment provided the garrison for Belize during the Second World War. Mr. Trudeau, when he was Prime Minister, caused something of a surprise at home and in Latin America when he suggested that Belize might be a Canadian security issue in the early 1970s. While that position was quickly adjusted, or at least clarified, subsequently, it has remained a possibility which Belizeans sometimes refer to when speaking of who might help to defend them in the case of Guatemalan attack. Certainly Guatemala has not been impressed by the nearly total support Belize has obtained for its diplomatic objectives especially those involving access to membership to international and regional organizations. The Canadian role in this has not gone unnoticed in Guatemala City.

A not totally dissimilar situation exists with regard to Guyana although here the issue is much more muddy. While Canada has investments in that country and has some trade and immigration connections with it, close relations have not developed. Guyana has a huge tract of land in the West claimed, often vociferously, by Venezuela, a much more serious eventual military threat than that posed by Guatemala to Belize. The Venezuelan Crisis of 1895, in which Canada was only too directly involved as the likely eventual battleground in the diplomatic showdown between Britain and the United States (the latter backing Venezuela in the dispute), has made this confrontation slightly better known in this country than the Belize-Guatemala one. Canadian acceptance of the great importance of Venezuela to Canada and to the West, and the early independence of Guyana from Great Britain, created a context where Ottawa has been far from forthcoming in seeking to reassure the Guyanese of active support in their ongoing dispute with their large, relatively powerful, rich and influential neighbour.

Whereas Belize has never actually been the object of a direct attack by Guatemala, Guyanese weakness and its early independence from Great Britain in a sense invited attack and this was not long in coming. The 1960s saw border provocations and finally a military attack launched by Venezuela into the disputed zone currently held by the Guyanese. Both these disputes could eventually cause Ottawa difficulties as it is likely that our support for Commonwealth partners could well take precedence over our concerns about Latin American reactions to that support given to what is considered by some Latin American capitals as remaining colonial enclaves. On the other hand it can at least be argued that Canadian membership in the Organization of American States gives it some influence in that

forum in protecting these small ex-colonies from potentially predatory neighbours. Canada is certainly unlikely to extend any sort of defence guarantees to either of these two countries and any commitment there is will be of a moral and diplomatic kind.

Insofar as the Commonwealth Caribbean islands are concerned in addition to trade, aid, immigration and tourism connections, Canada has assisted the small security forces of several of these states and has exercised its armed forces in some of these countries and with their forces on a number of occasions. The similarities among most Commonwealth countries allow for easy military and police cooperation, a state of affairs made even more easy by common procedures, structures, staff systems, and language. In the current state of affairs this poses few problems. While the invasion by the United States of Grenada in 1983 was profoundly embarrassing for Canada (not to mention the United Kingdom) this country had not been militarily involved in assisting that former British colony. This might not be the case if the future found the United States disposed to repeat this kind of operation in other parts of the Commonwealth Caribbean.

A far-off concern of British and Canadian statesmen since the 1950s has been to what extent the smaller islands are viable states in any way able to ensure their own security. While Latin American countries bordering on the Caribbean have so far shown relatively little interest in replacing the metropolitan powers in the islands, there have been more than one incident where a growth in Latin American security concerns has caused a forward policy to be adopted. In the recent Trinidad and Tobago attempted coup it was interesting to note the rapid deployment,

and subsequent constant close surveillance of the island and the evolution of the situation therein, by two units of the Venezuelan fleet. Cuba has also not been absent from Caribbean Commonwealth concerns and more than one island in earlier years accused Havana of unwarranted interference in its affairs. Thus while in Ottawa the tendency is to downplay security concerns in the Caribbean, this could be a mistake over the long term.

If Commonwealth Caribbean states could conceivably provide eventual security concerns for Canada or at least complications for our relations with Latin American states bordering on or lying near these ex-colonies, the situation regarding the Falklands is even more tense. As is well known, Canada backed the United Kingdom completely during the 1982 Falklands War and indeed on the issue since. While most Latin American ire at that time was directed to the more influential Americans and of course to the British, many newspapers and all foreign ministries noted Canada's stance with some commenting sadly on this country's continuing perception of itself as a European and not as an American nation. Be that as it may the Falklands conflict greatly disturbed Canadian nuclear cooperation with Argentina and damaged somewhat, although surprisingly temporarily, our relations overall with Buenos Aires.

It is unlikely that Canadian attitudes on this subject will evolve terribly more quickly than will those of the United Kingdom and while not directly involved one is sure to be criticized within and without the OAS if the issue reappears in a dramatic form at any time in the future. The Falklands dispute has become a "cause célèbre" in Latin America and, subsequent to the behaviour of Chile and especially Colombia, is now often seen as proof of friendship for the region on the

part of states outside it. Canada is and will probably long be unable to pass this particular test even though this country would be delighted to see a negotiated settlement to this long-standing dispute.

Moving back to the French territories and former colonies farther north, one sees not only the populous republic of Haiti but also the integral parts of France represented by Guadeloupe and Martinique and the several smaller territories spread more widely among the islands of the Antilles, and finally the strategic outpost of French Guiana on the coast of South America between Brazil and Surinam. So far the French department islands have been remarkably stable and seem for the foreseeable future likely to remain so. The smaller islands are also calm and the French military presence throughout the area makes them highly unlikely to be interesting targets for influence coming from Havana, Caracas or indeed anywhere else other than Paris. The strong military presence of the French in their part of the Guianas where they have a major missile facility is also often seen as a helpful stabilizing element in an area where dangerous instability in Surinam could well lead to unpleasantness of a considerable order. French and Brazilian conservatism acts no doubt as a break on more radical designs developed in neighbouring Surinam.

The colonial or near colonial status of all these territories has limited the Canadian desire to expand its Francophone-based connections with the region, connections which are much more flourishing in Africa than in the Caribbean. This can not be said of Haiti to the North. The western half of Hispaniola with its capital at Port au Prince has been independent for nearly two centuries. Under strong United States political and

military influence since shortly after the turn of the century, Haiti has also generally maintained close cultural and indeed political ties with France as well. Canada's arrival as a major partner on the scene is of much more recent date although Canadian Francophone interest of a cultural and religious kind has more distant origins.

This island republic has been a major source of immigration into Canada and has helped to maintain the delicate balance between Anglophone and Francophone over more than a decade. The importance of the Haitian community in Montreal and more generally in Québec is far from insignificant. While it had previously been felt that there was no security element in the Ottawa-Port-au-Prince linkage, recent events following the overthrow of the Duvalier Regime in 1988 have shown otherwise. Public pressure during these troubled times has been intense and has brought about a rather curious Washington-Paris-Ottawa axis of states deeply involved in the Haitian situation and anxious both to favour the establishment of democracy while maintaining stability overall. Such cooperation has indeed found a security dimension and even Canada has not been able to avoid it. Its most obvious form was the dispatch of a naval force with a landing party by Ottawa to the Haitian area during the time of the troubled attempt at elections in late 1988.

Therefore, while it would certainly be a mistake to suggest that the Commonwealth and Francophone connections have a major security element in them for Canada, it is equally erroneous to suggest they can have none at all. Curiously enough our first deployment of military personnel to the Belize region was not to that fellow Commonwealth monarchy but rather to its traditional opponent, the Guatemalan republic where ONUCA has troops

deployed. Canadian military cooperation with the Commonwealth Caribbean has already a defence dimension and one which could conceivably have international relations implications with either the U.S., Latin America or both at some time in the future. Other outstanding disputes mentioned are also unlikely to involve great security factors but may include some. Haiti has shown that it is capable of calling for Canadian military activity in a very direct fashion indeed and continuing instability in that country could very possibly lead to a repetition of this kind of action or of deployments of greater size.

Chapter XIX: Drugs

Few problems in international relations or indeed in society as a whole seem as intractable as does that of drugs. The very fact that the word itself can equally well conjure up the idea of life-saving and pain-reducing miracles of modern medicine, and pictures of shattering effects destroying the lives and future of otherwise healthy young people is a clear indication of the kind of difficulties which underscore but make nearly impossible rational debate leading to likely solutions to this quandary affecting almost all of mankind in one way or another.

The attempt to control the improper use of drugs is called currently a "war". President Bush and other American leaders, with the end of the Cold War, have heralded the drug problem as the most serious national security issue for the United States in the whole world.¹¹⁰ In this context it will surely not seem surprising to see a chapter on drugs in a study of the security issues of a country not only next door to the United States but allied to that great power and suffering greatly if not equally from the same problem.

It must first be said that the drugs problem has not in the past been viewed in any such way nor has there been consideration given to dealing with the problem through international military action until very recently. The 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s have been a period where great issues such as the role of women, AIDS, war, vast political

110. Coletta Youngers and John Walsh, "La Guerra contra las drogas en los Andes: una política mal encaminada", p. 350.

change, and many other enormous shocks to modern society have shown us the need to respond more carefully, less automatically and with greater thought than has been the case in much of the past. The marginalization of many minorities which was so much a characteristic of much of human society has cost us dearly in terms of mass murder, social dislocation, drug abuse and sexually transmitted diseases. An era of unequalled promise in the history of mankind has been frustrated by excessively insensitive and one is tempted to say "programmed" reactions. In the words of one well-known commentary "the 20th century is marked by first-class problems and second-class brains."

Nowhere are the dilemmas occasioned by such dramatic change in society so powerful and so widespread as in the issue of drugs. The only Western example of a similar phenomenon was not so much the growth in alcohol abuse of the end of the last century and the beginning of this but rather the reaction of much of Western society, and particularly of the United States to the phenomenon of largely urban misuse of the traditional pastime of drinking spirits and beer.

As in the 1920s in the United States so in the 1990s in that country and in most of the Western world, one sees the abuse of a traditional form of stimulant and the widespread impact of that fact, and of the efforts to control such practices in society as a whole. Drugs, like alcohol have been present in Western and other civilizations for millennia. While alcohol-based stimulants tended to dominate mass culture in Western Europe and North America, what are currently termed drugs were much more widespread in their use in Andean America, the Middle East and parts of Asia at least. Few attempts anywhere in the world were made before the 20th century to stamp out these

practices either because they were not particularly widespread, or because their effects were not considered very great, or even because they were viewed in an essentially positive light. The one obvious exception to this assertion is the importation, large-scale use and subsequent attempts at repression of opium in the Chinese empire following its opening to the West.

What has changed is of course that while the attack on alcohol abuse was slowed and then virtually halted until very recent years, the growth of the use of drugs has been not only in numerical but also in class terms. While up to the 1950s the consumption of heroin or marijuana was either a "ghetto" phenomenon or closely associated with the Bohemian lifestyles of a small minority, the 1960s and the years since have seen the use of those drugs and others pass into the hands of the young and not so young of the upper and middle classes of the Western world. In the 1960s and to some extent in the 1970s this phenomenon was related to a generation of more widespread protest, a call for change which seemed at the time to threaten political stability if not too dramatically public health. The 1970s and 1980s, with a reduction in consumption of and concern with marijuana, and the extraordinary growth in the use of cocaine and its derivatives, seem no longer to offer a picture of a threat to political stability nor to be part of a generational protest, but rather strike firmly at public health and even more dramatically at social peace through the demands for large amounts of ready cash on the part of addicts attempting to deal with their habit.¹¹¹ Drug-related crime has reached such a level of intensity, and the growth of both occasional and addict usage has been so extraordinary that when

111. See Rosa del Olmo, Los Discursos sobre la droga.

recent calls were made for a "war" on drugs such a phrasing no longer seemed to Western middle classes to be either exaggerated or unnecessary. Hence an issue of minor concern only three decades ago has been able to become widely perceived as a security threat not only on the streets of our cities but also in our international relations as well.

While there is a general acknowledgement that the problem is an international one, until recently there was no similar view as to the solution being international. For a number of years in the recent past the United States put much more emphasis on having producer countries counteract the problem than in doing very much itself in dealing with consumption. As the major consuming state by far in the world, the United States was naturally most concerned to bring the problem under control. The influence of drugs in the cities of the United States reached in the 1970s and the 1980s levels undreamed of in the past and the spiralling rate of crime was increasingly laid at the feet of the drug problem. The difficulty was and to some extent is that with tens of millions of voters being occasional users and with several million of them being addicts there were obvious dangers for democratic governments anxious to be re-elected in attacking too directly the drug problem in that country. It was much easier to call on producer countries to do something about the crop than it was to arrest, or indeed treat, hundreds of thousands or even millions of American citizens.

At this time one found the extraordinary circumstances applying increasingly where the United States called on producing countries to act forcefully against producers and traffickers while when those same traffickers resulted in being

Americans, Senators and Congressmen from their localities hastened to defend them and clamour to the State Department to do something to ensure their release from the hands of the same governments that same department had just been pleading with to do more to control drugs. The situation was simply ridiculous and made American attempts to convince other countries of the seriousness of their problems very difficult indeed as it was obvious that what was "sauce for the goose was not sauce for the gander."

Nonetheless until very recent times, and especially during the last year, Washington has continued to place the emphasis on control at point of production and has steered clear from a truly war-footing in terms of its domestic control and suppression of the problem. While American aid, police and even military forces have been deployed to producing countries, particularly Bolivia, and action on the ground there has on occasion been sharp; at home civil rights, the judicial system and electoral considerations have slowed greatly a serious campaign of repression and emphasis has instead been placed on education and prevention. Meanwhile the call for Latin American repression has been constantly rising in tone.

The Latin American perception of the problem could hardly be more different. Traditional usage of the coca plant for chewing as a means to stave off hunger, deal with high altitudes and a variety of privations is of long date going back thousands of years in Peru and Bolivia and to some extent Colombia as well. While historians and anthropologists differ on some aspects of this traditional use of the plant, it is clear that at least the aristocracy in much of the Andes has used the plant for many hundreds of years.

French military missions in Latin America at the end of the 19th century heaped praise on the practice as one which helped the local soldier endure hardship and keep the field at heights unimaginable in traditional European warfare. In the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay in the 1930s, the Bolivian soldier was issued the coca leaf in an attempt to help him stave off the hunger so often haunting his army as a result of the long distances involved in Bolivian supply lines from the centre of the country to the front.

Peruvian and Bolivian farmers in certain areas have grown the crop legally for hundreds of years and it is therefore not surprising that Latin Americans find it difficult to see why they should bear the brunt of the effort to resolve a northern problem when their production has been there for so long. Instead they argue that it is for the United States to deal with the consumption end of the problem rather than causing difficulties for the weak states and democracies of South America which can attempt eradication campaigns only at great risk and with enormous difficulty. In the words of one phrase of graffiti on a Bogotá wall: "la solución: que USA no USE lo que USA" (the solution: that the USA not USE what it USES). The difference in attitudes could hardly be more clear.

Taking a non-United States example used by one perceptive British diplomat and expert on drugs, one can see the divergence in views even more clearly. This suggests that the problem should be turned around and one should try to imagine in a United Kingdom environment what the reaction would be in Scotland if several Muslim countries sent representatives to the British government explaining that Scotch Whisky was arriving in their countries in large quantities and in violation of the law

and the Koran; that this was causing increased delinquency and indeed violence in the streets of these Muslim countries and that the problem was being taken very seriously indeed. Hence one was asking, and nearly demanding, that the British government take steps to eradicate production of Scotch Whisky and thereby remove the problem for the consuming states. Even without a consideration of the current Conservative government's difficulties in winning seats in Scotland, it is obvious that no British government could ever imagine reacting favourably to such a request, particularly if the Muslim governments making it were unwilling to take firm measures in their own countries.

While this example is not totally transferrable, it does seem to this author that there is enough similarity in the two cases to make consumer countries think again about the issue of drugs and the capabilities of highly unstable democracies, just recently emerging from long periods of military rule, to deal with any such demands upon them. It is hardly surprising then to discover that these debt-ridden, impoverished, misdeveloped and off-balance countries have been extremely unsuccessful in finding domestic solutions to this problem over the years.

In this extraordinary variety of views lies a frustration for both consumer and producer nations. The reaction of the United States population has been to call for firm action against countries which Washington does not feel are pulling their weight in the anti-drug drive. This public outcry has found expression in specific congressional limitations on aid distribution where the linkage is made very clear between cooperation and stamping out drug cultivation and the receipt of much-needed United State economic assistance. Andean countries have found on more than one occasion passed appropriations

blocked through an assessment of their anti-drug efforts as insufficient when viewed from the United States perspective.

As mentioned elsewhere, with the end of the Cold War either in sight or already achieved, this drug "war" has become a matter of considerable discussion in United States military and political circles especially in the light of the definition of the problem as the single most important security issue for that country. The United States military at home is now deeply involved in the anti-drug campaign providing interception capabilities, patrolling, intelligence, and communications functions in cooperation with the Drug Enforcement Agency, United States Customs, and the Coast Guard. A vastly increased defence appropriation for drug cooperation has been the source of much institutional interest in the Department of Defense in these days of reduced budgets overall.

Overseas the American aid effort, while including economic development assistance aimed at crop substitution, remains remarkably military-oriented. In addition to assistance to the Peruvian, Bolivian and Colombian police, there has been a dramatic increase in aid of a military nature to the armed forces of those three countries but with clear drug combatting intentions. United States assistance to the Bolivian Army, for example, should allow for the formation of at least one specialist battalion trained, armed and organized for operations against traffickers. The ability of that country's air force and navy to assist the police and any eventually formed specialist army units is also being raised by aid from Washington. In Peru, the "militarization" of the drug war is not so obvious or so debated as it is in Bolivia but assistance to that country's army is clearly aimed at improving its

capabilities to engage in anti-drug operations either alone or jointly with the United States or its neighbours. In the case of Colombia, that country's military roles do not include anti-drug operations which are the strict preview in normal times of the police but large-scale raids in the months since the August 1989 crackdown have required the military to assist both with air lift, supply and indeed the deployment of combat troops.

The United States is therefore considering more and more that the armed forces have an ever greater role in assisting with dealing with the drug problem. The United States' military are ordered to cooperate with other countries' armed forces and to assist them in improvements aimed at this objective. At home an ever increasing emphasis is placed on this role which is well viewed by the public and by Congress. There has even been discussion of foot and vehicle patrols to supplement the already significant naval and air dimensions of control of access to United States airspace, coast and territory. This deployment of effort, when combined with police activity aimed at the same objective, represents an enormous investment in funds, manpower, material and national energy the total cost of which is hard to establish but which is certainly massive and running into the billions of dollars.

European and Canadian interest in what has been termed, often polemically, the "militarization" of the drug war, has been much more circumspect. Generally speaking, European capitals as well as Ottawa view the drug problem as very much more one of social and economic development as opposed to one offering a situation where military options to resolve the problem offer much scope. Indeed, in general, while these countries see the obvious need for repression to occur to some degree in the producing

countries, they equally feel that only measures which give producing farmers the possibility of replacing the coca plant with something else which will yield at least a respectable percentage of the profits that crop provides, can succeed in tempting agricultural producers to abandon the easy cash crop represented by coca. This is of course also the view of the United Nations which operates a small but reasonably successful crop-substitution programme in both Peru and Bolivia.

A number of European countries have assisted Andean police forces involved in the effort to control illegal drug exports. However so far these countries have shown little interest in moving such aid into the military realm. This may reflect traditional suspicions on the left of any efforts to strengthen the armed forces of these weak democracies but also probably underscores the relative lack of European connections (other than pure arms sales) with the Latin American military since the end of the 1930s and the replacement of European military missions with those from the United States. Mostly, however, this aid posture is an expression of the deep-rooted feeling mentioned above that nothing which does not aim at producing real development and hence improvements in employment prospects in these countries will go very far in offering options other than coca production to the farmers of the region. Each country tends to be interested essentially in stopping the drugs reaching its own shores. Coordination at an international level is only being discussed so far.

Canada specifically has a long tradition of viewing most problems in Latin America as being the result of poverty, political reluctance to reform, unjust distribution of national income and similar economic and social conditions. Ottawa has been reluctant over several decades to focus a defence-oriented view on the region as a whole and specifically on the problem areas of Cuba, Central America and now the Andean coca-producing countries, to mention but a few. Nonetheless as seen in the aid chapter of this paper, Latin America has not been a major target for Canadian aid efforts and this is in some ways particularly true of much of the Andean region. Indeed our interest in that area of the hemisphere has been limited and, for example, we have an embassy in neither Ecuador nor Bolivia. Our military presence there is of course nil and even our Royal Canadian Mounted Police liaison officers are few and far between and this despite the drug problem. At the moment there are RCMP liaison officers only in Bogotá, Brasilia and Lima among the Latin American capitals although there are others working in West Indian and United States cities and of course members cooperating with the United Nations and the Organization of American States. It should be noted however that this lack of a diplomatic, military and police presence does not represent a faulty understanding of the need for such people on the ground in the region but rather reflects much more the financial constraints under which the Department of External Affairs, the Department of National Defence, and the RCMP work.

If militarization of the drug war is of concern to Canada, and it is, it has nonetheless proven necessary to take it seriously for reasons discussed above as well as for others to be discussed at this point. Obviously, as mentioned, the very fact that our neighbour and ally takes this issue so seriously as to

consider it a major national security threat means that Canada must at least keep a watchful eye on the issue. When the American military discusses patrolling the Canadian border and taking a more active role in intercepting drugs coming over that border, drugs which may have transited through a variety of Latin American countries, possibly then through Europe, and only then, finally, come through Canada and attempted to enter the United States; there is no logical way Canada can avoid studying these trends with interest and concern.

Domestic issues play their part as well. Polls show that Canadians do want their armed forces to assist more in dealing with the drug problem. Further links with Latin America in recent months have pushed these issues much further to the fore than in the past. And finally, Canadians suffer dramatically as well, even if not as much as Americans do, from the arrival of illegal drugs into this country. Hundreds of thousands of addicts suffer greatly and the scourge adds greatly to crime levels, especially violent ones, throughout the country. The cost in health care is tremendous but the price to pay in family disruption, damaged or lost lives, and wasted youth is almost incalculable. There was for a number of years a tendency here, in Europe, and in the rest of the developed world to consider the problem essentially an American one with which the U.S. should properly deal. Recent trends in this country, in Western Europe and in many other places suggest that that "holier than thou" attitude was, to say the least, misplaced.

There are however some favourable signs. Many experts and analysts point to a decline if not in the number of drug users at least in the rate of the spread of drug usage particularly in the young. It may indeed be true, as a number of these analysts

have suggested, that there has been a tapering off in demand and that young people in particular have reached the saturation point where drugs are concerned and are beginning to turn away from them. Few Canadians would be tempted by any sort of military anti-drug crusade conducted at an international level and directed against the poor farmers of drug-growing regions in Latin America or indeed elsewhere. These factors act as a brake to excessive cries of alarm and demands for action.

On the other hand the problem is not going away by itself. Even if coca production and its transformation into cocaine and marketing outside the Latin American region could be brought to a halt, all indications are that other drugs will replace this one and it is in this sense that the drugs problem is central to social and psychological questions of the widest variety in modern industrial societies.

Widespread hope remains that crop substitution may at least reduce supply and make more difficult the job of the trafficker.¹¹² Unfortunately recent experience suggests that that hope may also be misplaced at least insofar as it suggests itself as some sort of final answer. Some would assert that in the months since the Colombians began their crackdown on the narcotics trade, we have had a (and possibly the only) real opportunity to succeed with crop substitution. For a variety of reasons the relative success of the Colombian anti-drug offensive has disrupted the market and sent the price for coca down to less than half that of the period before the crackdown and this in the Andean regions of production themselves. According to the United Nations this fall in price and

112. Ibán de Rementería, "La Sustitución de cultivos como perspectiva", in Diego García-Sayán, Coca, cocaína y narcotráfico, p. 383.

disruption of market opportunities has meant that for the first time in the recent past the substitution of coca, coffee and some other crops for the coca plant has become a real economic possibility for the Bolivian and Peruvian coca farmer.

That farmer is of course well aware that he is living in a sort of "gold rush" environment which will probably end sooner rather than later. In the desperate circumstances of poverty in which he found himself before going into coca production, he was forced to find some means to feed his family and prepare a future.¹¹³ Now, under pressure from the police, and being better educated on the impact of his crop in other countries of the world, and also living himself in an environment where crime and delinquency are on the rise; he is often ready to be tempted away from his crop. The economic factors of a falling price for coca make this (probably very temporary) situation one where dramatic international moves to provide capital, seed, transport, organization and infrastructure for a change in crop might well bear extraordinarily positive results.

Unfortunately, the lack of international cooperation in providing assistance in the region means that the United Nations and other programmes which might respond to this new and promising context are unable to find the means to do so. At the time of writing the local coca price is showing some signs of recovery and the lack of international money where the international mouth has been only too present may mean that this opportunity, likely now to be lost, may well not repeat itself. A recovery of the whole drug production and trafficking system

113. Canada. Royal Canadian Mounted Police, "National Drug Intelligence Estimate 1988/1989", p. 13.

in the region, based once again on Columbia or elsewhere in the promising vastness of Brazil or Venezuela, may lead to a heightened development of coca-growing lands as more and more farmers and workers displaced by the economic crisis of these countries turn to the only real possibility for making a decent living currently available. Such a trend, if it resulted in a greater flow of illegal drugs into the United States and perhaps elsewhere, would raise a heightened call for a military response and for a reinforced eradication programme which could well destabilize the region and become a quagmire for the United States military as well as a burial ground for local democracies.

The producing countries are under no illusions about what is required in order to truly eliminate at least a significant percentage of the coca crop. Given its vital role in the economies of the region it is essential to have any programme which aims at replacing it be within the context of a broadly based attempt to further dramatically the economic development of these countries as a whole. In Peru especially, but also in Bolivia, coca farmers are rarely from the regions in which they currently farm. They are instead attracted by the high price of the coca crop to move from other regions of their countries and establish themselves in the coca growing areas. Thus programmes aimed solely at the coca-growing areas will necessarily be inadequate in dealing with the problem since they will merely attract more farmers or would-be farmers from poorer areas to begin operating in the drug field.

Under such circumstances it is easy to imagine why producing countries insist on a more global approach to the problem and put forward the twin ideas of "drugs for debt" and "drugs for

trade". These recommendations suggest in the first case that the highly destabilizing impact of excessive levels of debt, when combined with the dependence of these economies on drugs, suggest the obvious solution that parts of this debt could be written off by the developed countries in return for effective eradication programmes on the part of producing states.

More important still is the second suggestion, that is that developed countries open much further access to their markets and that producing countries face in the future much less protectionism where their legitimate exports are concerned. Thus drugs would have given these Andean countries a means to pry open European and North American markets which would otherwise have remained more restrictive. Critics in the developed world have suggested that such approaches are mere blackmail by the producing countries who, instead of acting resolutely to stamp out the drug traffic, use unscrupulously their drug-producing potential to force concessions from the developed world. Here again one sees the division in ways of looking at the problem of drugs which was discussed at the beginning of this chapter.¹¹⁴ What seems certain is that barring a wholesale military eradication programme wherein the farmer is also considered the "enemy" only a wide-ranging development programme doing away with the root causes for the peasantry's opting for drug cultivation will get us very far.

Canada will no doubt remain for some time unattracted by a militarization option where drugs in the Latin American countries are concerned. Discussion of a kind of multilateral force deployed southward and active in taking head-on

114. Deustua, *op. cit.*, pp. 57-59.

traffickers and producers is not likely to tempt Ottawa in the future. Nonetheless so far Canada has not been overly active in assisting the Latin American states in dealing with the problem although it is fair to say, as seen in the aid chapter that some effort is being made to help all three most affected Andean countries.

In the near future the military link with drug control is likely to be a limited one for this country and is likely to remain based on these shores. Since August of 1987 the Department of National Defence and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police have had a Memorandum of Understanding where assistance from the armed forces to the RCMP is concerned. That police force is entitled to request of the armed forces the use of ships and aircraft to detect, monitor and if required intercept off-shore vessels suspected of participation in illegal drug trade. The Canadian Navy is to provide on request the RCMP with the means of transport to apprehend suspected vessels as well.

Other police forces could also expect such assistance if they were involved in a joint force operation with the RCMP. Thus the armed forces are involved and have now been so for at least three years with drug trade suppression. Nonetheless the RCMP remains the lead agency in drug enforcement and requests DND support as needed. The RCMP is responsible for DND-RCMP cooperation in the war on drugs.

While no doubt some improvements can be made, RCMP sources suggest that cooperation at the moment between DND and the national police is good. The Director Drug Enforcement of the RCMP is a senior officer responsible for such collaboration and he works in consultation with the Solicitor General's

Department. As yet, and to some extent in contrast with the practice in the United States, DND is not particularly active in the intelligence side of anti-drug operations, a role left both nationally and internationally in the hands of the Strategic Intelligence Branch of RCMP headquarters.

The Canadian Armed Forces have had the usual Commonwealth-style reaction to the idea of extensive anti-drug involvement, a reaction initially that of the United States forces as well. However, slowly but surely cooperation has begun even though not on the massive scale, or with the fanfare, seen south of our borders. The military are reluctant to be seen in a police role both because they generally feel that their training is not the best for such operations and because they tend to prefer to think of themselves as dealing with international security problems overwhelmingly and only secondarily domestic ones. Nonetheless under the impact of government interest, public opinion, and changing times the views of some officers is evolving. The Canadian Armed Forces are of course responsible to answer any call made by the Crown for their services and if the need is felt for them to intervene more dramatically, they of course will do so. In addition to those roles already mentioned, it is possible to imagine a greater air interception, sea patrol, border control and intelligence roles being given to the forces. However, this would involve government determination to use the forces against drugs at a much higher level than that which has been known up to the present. Training and morale considerations are of importance and it is uncertain whether the armed forces provide the best source of capabilities in the future for the roles required by an enhanced Canadian effort to suppress the drug traffic. A significant study would be necessary to discover the parameters of any such

involvement and the implications it might have for national defence.

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to show the extent to which Canada's links with Latin America have grown in recent times while not forgetting to underscore the fact that those connections are far from great and are in no way at the same level of intensity as are our relations with Europe, the Commonwealth or the United States. Canada remains a country where the vast majority of the population is of European stock. In addition its two founding peoples are from a small part of North-western Europe but represent still by a considerable margin the majority of the nation's population. The implications of this state of affairs, our historic links with Great Britain and the countries of the Commonwealth, our cultural and more recent increased contacts with France and the rest of Francophonie; all suggest linkages to Europe which can hardly be mirrored by anything with our Latin American partners.

The United States is our major trading partner, our major source of investment, our largest ally and a country with which we have recently signed a historic if not uncriticized free trade agreement. Cultural, economic and indeed personal relations across the border have grown rapidly in recent decades making the nexus of United States-Canadian relations complicated but rich. In no way can the extent of these connections be compared with Canada's current or potential rapprochement with the states of Latin America.

Where Latin America stands rather is as one of the other major portions of the world with which Canada wishes more close relations. While in recent years it is the ASEAN countries, as well as Japan and China, which have attracted the bulk of Canadian economic interest outside our traditional partners, in

formal terms we have opted to link ourselves more closely with the Latin Americans. However even here it is necessary to be on one's guard as to what has happened. Joining the Organization of American States was as much a move towards closer relations with the United States as it was one towards closer relations with Latin America. The OAS is a regional organization of all the Americas and is, as is well known, dominated by the United States even though trends at the moment appear to be weakening Washington's position therein. In the geopolitical context in which Canada finds itself, moves towards further linkages to the south of our borders, especially given the historic development of Latin America, naturally bring us into closer contact with the United States as well.

Canada's increased role in Central America, on the other hand, has served so far to distance us further from the United States and this largely as a result of a highly independent foreign policy posture adopted by successive governments in Ottawa on the issue of Central American crisis, war, and the regional peace process. Benefitting from our status as a friend of the United States, and supported most effectively by Spain and West Germany, two other friends of the United States, Canada has found itself able to be influential and an independent actor in the area.

One can see then again a reflection of the historic Canadian quandary where closer relations with Latin America were concerned. On the one hand such relations cause us to be linked more closely with the United States and to find ourselves in potentially confrontational circumstances with that superpower over issues which we do not consider vital but which they most certainly do. On the other hand we have legitimate interests

and views to express on world problems and Latin America is not excluded from these. Hence Ottawa has a perfect right to make its voice heard on issues in the Latin American region.

It has been seen in this paper that Canada has obvious interests in Latin America and that some of these have a distinct security dimension. Canadian trade and investment in this part of the world are not insignificant and the stability which makes them possible is a proper concern of Canadian governments. The peaceful settlement of disputes among these countries, given Canada's record in international fora and in peacekeeping, is likewise a field for Canadian interest especially where the humanitarian desire to curb war is combined with a national interest to reduce instability. That instability can have an impact not only on our trade and investment posture in Latin America but also on the direct context of immigration into Canada. War in Central America, considered a remote problem at the end of the 1970s, ended up being the source of not only dangers for our investment, and disruptions of our trade but also the cause of tens of thousands of immigrants coming to Canada, of difficult moments in our relations with the United States, of the deployment of a major verification and peacekeeping mission by the Canadian Forces in the region and the expenditure of much diplomatic energy. In addition those wars were to raise the profile of Central and Latin America in the Canadian public consciousness with consequent pressures on government policy. The enormous relative increase in this country's aid to the five republics in question reflects these changes. Few observers would have considered these events likely in the late 1970s or early 1980s and one can therefore conclude that it is risky to understate

the potential for a closer relationship with Latin America in a number of areas.

Whereas it can be asserted with some force that few Latin American issues can stimulate Canadian interest in the way Central America has, it is nonetheless true that other concerns are also important to us. This paper has shown that the Panama Canal does have a role in Canadian security calculations that, while possible to exaggerate, is still there. Drugs, as a domestic and an international worry, can hardly be ignored by any government hoping to maintain public confidence at election time. The Latin American connection in this regard is an obvious one. But the American connection, given the seriousness with which Washington views this matter and the military nature of much of its response, is even more clear to Canadian analysts attempting to come to grips with it.

Nuclear proliferation also is an area of concern for Ottawa in this region as in most others of the world. Canada does not hide its concern that the dangers of the spread of nuclear weapons are considered by it to be among those most threatening to world peace. Given our role in the development of the Argentine nuclear industry, and our concern with Brazilian-Argentine rivalry in this area, the inclusion of Latin America among the areas of the world worrying to us is hardly surprising. In this regard the improvement in relations between Buenos Aires and Brasilia has been more than welcome. Collaboration between the two capitals on nuclear matters has been particularly gratifying and Canada will no doubt watch with interest further events in this field.

While it has been shown that the strategic resource concerns of the 1970s have largely dissipated and that Latin America is no exception to this rule, there are, as mentioned, certain resource concerns for us. The most important of these for Canada is petroleum and it is of course in that sense that Venezuela in particular and the sea routes north from Venezuela, attract Canadian strategic interest. This situation is unlikely to change for some considerable time.

Summing up then, Latin America is of strategic importance to Canada and that importance is growing as a result of the many factors mentioned throughout this paper. It is, however, a mistake to suggest that the region is of vital interest to us as it is perceived to be by the United States. Canada wishes to see a peaceful world where its trading interests and humanitarian concerns can be furthered. Latin America is one of the regions of the world where both these factors come into play. This country legitimately wishes a role where it can enhance the advantages it obtains from Latin American links without overly encumbering itself with commitments it would find hard to meet. This challenge has been and remains the key one in Canadian relations with the region. Recent increases in the Canadian presence there merely underscore this situation but do not change the essential elements of it.

ANNEX AKey Defence Expenditure Data

	\$ Million(1985)			\$ per Capita			% of Government Spending		
	<u>1985</u>	<u>1987</u>	<u>1988</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1987</u>	<u>1988</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1987</u>	<u>1988</u>
Argentina	1889	993	192	62	32	37	12.1	9.2	n.k
Bolivia	127	198	93	20	29	13	24.9	n.k	9.5
Brazil	1731	1318	809	13	9	6	3.1	11.2	n.k
Chile	1242	816	621	102	65	49	24.8	18.4	15.5
Colombia	274	317	269	10	11	9	5.3	5.5	n.k
Cuba	1597	1344	1677	157	131	162	13.0	n.k	n.k
Dominican Republic	51	74	n.k	8	11	n.k	8.1	11.1	n.k
Ecuador	284	289	n.k	30	29	n.k	11.8	n.k	n.k
El Salvador	252	253	n.k	52	50	n.k	23.6	36.4	n.k
Guatemala	197	173	n.k	25	20	n.k	16.6	13.0	n.k
Haiti	31	n.k	n.k	6	n.k	n.k	n.k	n.k	n.k
Honduras	72	63	67	16	14	14	4.7	6.7	6.9
Mexico	1241	568	619	16	7	7	2.7	n.k	1.4
Paraguay	60	79	76	16	20	20	14.1	21.2	18.5
Peru	641	217	n.k	33	10	n.k	25.2	n.k	n.k
Uruguay	128	n.k	n.k	44	n.k	n.k	10.9	n.k	n.k
Venezuela	824	n.k	933	48	n.k	48	6.5	n.k	10.2

IISS, The Military Balance 1989-90.

ANNEX B

Major Exports to Latin America
With 1989 Value
(\$000)

<u>Country</u>	<u>Major Items</u>	<u>1989 Value</u>	<u>Total Value of Exports</u>
Argentina	Salt, sulphur, earth, stone, etc.	7731	36670
	Wood pulp, waste, etc.	3513	
	Zinc and other metals	2945	
	Nuclear reactor parts	6795	
Bolivia	Cereals	2785	7535
Brazil	Live animals	3154	521161
	Wheat and meal	4106	
	Cereals	48679	
	Salt, sulphur, earth, stone, etc	63044	
	Ores, slag and ash	34676	
	Mineral fuels, oil, etc	73411	
	Inorganic chem., metal compounds	4879	
	Organic chemicals	4805	
	Pharmaceutical products	2212	
	Fertiliser	67448	
	Plastic and articles thereof	3021	
	Rubber and articles thereof	11506	
	Wood pulp, etc.	18124	
	Paper, paperboard	41658	
	Iron and Steel	4012	
	Lead and articles thereof	4007	
Chile	Machinery, parts	95314	110202
	Electrical machinery, parts	15629	
	Optical, photo, cine, precision	3669	
	Salt, sulphur, earth, stone, etc	14418	
	Ores, slag and ash	14039	
	Mineral fuels, oil, etc	10645	
	Fertiliser	8799	
	Plastic and articles thereof	3329	
Colombia	Articles of iron or steel	2300	163995
	Machinery, parts	23148	
	Electrical machinery, parts	9343	
	Vehicule/rail/tramway parts	7460	
	Edible vegetables, roots, herbs	14694	
	Cereals	31302	
	Salt, sulphur, earth, stone, etc	7086	
	Inorganic chem., metal compounds	3209	
	Fertiliser	4610	
	Plastic and articles thereof	2398	
	Rubber and articles thereof	2930	
	Paper, paperboard	38357	
	Iron and Steel	2098	
	Copper and articles thereof	4900	
	Aluminum and articles thereof	4792	
	Machinery, parts	9504	
	Electrical machinery, parts	12169	
	Vehicule/rail/tramway parts	10297	

Costa Rica	Paper, paperboard, etc	10122	
	Electrical machinery, parts	3243	22937
Cuba	Fish and crustaceans, etc	2277	
	Dairy products, etc	4906	
	Edible vegetables, roots, herbs	5938	
	Cereals	94301	
	Mill industry products, malt, etc	9183	
	Salt, sulphur, earth, stone, etc	6360	
	Misc chemical products	3383	
	Paper, board, pulp, etc	4861	
	Articles of iron/steel	2581	
	Machinery, parts	2183	
	Electrical machinery, parts, etc	4912	
	Furniture, bedding, mattresses, etc	2096	154024
Dominican Republic	Fish and crustaceans, etc	11095	
	Mill industry, malt, etc	3567	
	Plastic and articles thereof	2284	
	Paper, board, pulp, etc	9764	
	Appliances, boilers, machinery, etc	9376	
	Electrical machinery	8694	61611
Ecuador	Paper/paperboard, pulp	6576	
	Textile fabric	2418	
	Iron, steel	2267	
	Aluminum and articles thereof	3735	
	Zinc and articles thereof	2065	
	Machinery, parts	4874	34205
El Salvador	Paper, paperboard, pulp, etc	4374	11212
Guatemala	Dairy produce, eggs, honey, etc	3792	
	Paper, board, pulp, etc	7041	21113
Haiti	Fish and crustaceans, etc	6514	
	Paper, board, pulp, etc	2024	
	Cotton	2211	
	Electrical machinery, parts, etc	2025	19389
Honduras	Fertiliser	2461	
	Paper, board, pulp, etc	6583	14595
Mexico	Live animals	10137	
	Meat and edible meal	17693	
	Fish and crustaceans	2489	
	Dairy products, eggs, honey, etc	46404	
	Edible vegetables, roots, herbs	7093	
	Cereals	5170	
	Oilseed, fruits, grain, etc	59772	
	Salt, sulphur, earth, stone, etc	41034	
	Ores, slag and ash	3846	
	Fertiliser	2107	
	Plastic and articles thereof	4492	
	Rubber and articles thereof	8415	
	Wood pulp, waste, etc	23819	
	Paper, paperboard	13543	
	Man-made staple fibers	2846	
	Pearls, precious stones and metals	2858	
	Iron and steel	71324	
	Articles of iron or steel	20627	

	Boilers, machinery, appliances, etc	63495	
	Electrical machinery, parts, etc	38296	
	Vehicule/rail/tramway, parts	71552	
	Aircraft and parts	40119	
	Optical, photo, cine, etc.	3405	603098
Nicaragua	Boilers, machinery, appliances, parts	3237	
	Electrical machinery, parts, etc	3634	20820
Panama	Printed books, newspapers, etc	3017	16912
Paraguay	Total	1639	
Peru	Dairy products, edible products	7760	
	Cereals	2363	
	Paper, paperboard, etc	6517	
	Textile fabric	5512	
	Machinery, parts	9024	
	Electrical machinery, parts, etc	5070	
	Vehicule/rail/tramway, parts	6382	56629
Uruguay	Edible vegetables, roots, herbs	2451	
	Salt, sulphur, earth, tools	2239	
	Pearls, stones, metals, coin	13222	
	Paper, paperboard, pulp	3359	25921
Venezuela	Edible vegetables, roots, herbs	8732	
	Cereals	15894	
	Fertilisers	2825	
	Plastics and articles thereof	2285	
	Rubber and articles thereof	4684	
	Wood pulp, waste, etc	32675	
	Paper, paper pulp, etc	39103	
	Man-made filaments	4279	
	Textile fabric	2981	
	Machinery, parts	20048	
	Electrical machinery, parts	2831	155100

Source: "Summary of Canadian International Trade", January 1990.

Bibliography

- Aguilera, Gabriel, El fusil y el olivo, San José, FLACSO, 1989.
- Alvarez, Jorge. Las Guerras civiles, Buenos Aires, Ateneo, 1975.
- Apuleyo, Mendoza ,Plinio. Zonas de fuego, Bogotá, Intermedio, 1989.
- Arciniegas, German. O.E.A.: La Suerte de una organización regional, Bogotá, Planeta, 1985.
- Avila, Bernal, Corrupción y expoliación en América latina, Bogotá, Grijalbo, 1988.
- Bean, Frank D. et al. Eds., Mexican and Central American Population and U.S. Immigration Policy, University of Texas Press, 1987.
- Best, Edward. U.S. Policy and Regional Security in Central America, London, IISS/Gower, 1987.
- Bidegain de Urán, Ana Maria, Nacionalismo, militarismo e dominação na América Latina, Petrópolis, Vozes, 1987.
- Black, Jan Knippers. Sentinels of Empire, New York, Greenwood, 1986.
- Blanchard, Peter and Peter Landstreet. Human Rights in Latin America and the Caribbean, Toronto, Canadian Scholars' Press, 1989.
- Bradford, Colin I. and Caroline Pestieau. Canada and Latin America: The Potential for Partnership, Toronto, CALA, 1971.
- Branco, Robert J., The United States and Brazil, Washington, National Defense University Press, 1984.
- Burr, Robert N. By Reason or Force, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1974.
- Burns, Jimmy, The Land that Lost its Heroes, London, Blansberry, 1987.
- Canada. Employment and Immigration Canada, Annual Reports 1981-1989.
- Canada. "Exports by Country: January-December 1989", Ottawa, Statistics Canada, 1990.

Canada. House of Commons. "Minutes of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and Defence, Ottawa, 9 November 1989.

Canada. Royal Canadian Mounted Police, "National Drug Intelligence Estimate 1988/1989", Ottawa, 1990.

Proença, Maria Candida, A Independencia do Brasil, Lisbon, Horizonte, 1987.

Chonchol, Jacques. "Land Tenure and Development in Latin America", in Claudio Veliz, Obstacles to Change in Latin America, London, Oxford University Press, 1965.

Comblin, Joseph. Le Pouvoir militaire en Amérique latine, Paris, Delarge, 1977.

Del Olmo, Rosa. Los Discursos de la droga, La Paz, HISBOL, 1989.

Deustua, Alejandro, El Narcotráfico y el interés nacional, Lima, CEPEI, 1987.

Dosman, Edgar J., "Latin America and the Caribbean. The Strategic Framework - a Canadian Perspective", Ottawa, Department of National Defence, 1984, ORAE Extra-Mural Paper No.31.

English, Adrian, The Armed Forces of Latin America, London, Jane's, 1984.

Eguizábal, Cristina, América latina y la crisis centroamericana: en busca de una solución regional, Buenos Aires, Latino americano, 1988.

Ewell, Judith, Venezuela: A Century of Change, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1984.

Fauriol, Georges. Latin American Insurgencies, Washington, National Defense University, 1985.

Finer, S.E., The Man on Horseback, Boulder, Westview, 1988.

Finlayson, Jock A. "Canada as a Strategic Mineral Importer: The Problematical Minerals", in D.G. Haglund (Ed.), The New Geopolitics of Minerals, Vancouver, University of British Columbia Press, 1989.

Gamba, Virginia, El Péon de la Reina, Buenos Aires, Sudamericana, 1984.

Garcia Sayán, Diego (Ed.). Coca, cocaína y narcotráfico: Laberinto en los Andes, Lima, Comisión andina de juristas, 1989.

Gilmore, Robert L., Caudillism and Militarism in Venezuela 1810-1910, Athens, Ohio University Press, 1964.

Granatstein, J.L., How Britain's Weakness Forced Canada into the Arms of the US, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1989.

Guglielmelli, Juan E. "¿Y si Brasil fabrica la bomba atómica?", Estrategia, No. 34-5, May-August 1975, pp.5-21.

Guillen Guillen, Edmundo, Visión peruana de la conquista, Lima, Milla Batres, 1979.

Hassig, Ross, Aztec Warfare, Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1988.

Hertoghe, Alain and Alain Labrousse, Le sentier lumineux du Pérou, Paris, Découverte, 1989.

Humphreys, R.A. and John Lynch. The Origins of the Latin American Revolutions 1808-1826, New York, Knopf, 1965.

International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance, (Years 1975, 1984, 1985, 1989-1990), London, IISS and Brassey's.

Johnson, John, J., The Military in Society in Latin America., Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1964.

Klepak, H.P. and G.K. Vachon. "A Strategic and Economic Analysis of Canadian National Interests in Latin America", Ottawa, Operational Research and Analysis Establishment, 1978.

Klepak, H.P., "The Applicability of the Sinai Model to Central American Peace Initiatives", in B.S. Mandell (Ed.) Back to the Future: Lessons from Experience for Regional Arms Control and Verification, Ottawa, Carleton, 1989, pp. 99-118.

_____, "The Argentine Army since the Falklands War", in Armed Forces, IV, 8, August 1985, pp. 293-295.

_____, "The Armed Forces of Guatemala", in Armed Forces, IV, 11 November 1985, pp. 416-418.

_____, "L'impact du conflit de basse intensité sur les forces armées de l'Amérique Centrale", in Jean Pariseau (Ed.), ACTA, Ottawa, 1988.

_____, "Menaces à la paix internationale en Amérique latine", in Études internationales, VII, 3, septembre 1976, pp. 393-410.

_____, "A Military Retreat from Politics in Latin America", Armed Forces, V, 11, November 1986.

_____, "Obstacles to Peace in Central America", Ottawa, CIIPS Occasional Paper, to be published autumn, 1990.

_____, "Potential Regional Strategic Considerations Regarding Nuclear Proliferation in Latin America", Ottawa, Operational REsearch and Analysis Establishment, Project Report 57, November 1975.

_____, "Security Considerations and Verification of a Central American Arms Control Region", Ottawa, Department of External Affairs and International Trade, Arms Control Verification Occasional Paper No. 5, August 1990.

_____, Verification of a Central American Peace Accord, Ottawa, Department of External Affairs, Arms Control Verification Occasional Paper No.2, 1989.

Lafeber, Walter. Inevitable Revolutions, New York, Norton, 1983.

Legault, Albert and Michel Fortmann. Une diplomatie de l'espoir, Québec, Laval, 1989.

Lipset, S.M. and A. Solari, Elites in Latin America, London, Oxford University Press, 1967.

Littuma, Alfonso, Doctrina de seguridad nacional, Caracas, Min-defensa, 1966.

López, Ernesto, Seguridad nacional y sedición militar, Buenos Aires, Legasa, 1987.

MacDonald, Brian (Ed.) Canada, the Caribbean and Central America, Toronto, Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies, 1986.

McFarlane, Peter. Northern Shadows: Canadians and Central America, Toronto, Between the Lines, 1989.

Mandell, Brian S., (Ed.) Back to the Future: Lessons from Experience for Regional Arms Control and Verification, Ottawa, Carleton, 1989.

Martínez, Leopoldo. La intervención norteamericana en México 1846-1848, Mexico, Panorama, 1989.

Martínez, Orlando. The Great Landgrab, London, Quartet, 1975.

Mercado Jarrin, Edgardo. Un Sistema de seguridad y defensa sudamericano, Lima, CONCYTEC, 1989.

Middlebrook, Martin. The Fight for the Falklands, London, Viking, 1989.

Mörner, Magnus, Race and Class in Latin America, New York Columbia University Press, 1970.

Morris, M.A. and Victor Millán. Controlling Latin America Conflict: Ten Approaches, Boulder, Westview, 1986.

Noel Moral, Roberto C., Ayacucho: Testimonio de un soldado, Lima, Publinor, 1989.

Nogueira Batista, Paulo, "A política nuclear do Brasil: um programa em marcha", A Defesa Nacional, 2, 1977, pp. 185-198.

North, Liisa, Between War and Peace in Central America: Choices for Canada, Toronto, Between the Lines, 1990.

Nunn, Frederick. Yesterday's Soldiers, Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1985.

Ogelsby, J.C.M. Gringos from the Far North, Toronto, MacMillan, 1976.

P. Lock, "Brazil: Arms for Export, in M. Brzoska and Thomson Ohlson (Eds.) Arms Production in the Third World, London, Tayler and Francis, 1986, pp. 79-104.

Patterson, Franklin, "The Guatemalan Military and the Escuela politécnica", in Armed Forces and Society, XIV, 3, 1988, pp. 359-390.

Pearce, Jenny. Colombia: Inside the Labyrinth, London, Latin American Bureau, 1990.

Phelps, Gilbert. Tragedy of Paraguay, London, Charles Knight, 1975.

Portales, Carlos, "Seguridad regional en Sudamérica. Escenarios prospectivos", in Augusto Varas (Ed.), Paz, desarme y desarrollo en América latina.

Querejazu Calvo, Roberto, Historia de la guerra del Chaco, La Paz, Juventud, 1990.

Queuille, Pierre. L'Amérique latine, la doctrine Monroe et le panaméricanisme, Paris, Payot, 1969.

Robinson, Alan, "La conexión mexicana", in América Economía, IV, 40, June 1990, pp. 10-14.

Rouquié, Alain. Amérique latine: Introduction à l'Extrême Occident, Paris, Seuil, 1987.

Rubinstein, Juan Carlos (Ed.), El Estado periférico latino americano, Buenos Aires, Universitaria, 1988.

Schaefer, Jürgen, Deutsche Militärhilfe an Südamerika: Militär- und Rüstungsiutevessen in Argentinien, Bolivien, Chile vor 1914, Düsseldorf, Bertelsmann Universitätsverlag, 1974.

Schooley, Helen. Conflict in Central America, London, Longman, 1990.

Schoultz, Lars. National Security and United States Policy toward Latin America, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1987.

Scobie, James, Argentina: A City and a Nation, New York, Oxford University Press, 1971.

Shearman, Peter and Phil Williams. The Superpowers, Central America and the Middle East, London, Brassey's, 1988.

Silva-Michelena, José (Ed.). Latin America: Peace, Democratization and Economic Crisis, London, Zed Books, 1988.

Skidmore, Thomas E., The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil 1964-1985, New-York, Oxford University Press, 1988.

Smith, Wayne S. The Closest of Enemies, New York, Norton, 1987.

Stepan, Alfred, Rethinking Military Politics, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1988.

Stubbs, Jean, Cuba: The Test of Time, London, Latin American, 1989.

Thomas, Hugh, Cuba, or the Pursuit of Freedom, London, Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1971.

Torres Rivas, Edelberto, Crisis del poder en Centroamérica, San José, EDUCA, 1983.

Varas, Augusto, Paz, desarme y desarrollo en América latina, Buenos Aires, Latinoamericano, 1987.

Varas, Augusto (Ed.) La Autonomía militar en América Latina, Caracas, Nueva Sociedad, 1988.

Veliz, Claudio, Obstacles to Change in Latin America, London, Oxford University Press, 1965.

Veneroni, Horacio L. Estados Unidos y las fuerzas armadas de América latina, Buenos Aires, Periferia, 1973.

Verbitsky, Horacio, Medio siglo de proclamas militares, Buenos Aires, Editora 12, 1989.

Younger, Coletta, and John Walsh, "La Guerra contra las drogas en los Andes: una política mal encanimada", in D. García-Sayán (Ed.), Coca, cocaína y narcotráfico, Comisión andina de juristas, 1989.

Magazines and Newspapers

"El Espectador", Bogota

"Boletín Informativo Honduras", Tegucigalpa, September 1990

"CAPA Memo", Toronto, February 1990

"Jane's Defence Weekly", London, October 1990

"El Gráfico", Guatemala, December 1988 and June 1990

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF FORM
(highest classification of Title, Abstract, Keywords)

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall document is classified)

1. ORIGINATOR (the name and address of the organization preparing the document. Organizations for whom the document was prepared, e.g. Establishment sponsoring a contractor's report, or tasking agency, are entered in Section 8.)		2. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (overall security classification of the document, including special warning terms if applicable)	
D Strat A, ORAE, NDHQ, Ottawa, Ont K1A 0K2		UNCLASSIFIED	
3. TITLE (the complete document title as indicated on the title page. Its classification should be indicated by the appropriate abbreviation (S,C or U) in parentheses after the title.) Canada and Latin America: Strategic Issues for the 1990s Extra-Mural Paper 54			
4. AUTHORS (Last name, first name, middle initial) H.P. Klepak			
5. DATE OF PUBLICATION (month and year of publication of document) December 1990	6a. NO. OF PAGES (total containing information. Include Annexes, Appendices, etc.) 246	6b. NO. OF REFS (total cited in document)	
7. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (the category of the document, e.g. technical report, technical note or memorandum. If appropriate, enter the type of report, e.g. interim, progress, summary, annual or final. Give the inclusive dates when a specific reporting period is covered.) ORAE Extra-Mural Paper (EMP) Number 54			
8. SPONSORING ACTIVITY (the name of the department project office or laboratory sponsoring the research and development. Include the address.) Directorate of Strategic Analysis			
9a. PROJECT OR GRANT NO. (if appropriate, the applicable research and development project or grant number under which the document was written. Please specify whether project or grant)		9b. CONTRACT NO. (if appropriate, the applicable number under which the document was written)	
10a. ORIGINATOR'S DOCUMENT NUMBER (the official document number by which the document is identified by the originating activity. This number must be unique to this document.) EMP 54		10b. OTHER DOCUMENT NOS. (Any other numbers which may be assigned this document either by the originator or by the sponsor)	
11. DOCUMENT AVAILABILITY (any limitations on further dissemination of the document, other than those imposed by security classification) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Unlimited distribution <input type="checkbox"/> Distribution limited to defence departments and defence contractors; further distribution only as approved <input type="checkbox"/> Distribution limited to defence departments and Canadian defence contractors; further distribution only as approved <input type="checkbox"/> Distribution limited to government departments and agencies; further distribution only as approved <input type="checkbox"/> Distribution limited to defence departments; further distribution only as approved <input type="checkbox"/> Other (please specify):			
12. DOCUMENT ANNOUNCEMENT (any limitation to the bibliographic announcement of this document. This will normally correspond to the Document Availability (11). However, where further distribution (beyond the audience specified in 11) is possible, a wider announcement audience may be selected.) Nil			

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF FORM

DD03 2/06/87

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF FORM

13. ABSTRACT (a brief and factual summary of the document. It may also appear elsewhere in the body of the document itself. It is highly desirable that the abstract of classified documents be unclassified. Each paragraph of the abstract shall begin with an indication of the security classification of the information in the paragraph (unless the document itself is unclassified) represented as (S), (C), or (U). It is not necessary to include here abstracts in both official languages unless the text is bilingual).

14. KEYWORDS, DESCRIPTORS or IDENTIFIERS (technically meaningful terms or short phrases that characterize a document and could be helpful in cataloguing the document. They should be selected so that no security classification is required. Identifiers, such as equipment model designation, trade name, military project code name, geographic location may also be included. If possible keywords should be selected from a published thesaurus. e.g. Thesaurus of Engineering and Scientific Terms (TEST) and that thesaurus-identified. If it is not possible to select indexing terms which are Unclassified, the classification of each should be indicated as with the title.)

- Latin America
- Organization of American states
- security relationships
- Central America
- International Economics
- Collective Security

